Jason Eberl

Pieper follows a philosophical tradition set down by Plato, who bears only a superficial relationship to Plato's Stepchildren (TOS) Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas, all of whom could find some affinity with Star Trek and other sci‐fi/fantasy adventures that tell a good morality tale or stretch the limits of human imagination. Aristotle points out, humans, as rational animals, isn't satisfied with mere pleasure seeking, but is driven to reflect upon the limitless possibilities of existence. The value of festive pursuits during higher times is grounded in the connection between human and divine minds. Socrates set the standard for communal and individual self‐exploration when he emphatically said that the unexamined life is not worth living. Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is not only speculative in nature, encompassing scientific and theoretical reasoning, but also practical, that is, technical and ethical reasoning.

Galen designed the Death Star's primary weapon with knowledge of how to manipulate kyber crystals to enhance energy output. Utilitarian ethics would likely conclude that Galen did the right thing, ultimately saving many more lives than those lost and helping to free the galaxy from the Empire's tyranny. This chapter examines how a utilitarian – concerned with the best overall outcome – and a deontologist – concerned with our fundamental moral duties – would evaluate Galen's choice to cooperate with the Empire. It also examines a potential justification for his serving both the Empire and the Rebel Alliance that may help us to navigate such complex moral dilemmas. Careful analysis of the conditions of moral complicity justifies Galen's collusion so long as he had a reasonable expectation that the Death Star would've been completed anyway, and that there was a reasonable hope of success in its ultimate destruction.

Traditional Christian theism holds that God is both transcendent and immanent, meaning that God exists wholly outside of the created universe, outside of space and time, yet interacts with the created universe in myriad ways. Divinizing the world in this way constitutes pantheism – the thesis that God is everywhere, in everything, and does not exist outside of the universe in any fashion. Thus L'Osservatore Romano's central criticism of Avatar is that this film “shows a spiritualism linked to the worship of nature, a fashionable pantheism in which creator and creation are mixed up.” This chapter discribes the three aspects of the Christian worldview: the variety of beings as a manifestation of God's nature in the created universe; the interrelated and interdependent nature of the elements and creatures that comprise the biosphere; and the inherent goodness of allowing beings of all types to flourish in their essential natures.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle argues that human beings are not born with inclinations toward either virtue or vice; rather, each person's moral character traits are cultivated through a combination of social influence and individual rational choice. Sons of Anarchy relies on our fascination with “anti‐heroes,” morally ambiguous protagonists for whom we often cheer. Aristotle stresses the importance of the right environment for becoming virtuous, especially when it comes to children. Far from being pure, the SAMCROpolis tends to nurture both virtues and vices in its “citizens.”. Part of the show's appeal stems from recognizing the members of SAMCRO as kindred spirits who exemplify‐albeit to dramatic extremes‐the mixture of virtue and vice found in every human being's moral character. The particular mix of virtue and vice that comprises Jax's moral character may, in the end, be exactly what SAMCRO needs at this moment in its history.

The hosts in Westworld can not feel pain or suffering; nevertheless, they exhibit behaviors when they're shot or otherwise abused that mimic how humans act when in pain or suffering. It is evident that Westworld has apparently evolved into a world of persons versus persons, each seeking to write their own self‐narratives and, in the process, pursuing dominance in order to flourish – recall Nietzsche's concept of the fundamental “will to power”. An artificial reality like Westworld can indeed be an appropriate environment in which moral agents exercise habitual actions that result in the cultivation of persistent character traits, whether virtuous or vicious. Westworld provided an environment in which Bernard William was able to realize his own personhood by freeing him from the moral constraints of the real world and the narrative that had been largely written for him by others in his early life.

This chapter examines the theodicy offered by the Christian philosopher and theologian, St. Augustine of Hippo. This examination of Augustine's theodicy explains the nature of the dark side of the Force to which Anakin succumbed. The chapter first explains Augustine's view of evil and how it relates to good. Like Luke, Augustine argues that moral evil, that is, evil done intentionally by a person is solely the fault of that person. For Augustine, the fault is found in the misuse of a person's God‐given free will. The chapter examines this theodicy through the lens of two heroic Jedi who fall from grace: Anakin Skywalker and his grandson, Jacen. It shows how Augustine's view of the nature and relationship between good and evil opens up the possibility of Anakin's eventual redemption.

Abstract:This symposium includes thirteen personal narratives from people who have received at least one organ transplant from a living or deceased donor. These narratives foster better understanding of the experiences of life-saving organ recipients and their families, including post-transplant difficulties experienced—sometimes requiring multiple transplants. This issue also includes three commentaries by Macey L. Levan, Heather Lannon, and Vidya Fleetwood, Roslyn B. Mannon & Krista L. Lentine. Dr. Levan is a living kidney donor and associate professor of surgery and population health. She writes and teaches on organ transplant and has expertise and experience in governance at the federal level as a member of the board of directors for the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Dr. Lannon is a social worker and transplant advocate. Her work and interest in the topic were inspired by her husband who needed a heart transplant. Dr. Fleetwood is a surgeon specializing in liver transplantation, pancreas transplantation, kidney transplantation, as well as living donor nephrectomy. Dr. Mannon is a nephrologist and professor of medicine, pathology and microbiology. Her work focuses on understanding and improving long-term kidney transplant outcomes for patients, donors, and caregivers. Dr. Lentine is a nephrologist specializing in treatment of adult patients with kidney disease. She is a researcher and co-chaired the international work group that developed guidelines for living donor kidney transplantation.

Recent debate among bioethicists concerns the potential to enhance human beings’ physical or cognitive capacities by means of genetic, pharmacological, cybernetic, or surgical interventions. Between “transhumanists,” who argue for unreserved enhancement of human capabilities, and “bioconservatives,” who warn against any non-therapeutic manipulation of humanity’s natural condition, lie those who support limited forms of enhancement for the sake of individual and collective human flourishing. Many scholars representing these views also share a concern over the status and interests of human beings with various types of cognitive and physical disabilities, some of which may be ameliorable by enhancement interventions. The question addressed in this paper is whether valuing the enhancement of human capabilities may be reconciled with valuing the existence and phenomenological experiences of human beings with various disabilities. Can we value enhanced capabilities without disvaluing those whose capabilities fall below a defined threshold of “normal function”? Furthermore, if certain forms of disability, particularly cognitive disabilities, negatively impact one’s flourishing, could the enhancement of one’s cognitive capacities through biotechnological means enhance one’s flourishing.

The questions of whether there is a shared nature common to all human beings and, if so, what essential qualities define this nature are among the most widely discussed topics in the history of philosophy and remain the subject of perennial interest and controversy. This book offers a metaphysical investigation of the composition of the human essence-that is, with what is a human being identical or what types of parts are necessary for a human being to exist: an immaterial mind, a physical body, a functioning brain, a soul? It also considers the criterion of identity for a human being across time and change-that is, what is required for a human being to continue existing as a person despite undergoing physical and psychological changes over time? Jason Eberl's investigation presents and defends a theoretical perspective from the thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas. Advancing beyond descriptive historical analysis, this book places Aquinas's account of human nature into direct comparison with several prominent contemporary theories: substance dualism, emergentism, animalism, constitutionalism, four-dimensionalism, and embodied mind theory. There are practical implications of exploring these theories as they inform various conclusions regarding when human beings first come into existence-at conception, during gestation, or after birth-and how we ought to define death for human beings. Finally, each of these viewpoints offers a distinctive rationale as to whether, and if so how, human beings may survive death. This book's central argument is that the Thomistic account of human nature includes several desirable features that other theories lack and offers a cohesive portrait of one's continued existence from conception through life to death and beyond.

This third brand-new 'Star Wars & Philosophy' title once again takes a fresh look at the franchise with all-new chapters. The focus of this volume is the more recent entries into the franchise, including hit TV shows such as THe Mandalorian. Modern applied philosophy is also used to analyse the Star Wars universe: In addition to thorny metaphysical questions about the nature of time and free will, this volume highlights the staggering cultural impact of George Lucas's universe. The newest Star Wars narratives tackle ethnicity on alien worlds and how love and sex with a droid like L3-37 would work ("It works"). The connections between the Separatist Freedom Movement and the struggle for social justice in the USA in the 21st century are brought to light. And philosophical second looks at Rian Johnson's The Last Jedi prove there is much more to this controversial entry in the Skywalker saga.

Many Catholics have expressed hesitancy or resistance to being vaccinated for COVID-19, with magisterial authorities and influential Catholic organizations advocating divergent views regarding the moral liceity of the vaccines, the justification of vaccination mandates, and whether such mandates should include religious exemptions. We address each of these disputed points and argue that vaccination for COVID-19 falls within the definition of being an ordinary—and thereby morally obligatory—treatment. To that end, we offer a brief overview of the Catholic moral tradition regarding the development of the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment, show how the Church morally evaluates vaccination as a good act, and underline the importance of positive witnessing in supporting vaccination.

A surgical head-transplant technique, HEAVEN, promises to offer significantly improved quality of life for quadriplegics and others whose minds are functional, but whose bodies require artificial support to continue living. HEAVEN putatively actualizes a thought-experiment long debated by philosophers concerning the definition of personhood and criterion of personal identity through time and change. HEAVEN’s advocates presume to preserve the identity of the person whose head is transplanted onto another’s living body, leaving one’s previous body behind as one would their corpse. Various classical and contemporary theories of personhood and personal identity would support this presumption, while others would contest it as providing an accurate or complete view of what is essential for a human person to persist through this procedure. This paper brings such theories to bear in analyzing whether HEAVEN can indeed deliver on its promise of complete ontological survival for the person whose head is transplanted.

Transhumanism is an ideology that embraces the use of various forms of biotechnology to enhance human beings toward the emergence of a “posthuman” kind. In this article, I contrast some of the foundational tenets of Transhumanism with those of Christianity, primarily focusing on their respective anthropologies—that is, their diverse understandings of whether there is an essential nature shared by all human persons and, if so, whether certain features of human nature may be intentionally altered in ways that contribute toward how each views human flourishing. A central point of difference concerns Transhumanists’ aim of attaining “substrate independence” for the human mind, such that one’s consciousness could be uploaded into a cybernetic environment. Christian anthropology, on the other hand, considers embodiment, with its characteristics of vulnerability and finitude, to be an essential feature of human nature—hence, Christians’ belief in bodily resurrection. Despite Christianity and Transhumanism having fundamental differences, I contend that Christians may support moderate forms of enhancement oriented toward supporting our flourishing as living, sentient, social, and rational animals.

The advent of current and emerging biotechnologies has placed greater levels of control in the hands of parentsParents and prospective parentsParents to shape their children’s physical, cognitiveCognitive, and emotive traits. Ethical questions initially formulated around the selection of embryos or fetuses that have certain desirable versus undesirable traits are now being applied, alongside novel questions, to whether parentsParents have an ethical obligationObligation, or at least a rightRight, to enhance their children to endow them with traits they would not naturally possess. This chapter elucidates how the ethics of enhancementEnhancement have developed, yet differ in important ways, from the ethics of selection. It then canvasses three primary ethical questions regarding enhancementEnhancement: whether parentsParents have an ethical obligationObligation to enhance their children when it is safe, effective, and feasible for them to do so; if not an obligationObligation, whether parentsParents have a rightRight to enhance their children and how their exercise of such a rightRight may alter the nature of the parentParents/child relationship; and what wider societal concerns might mitigate against such a parental rightRight or obligationObligation, at least not without significant socioeconomic restructuring. While this chapter is focused on specific ethical questions raised by the prospect of parentsParents making enhancementEnhancement choices on behalf of their born or preborn children, the conclusion highlights how such questions arise within a wider debate concerning whether biotechnological forms of human enhancementEnhancement should be freely allowed, universally restricted, or permitted on a limited basis for specific traits and purposes.

In debates over issues such as abortion, a primary principle on which the Roman Catholic outlook is based is the natural law mandate to respect human life rooted in the Aristotelian philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. This principle, however, is limited by focusing on the obligation not to kill innocent humans and thereby neglects another important facet of the Aristotelian-Thomistic ethical viewpoint—namely, obligations that bind human beings in relationships of mutual dependence and responsibility. I argue that there is a need to cultivate a “virtue of acknowledged responsibility” and conclude by addressing a prevalent issue in contemporary society: absent paternal responsibility. My aim is to show that there is an interesting and often neglected rationale in Catholic moral understanding for “deadbeat dad” laws that compel men to take responsibility for any children or fetuses they father and to assist women who give birth to those children or carry those fetuses.