• Rigidity and Content
    In Richard G. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford University Press. 1997.
  •  6
    Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-Order Logic
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (8): 416-424. 1993.
    I n "The Skeleton in Frege's Cupboard," Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandul argue that "Frege's failure to grasp the idea of the standard interpretation of higher-order logic turns his entire foundational project into a hopeless daydream" (315). We examine the grounds for what we take to be the central thesis of their paper, that "Frege is inextricably committed to a nonstandard interpretation" of higher-order logic (310) and argue that Hintikka and Sandu present no compelling evidence in favor o…Read more
  •  1864
    Knowing How
    Journal of Philosophy 98 (8): 411-444. 2001.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
  •  521
    Modality And What Is Said
    Noûs 36 (s16): 321-344. 2002.
    If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is necessarily true, then what it says must be so. If, relative to a context, what a sentence says is possible, then what it says could be true. Following natural philosophical usage, it would thus seem clear that in assessing an occurrence of a sentence for possibility or necessity, one is assessing what is said by that occurrence. In this paper, I argue that natural philosophical usage misleads here. In assessing an occurrence of a sentence for p…Read more
  • Ideology: New Essays (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  13
    Is Epistemology Tainted?
    Disputatio 8 (42): 1-35. 2016.
    Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most saliently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.
  •  64
    How Propaganda Works, Precis
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 470-474. 2018.
  •  37
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2): 497-511. 2018.
  •  12
    Quantifiers and context-dependence
    with Alonso Church
    Analysis 55 (4): 291. 1995.
  •  83
    Precis of How Propaganda Works
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (3): 287-294. 2016.
    Precis by the autor of the book How Propaganda Works.Sinopsis del autor del libro How Propaganda Works.
  •  110
    Knowledge, Habit, Practice, Skill
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement): 315-323. 2015.
  •  296
    Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions
    Analysis 65 (2): 126-131. 2005.
    Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.
  •  106
    Truth and Metatheory in Frege
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1). 1996.
    In this paper it is contended, against a challenging recent interpretation of Frege, that Frege should be credited with the first semirigorous formulation of semantic theory. It is argued that the considerations advanced against this contention suffer from two kinds of error. The first involves the attribution to Frege of a skeptical attitude towards the truth-predicate. The second involves the sort of justification which these arguments assume a classical semantic theory attempts to provide. Fi…Read more
  •  451
    On 'Average'
    with Christopher Kennedy
    Mind 118 (471). 2009.
    This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the worl…Read more
  •  98
    In the Twentieth Century, Logic and Philosophy of Language are two of the few areas of philosophy in which philosophers made indisputable progress. For example, even now many of the foremost living ethicists present their theories as somewhat more explicit versions of the ideas of Kant, Mill, or Aristotle. In contrast, it would be patently absurd for a contemporary philosopher of language or logician to think of herself as working in the shadow of any figure who died before the Twentieth Century…Read more
  •  137
    On a Case for Truth‐Relativism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1): 179-188. 2016.
  •  279
    Knowledge and Practical Interests
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodolog…Read more
  •  413
    Context and logical form
    Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (4): 391--434. 2000.
    In this paper, I defend the thesis that alleffects of extra-linguistic context on thetruth-conditions of an assertion are traceable toelements in the actual syntactic structure of thesentence uttered. In the first section, I develop thethesis in detail, and discuss its implications for therelation between semantics and pragmatics. The nexttwo sections are devoted to apparent counterexamples.In the second section, I argue that there are noconvincing examples of true non-sentential assertions.In t…Read more
  •  71
    Replies to Dickie, Schroeder and Stalnaker (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3): 762-778. 2012.
  •  83
    Précis of knowledge and practical interests (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.
    Our intuitions about whether someone knows that p vary even fixing the intuitively epistemic features of that person’s situation. Sometimes they vary with features of our own situation, and sometimes they vary with features of the putative knower’s situation. If the putative knower is in a risky situation and her belief that p is pivotal in achieving a positive outcome of one of the actions available to her, or avoiding a negative one, we often feel she must be in a particularly good epistemic p…Read more
  •  27
    Context and Logical Form
    In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, Broadview Press. pp. 316. 2013.
  •  824
    Hermeneutic fictionalism
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.
    Fictionalist approaches to ontology have been an accepted part of philosophical methodology for some time now. On a fictionalist view, engaging in discourse that involves apparent reference to a realm of problematic entities is best viewed as engaging in a pretense. Although in reality, the problematic entities do not exist, according to the pretense we engage in when using the discourse, they do exist. In the vocabulary of Burgess and Rosen (1997, p. 6), a nominalist construal of a given discou…Read more
  •  20
    Thoughts and Utterances
    Mind and Language 20 (3): 364-368. 2005.
  •  93
    Reply to Hintikka and Sandu: Frege and Second-Order Logic
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (8): 416-424. 1993.
    Hintikka and Sandu had argued that 'Frege's failure to grasp the idea of the standard interpretation of higher-order logic turns his entire foundational project into a hopeless daydream' and that he is 'inextricably committed to a non-standard interpretation' of higher-order logic. We disagree.
  •  407
    On the linguistic basis for contextualism
    Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 119-146. 2004.
    Contextualism in epistemology is the doctrine that the proposition expressed by a knowledge attribution relative to a context is determined in part by the standards of justification salient in that context. The (non-skeptical) contextualist allows that in some context c, a speaker may truly attribute knowledge at a time of a proposition p to Hannah, despite her possession of only weak inductive evidence for the truth of that proposition. Relative to another context, someone may make the very sam…Read more