•  91
    Conspiracy Theories and Fortuitous Data
    with J. Buenting
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (4): 567-578. 2010.
    We offer a particularist defense of conspiratorial thinking. We explore the possibility that the presence of a certain kind of evidence—what we call "fortuitous data"—lends rational credence to conspiratorial thinking. In developing our argument, we introduce conspiracy theories and motivate our particularist approach (§1). We then introduce and define fortuitous data (§2). Lastly, we locate an instance of fortuitous data in one real world conspiracy, the Watergate scandal (§3)
  •  3
    Fortuitous Data and Conspiracy Theories
    Journal of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. forthcoming.
  •  39
    Dis-unified pluralist accounts of causation
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3): 388-401. 2009.
    One way of assessing the philosophical literature on causation is to consider views on the nature of the causal relation. Early theorists were 'monists', taking there to be one causal relation. More recent theorists, however, have turned to pluralism, which holds that the causal relation is only accurately captured by two (or more) relations. I argue that one way of being a pluralist – the way which takes there to be exactly two types of causation – is self defeating, if it promises to handle in…Read more