Jasper Doomen

In order to recognize the interests of individuals who may be affected by the expressions of others, individuals’ own judgment of what constitutes ‘harm’ should be decisive. This does not mean that freedom of expression should on that basis potentially be reduced to nothing, for individuals may be expected to ignore certain expressions that harm them. Acknowledging the difficulty of determining the extent of freedom of expression, and the concurrent extent of acceptable harm, an absolute principle is forgone here, and the ignore principle is proposed instead. It dictates that only harm that cannot reasonably be ignored must be accepted.

A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option to explore an alternative, semantic, solution remains open. This proposed solution is focused on what the liar paradox expresses and what it fails to express.

Religious Ideas in Liberal Democratic States adds new context to the ongoing debate over the scope of religious freedom, drawing from a variety of perspectives to discuss the meaning of religion itself within a democratic state. This book argues that categorizing religion as a solely private affair is too narrow an interpretation and questions whether ideas like freedom, human dignity, and equality can be truly actualized in a neutral and secular state. The contributors explore the impact of religion, acknowledged or not, on legislation, human rights, and group rights through legal, historical, and sociological lenses--back cover.

This article discusses the status of animal rights, and more particularly whether these rights may be defended from a natural rights perspective or from an ethical perspective. I argue that both options fail. The same analysis applies in the case of mankind. ‘Mankind’ does not bring with it the acknowledgement such rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably characteristic of mankind, namely, reason. Reason is decisive, though, in another respect, namely, the fact that reasonable beings can claim and lay down rights. It does not follow from this that animals should have no rights, since human beings may be motivated to constitute such rights, while this provides the most solid basis for them.

Nihilism poses grave problems for those who seek directives to lead their lives. In this article, the three most important ways to deal with nihilism are inquired, with an emphasis on their credibility. Both nihilism from a metaphysical perspective and the emphasis on pleasure from nihilistic considerations are given attention. The acceptance of nihilism can have far-reaching consequences, which are evaluated at various points. Nietzsche's approach must also be considered. He accepts what he calls a sort of nihilism, but as a means to 'new' values. This alternative to nihilism is examined no less critically than the other two stances.

In this article, Adam Smith’s ethics are explored; it is demanded how tenable some of his conclusions are. § 1 is focused on Smith’s treatment of selfish and non-selfish acts. In § 2, the consequences of the conclusions presented in § 1 for ethics are dealt with, describing Smith’s position and the problems it entails. § 2.3 consists of an attempt to present an alternative for Smith’s theory, in which some of Hobbes’s thoughts are helpful. It appears that Smith’s method is commendable, but some of the consequences of his theory are problematical.

This paper analyses the nature of ethical concepts, views, and theories and inquires in particular to what extent they may be considered religious. The analysis is not limited to the religious aspects of specific religious worldviews (such as Christianity). The concepts ‘good’ and ‘dignity’ are examined as representative examples. This is a meta‐ethical issue, which may profitably be explored by examining the positions of representatives of moral realism, noncognitivism and ethical constructivism. The practical consequences of this inquiry are also discussed; to that end, the meaning of ‘self‐interest’ is explored, and two varieties are introduced, namely, direct and indirect self‐interest.

Darwinism has become an encompassing theory, leaving the confines of science and accounting for all aspects of life. Such an outlook entails important consequences for the evaluation of life. In particular, organisms are considered mere means for species’ preservation and development, while reason is no special faculty, but rather an outgrowth of functions that are rudimentarily present in animals. Darwinism cannot, for that reason, be said to be ‘true’, but if Darwinism is the correct view, the implications for man are grave, no purpose or meaning of life being discernable. Darwinists are accordingly faced with the question why they continue their inquiries.

A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option to explore an alternative, semantic, solution remains open. This proposed solution is focused on what the liar paradox expresses and what it fails to express.

This study explores freedom and equality as necessary constituents of a liberal democratic state. At the same time, equality and freedom conflict in various respects. It is examined how such conflicts may optimally be resolved while taking seriously the interests involved. These inquiries have far-reaching consequences for the justification of the liberal democratic state. Equal rights are generally considered to be an integral part of a liberal democratic state, but on what foundation are such rights based? Various attempts have been made to provide such a foundation from a moral framework. Some important and influential positions are examined critically and an alternative perspective is offered. "Equality" is approached straightforwardly, without appealing to obscure notions while seeking an outcome that may universally be accepted. Rationality is an important feature in this respect. The question to what extent freedom should be allowed to citizens is another important issue. Granting citizens freedom is beneficial for the liberal democratic state as a whole and for citizens themselves. The limits of freedom must, however, be defined carefully. The search for a simple solution is balanced against the need to do the complexities of individual cases justice. In addition, it is not the task of a liberal democratic state to influence people’s convictions concerning equality ; only equal treatment should be guaranteed.

The quest to provide a fundamental understanding and explanation of reality is an ambitious one. Perhaps it is too ambitious. The possible restrictions for suchan enterprise to be successful must be inquired in order to determine the issue. Section 1 explores one’s understanding in reaching (scientific) conclusions: to what extent does a successful account testify to understanding? Section 2 focuses on the other side of such an account: does it provide an explanation in a more fundamental sense than pointing out causes of phenomena, or is it restricted to such a task? A critical attitude vis-à-vis the (scientific) enterprise of unearthing reality’s structure remains necessary in order not to confuse a consistent and productive theory with one that demonstrates an understanding and explanation in the sense of this article.