Javier Anta

In this paper I discuss how to conceptual engineer ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ as they are used in information theory and statistical mechanics. Initially, I evaluate the extent to which the all-pervasive entangled use of entropy and information notions can be somehow defective in these domains, such as being meaningless or generating confusion. Then, I assess the main ameliorative strategies to improve this defective conceptual practice. The first strategy is to substitute the terms ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ by non-loaded terms, as it was first argued by Bar-Hillel in the 1950s. A second strategy is to prescribe how these terms should be correctly used to be meaningful, as it was pioneered by Carnap (Two essays on entropy, University of California Press, 1977) in Two Essays on Entropy. However, the actual implementation of these two ameliorative strategies has been historically unsuccessful due to the low credentials that philosophers as conceptual prescribers have among scientists. Finally, to try to solve these obstacles, I propose a third strategy based on leveraging evidence from the contribution of philosophy as a complementary science or the so-called ‘Philosophy in Science’ (à la Pradeu et al. in Brit J Philos Sci 75:(2):375–416, 2024) to integrate conceptual prescriptions and analyses of entropy and information as part of the scientific practices in which these notions are used.

In this paper, I argue that the history and philosophy of thermodynamics of computation in 1998–2024 has contributed to gain scientific knowledge about Maxwell’s demon and Landauer’s principle, thus successfully implementing Hasok Chang’s model of integrated HPS as complementary science. Here, I distinguish three senses in which this HPS field has contributed epistemically to thermal physics. Firstly, by reopening a closed research programme based on Smoluchowski’s 1912 fluctuation-based exorcism of Maxwell’s demon Norton (2013d) expanded and diversified the knowledge gained by the orthodox informational programme by developing novel arguments, hypotheses, and evidence. Secondly, several studies in this field such as Earman and Norton (1999) and Hemmo and Shenker (2012) have generated critical awareness among special scientists by challenging the soundness and universal validity of some ideas, thus increasing knowledge quality by refuting unjustified beliefs, sophisticating the proofs for and against Landauer’s principle, and therefore improving their objections. Finally, I argue that conceptual engineering proposals in this field have contributed to improve how special scientists understand problematic and poorly-defined notions such as ‘thermodynamic irreversibility’ or ‘implementing logic operations’.

The debate of “scientific pursuit” has been revitalized by philosophers of science in recent years. In this article, we adopt the analytic distinction between appraisals of pursuit and appraisals of acceptance as a useful tool to analyze a historical episode that remains poorly understood in contemporary philosophy and history of science. Namely, we propose to identify an “informational research tradition” in molecular biology, spanning from the mid-twentieth century to today, and assess it as a research tradition that has persistently passed appraisals of pursuit despite struggling to pass appraisals of acceptance. This historical case, in turn, allows us to rethink the notion of scientific pursuit in a more pluralistic fashion. We argue that biologists’ perception of the pursuitworthiness of the informational research tradition entailed three distinct promises, often in trade-off with one another: a promise of unification, a promise of understanding, and a promise of quantitative prediction. Distinguishing between these promises is fundamental to highlighting the variety of expectations involved in actual epistemic evaluations involved in contexts of pursuit.

In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel’s (1958) symmetry thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa.

Our main aim in this paper is to evaluate from a critical historical-philosophical standpoint the intellectualIntellectual origins of ‘Landauer’s principlePrinciple’, a thesis formulated in 1961 by the IBM researcher Rolf Landauer[aut]Landauer, Rolf. He asserted that any physicalPhysical implementation of a logically irreversibleIrreversible operation such as erasing a bit of information leads to an entropy increase in the systemSystem computing that operation. Contrary to the popular narratives from the thermodynamicsThermodynamics of computation about the genesis of Landauer’s principle, we argue that this ideaIdeas was influenced, firstly, by Léon Brillouin’s[aut]Brillouin, Leon Negentropy principle, theoretically connecting information and entropy. Secondly, Landauer found in John von Neumann’s[aut]Neumann, John, vonideasIdeas in 1949 the path to connect informational processesProcess and thermal effects through the logical irreversibilityIrreversibility of computational operations. Interestingly, both Brillouin and von Neumann also gave general and ill-defined formulations of this ideaIdeas previous to the work of Landauer. Finally, alongside these two main intellectualIntellectual sources one should include, complementing historiographic proposals such as Wright, the influence of the potential double-well model of the IBM researcher John Swanson in developing a concrete model to apply this thesis. Finally, we defend reconceiving the intellectual genesis of Landauer’s principlePrinciple as a direct historical heir to a rich multiplicity of physical, informational, and computational trends of thought during the 1950s.

In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (Time and chance, Harvard University Press, 2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (in: Ernst & Hüttermann (eds) Probability in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics, 2010) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (in: Beisbart & Hartmann (eds) Probabilities in physics, Oxford University Press, 2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something.

This paper aims to analyze a specific way in which a scientific programme or area can, in Lakatosian terms, degenerate: namely, through a developmental process of intellectual inflation. Adopting a pluralist approach to the notion of scientific progress, we propose that the historical development of a particular scientific area can be analyzed as being intellectually inflationary during a bounded period of time if it has considerably increased its productive output (thus displaying productive progress) while the overall semantic or epistemic value of those products have not improved in a significant fashion (thus lacking progress in a semantic or epistemic sense). Then, we apply this concept to thoroughly assess whether there are some intellectually inflationary patterns in the development of two areas of research: (i) information-theoretical evolutionary biology in 1961-2023, and (ii) ensemblist non-equilibrium statistical mechanics in 1938-2023. And finally, we argue that tracking and analyzing intellectually inflationary patterns in the history of sciences might contribute to vindicate a non-productivist picture of current scientific research.

In this paper I discuss how to conceptual engineer ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ as they are used in information theory and statistical mechanics. Initially, I evaluate the extent to which the all-pervasive entangled use of entropy and information notions can be somehow defective in these domains, such as being meaningless or generating confusion. Then, I assess the main ameliorative strategies to improve this defective conceptual practice. The first strategy is to substitute the terms ‘entropy’ and ‘information’ by non-loaded terms, as it was first argued by Bar-Hillel in the 1950s. A second strategy is to prescribe how these terms should be correctly used to be meaningful, as it was pioneered by Carnap (Two essays on entropy, University of California Press, 1977) in Two Essays on Entropy. However, the actual implementation of these two ameliorative strategies has been historically unsuccessful due to the low credentials that philosophers as conceptual prescribers have among scientists. Finally, to try to solve these obstacles, I propose a third strategy based on leveraging evidence from the contribution of philosophy as a complementary science or the so-called ‘Philosophy in Science’ (à la Pradeu et al. 2024) to integrate conceptual prescriptions and analyses of entropy and information as part of the scientific practices in which these notions are used.

This work constitutes one of the first introductions to the new branch of philosophy focused on applying information concepts to address ontological, epistemological and ethical problems. Led Luciano Floridi, the philosophy of information has emerged in recent decades as an attempt to incorporate the effects of the digital revolution into the methods and themes of philosophical thought. What is meaning? How do we gain knowledge of reality? From the early 1950s to the present day, Rudolf Carnap, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Fred Dretske, among others, have sought to use informational notions to try to answer these questions. In this book, Javier Anta presents the philosophy of information through a historical and conceptual approach ranging from Shannon's theory to the recent naturalistic proposals of Brian Skyrms. He also analyzes the main concepts of information that have allowed the consolidation of this new philosophical discipline.

En este artículo defiendo que el problema humeano de la justificación racional de la inducción no ha contribuido a la comprensión filosófica de este tipo de inferencias. La teoría material de la inducción propuesta por Norton (2003) permite analizar el razonamiento inductivo más allá del laberinto justificativo humeano, pero con un corte demasiado alto: asumir que las inducciones dependen intrínsecamente de cómo es localmente la realidad. En su lugar, propongo una teoría de la inducción en la que las inducciones dependen no de tesis ontológicas, sino de las capacidades cognitivas para comprimir información de un modo epistémicamente efectivo.

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics introduces us to the philosophy of physics of logical empiricism. However, here the expression “philosophy of physics” does not refer to a consolidated area of philosophy but to the set of concepts, methods, and analyses relating to general relativity, quantum mechanics, and other physical theories that were developed by the members of the logical empiricist movement. Because of the thoroughness with which it treats an issue so unjustly disregarded in the literature, Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences is an essential work not only for HOPOS readers interested in the intellectual origins of recent philosophy of physics but also for those interested in general philosophy of science. The main aim of this book is to overturn many of the inherited prejudices about how the logical empiricists—Carnap, Reichenbach, Frank, Neurath, and Feigl, among others—related philosophically to the physics of their time.

In this paper, I analyze the physical content of the main information concepts in the history of physics of the last seven decades. I argue that this physical character should be evaluated not by appealing to analytical-linguistic confusion (Timpson 2013) or to the usefulness of its applicability (Lombardi et al. 2016), but properly from its capacity to allow us to acquire significant knowledge about the physical world. After systematically employing this epistemic criterion of physical significance I will conclude by rejecting the main strategies of ontological inflation and physical content of the main information concepts in the classical thermal physics literature.

The main objective of this dissertation is to philosophically assess how the use of informational concepts in the field of classical thermostatistical physics has historically evolved from the late 1940s to the present day. I will first analyze in depth the main notions that form the conceptual basis on which 'informational physics' historically unfolded, encompassing (i) different entropy, probability and information notions, (ii) their multiple interpretative variations, and (iii) the formal, numerical and semantic-interpretative relationships among them. In the following, I will assess the history of informational thermophysics during the second half of the twentieth century. Firstly, I analyse the intellectual factors that gave rise to this current in the late forties (i.e., popularization of Shannon's theory, interest in a naturalized epistemology of science, etc.), then study its consolidation in the Brillouinian and Jaynesian programs, and finally claim how Carnap (1977) and his disciples tried to criticize this tendency within the scientific community. Then, I evaluate how informational physics became a predominant intellectual current in the scientific community in the nineties, made possible by the convergence of Jaynesianism and Brillouinism in proposals such as that of Tribus and McIrvine (1971) or Bekenstein (1973) and the application of algorithmic information theory into the thermophysical domain. As a sign of its radicality at this historical stage, I explore the main proposals to include information as part of our physical reality, such as Wheeler’s (1990), Stonier’s (1990) or Landauer’s (1991), detailing the main philosophical arguments (e.g., Timpson, 2013; Lombardi et al. 2016a) against those inflationary attitudes towards information. Following this historical assessment, I systematically analyze whether the descriptive exploitation of informational concepts has historically contributed to providing us with knowledge of thermophysical reality via (i) explaining thermal processes such as equilibrium approximation, (ii) advantageously predicting thermal phenomena, or (iii) enabling understanding of thermal property such as thermodynamic entropy. I argue that these epistemic shortcomings would make it impossible to draw ontological conclusions in a justified way about the physical nature of information. In conclusion, I will argue that the historical exploitation of informational concepts has not contributed significantly to the epistemic progress of thermophysics. This would lead to characterize informational proposals as 'degenerate science' (à la Lakatos 1978a) regarding classical thermostatistical physics or as theoretically underdeveloped regarding the study of the cognitive dynamics of scientists in this physical domain.

In this talk I present the main results from Anta (2021), namely, that the theoretical division between Boltzmannian and Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood as a separation in the epistemic capabilities of this physical discipline. In particular, while from the Boltzmannian framework one can generate powerful explanations of thermal processes by appealing to their microdynamics, from the Gibbsian framework one can predict observable values in a computationally effective way. Finally, I argue that this statistical mechanical schism contradicts the Hempelian (1958) thesis that the predictive power of a scientific theory is directly proportional to its explanatory potential, and vice versa.

Throughout the history of the philosophy of science, theories have been linked to formulas as a privileged representational format. In this paper, following, I defend a semantic-representational conception of theories, where theories are identified with sets of scientific re-presentations by virtue of their epistemic potential and independently of their format. To show the potential of this proposal, I analyze as a case study the use of phase diagrams in statistical mechanics to convey in a semantically consistent and syntactically correct way theoretical principles such as Liouville’s theorem. I conclude by defending this philosophical position as a tool to show the enormous representational richness underlying scientific practices.

Although the everyday notion of information has clear semantic properties, the all-pervasive technical concept of Shannon information is usually considered as a non-semantic concept. In this paper I show how this concept was implicitly ‘semantized’ in the early 1950s by many authors, such as Rothstein or Brillouin, in order to explain the knowledge dynamics underlying certain scientific practices such as measurement. On the other hand, I argue that the main attempts in the literature to develop a quantitative measure of semantic information to clarify science and scientific measurements, such as Carnap-Bar-Hillel, or Dretske, will not successfully achieve this philosophical aim for several reasons. Finally, I defend the use of a qualitative notion of semantic information within the information-theoretical framework MacKay to assess the informational dynamics underlying scientific practices, particularly measurements in statistical mechanics.

In this paper I will defend an approach to the thought experiment known as ‘Maxwell’s Demon’ based on a Maxwellian conception of statistical mechanics. Instead of assuming that thermodynamic descriptions depend reductively on the dynamics of molecular components, I will adopt a conception of thermophysics as a ‘resource theory’ in the Maxwellian line recently defended by Myrvold (2011) and Wallace (2017). From this interpretative stance, Maxwell’s demon would not lead directly to the plausibility of violating the second law of thermodynamics, but to show the pragmatic impossibility of knowing deterministically the exact microscopic of thermal systems.

ArgumentIn this comparative historical analysis, we will analyze the intellectual tendency that emerged between 1946 and 1956 to take advantage of the popularity of communication theory to develop a kind of informational epistemology of statistical mechanics. We will argue that this tendency results from a historical confluence in the early 1950s of certain theoretical claims of the so-called English School of Information Theory, championed by authors such as Gabor (1956) or MacKay (1969), and from the attempt to extend the profound success of Shannon’s ([1948] 1993) technical theory of sign transmission to the field of statistical thermal physics. As a paradigmatic example of this tendency, we will evaluate the intellectual work of Léon Brillouin (1956), who, in the mid-fifties, developed an information theoretical approach to statistical mechanical physics based on a concept of information linked to the knowledge of the observer.

In this paper I aim to demonstrate that Rudolf Carnap's analysis of the application of information theory within physics, an intellectual-historical precedent of current philosophical criticisms toward this tendency, is justified. First, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) underlined the unjustified ‘semantification’ of Shannon entropy Furthermore, Carnap criticized the ‘physicalization’ of Shannon entropy, but that criticism was not accepted by the physics community of the 1950s (Köhler 2001). Finally, in the posthumously published "Two Essays on Entropy" Carnap (1977) developed a critical assessment of entropy concepts that showed some deep conceptual and interpretative deficiencies in Jaynes (1957a) and Brillouin’s (1956) informational approaches to thermophysics.

In this study I aim to develop a cognitive evaluation of how semantically-driven and rule-based diagrammatic reasoning were psychologically plausible for partic-ular cases of scientific practice: an actual trackless path reconstruction in bubble chamber experiments, as reported by Galison (1997). I will propose “cognitive imagery projection and manipulation” (CIPM) as the most plausible psychologi-cal (perceptual/attentional/cognitive) mechanism matching the specific explanatory requirements for the case study, outlining the most significant current theories about this mental phenomenon (Shimojima; 2011).

In this paper I will evaluate whether some knowledge states that are interpretatively derived from statistical mechanical probabilities could be somehow relevant in actual practices, as famously rejected by Albert (2000). On one side, I follow Frigg (2010a) in rejecting the causal relevance of knowledge states as a mere byproduct of misinterpreting this theoretical field. On the other side, I will argue against Uffink (2011) that probability-represented epistemic states cannot be explanatorily relevant, because (i) probabilities cannot faithfully represent significant epistemic states, and (ii) those states cannot satisfactorily account for why an agent should theoretically believe or expect something.

In this paper we argue for an integrated inferential conception about theories and representations and its role in accounting for the theoretical value of philosophically disregarded representational practices, such as the systematic use of phase space diagrams within the theoretical context of statistical mechanics. This proposal would rely on both inferentialism about scientific representations (Suárez 2004) and inferentialism about particular physical theories (Wallace 2017). We defend that both perspectives somehow converge into an integrated inferentialism by means of the thesis theories as being composed of representations, as defended from the representational semantic conception defended by Suárez and Pero (2019).

In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel's (1958) symmetry thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa.

In this paper we develop an inferential account on the meaning and reference of theoretical concepts in physics, mainly based on the pragmatic notion of ‘inferential validity’. Firstly, we distinguish between empirical meaningfulness and theoretical significance as two different modes of meaning, wherein the former depends on consistently encoding experimental values, as proposed by Chang, and the latter on being semantically coherent with other concepts. Secondly, we argue that each of these contributions to the validity of inferences imports a causal and representational mechanism of reference-fixing, respectively. Finally, we will rely on entropy concepts as our case study.

In this paper I will defend the incapacity of the informational frameworks in thermal physics, mainly those that historically and conceptually derive from the work of Brillouin (1962) and Jaynes (1957a), to robustly explain the approach of certain gaseous systems to their state of thermal equilibrium from the dynamics of their molecular components. I will further argue that, since their various interpretative, conceptual and technical-formal resources (e.g. epistemic interpretations of probabilities and entropy measures, identification of thermal entropy as Shannon information, and so on) are shown to be somehow incoherent, inconsistent or inaccurate, these informational proposals need to 'epistemically parasitize' the manifold of theoretical resources of Boltzmann's and Gibbs' statistical mechanics, respectively, in order to properly account for the equilibration process of an ideal gas from its microscopic properties. Finally, our conclusion leads us to adopt a sort of constructive skepticism regarding the explanatory value of the main informationalist trends in statistical thermophysics.

En este artículo pretendo evaluar las bases conceptuales y interpretativas de las ‘paradojas info-térmicas’ subyacentes a las aproximaciones informacionales a la física térmica, por las cuales nuestra información epistémica sobre un sistema molecular aumenta y disminuye simultáneamente cuando este se aproxima al equilibrio térmico. Defiendo que el contenido paradójico de nuestra tesis persiste incluso cuando se distinguen distintos tipos de información, debido a la conexión robusta entre la parte del incremento y la parte de la disminución informacional de la tesis. Concluiré defendiendo que dicha paradoja muestra las inconsistencias conceptuales de las aproximaciones informacionales de la física térmica.

Ontic Structural Realism, as pivotal position in philosophy of science and metaphysics, defends the idea that the world is ultimately constituted of real physical structures. French (2014) regards physical symmetries as the foundational structure of a world without objects. On the other hand, Ladyman and Ross (2007) hold that the world is essentially made of non-redundant informational structure. I argue in this paper that these two positions are by no means incompatible, for instance by interpreting French’s physical symmetries as real structures both encompassing and compressing every piece of information (Kolmogorov complexity) within the world.