Javier Sánchez Cañizares

Irruption Theory (IT) offers a novel approach to understanding mind-brain interaction in decision-making. IT suggests that the mind’s influence on brain dynamics can manifest as “irruption” — the emergence of noise or physical fluctuations that alter brain activity. Lately, Irruption-Absorption Theory (IAT) has also incorporated the idea of “absorption,” which refers to the mental stabilization or fixation of chosen content. A crucial tool for exploring the implications of this theory could be the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) model, which can simulate phase transitions in the brain, such as shifts from randomness to different kinds of stability, through simple parameter adjustments. In this paper, we demonstrate how the HKB model can incorporate IAT’s irruption and absorption after some conceptual refinement, dubbed IAT*, and help to understand the results of recent experiments that require decision-making. In doing so, we aim to present mental influence in decision-making tasks as that which enables phase transitions responsible for perception and choice. Our interpretation is that the mind’s selective focus may guide brain dynamics, aligning with physical causality without disrupting it.

From how a whirlpool is formed behind a rock to how temperature speeds up a chemical reaction, constraints are pervasive in nature. They are also essential for explaining the emergence of dissipative structures, the far-from-equilibrium systems responsible for increasingly complex forms of organization. In this article, we argue that the constraints on change exert a non-derivative causal influence on microphysics by introducing selection rules, and that they are causal not by what they produce, but by what they prevent. However, recent approaches in the philosophy of science, such as the one we call “higher-level causal eliminativism” (HLCE), deem constraints as non-causal explanations or derivative causal explanations. HLCE is a microphysicalist perspective according to which reality is the result of an interplay of microphysical interactions. It denies the causality of constraints; only their explanatory value is recognized. In so doing, HLCE commits itself to superdeterminism, the theory for which some unknown non-local hidden variables and the laws of nature utterly determine the outcomes of all events, including those of quantum physics. Superdeterminism considers all higher-order relationships as nothing but statistically salient effects of global microphysical field interactions. By undermining the dependence of mathematical selection on ontological processes, superdeterminism leads to an arbitrary selection of initial conditions for the universe. Yet we will argue that this arbitrariness undermines itself and the hopes of HLCE.

The philosopher Roberto Unger and the physicist Lee Smolin have recently argued that the current explanatory framework of cosmology, which presumes a timeless background of unchanging physical laws, should be replaced by a thoroughly relational framework in which time is fundamental and all laws are subject to change. Within this alternative framework, however, Unger and Smolin find themselves confronted by a dilemma: either the laws of nature evolve according to some higher set of “meta-laws,” which reinstates a timeless background at a higher level, or the laws of nature evolve randomly and the path of inquiry is blocked. In response to this dilemma, the authors propose a theory of causal events as singular, freely chosen, and self-determined optimalities constrained only by their intrinsic relations to all other events.

The Maximum Entropy Production Principle (MEPP) stands out as an overarching principle that rules life phenomena in Nature. However, its explanatory power beyond heuristics remains controversial. On the one hand, the MEPP has been successfully applied principally to non-living systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, the underlying assumptions to lay the MEPP’s theoretical foundations and range of applicability increase the possibilities of conflicting interpretations. More interestingly, from a metaphysical stance, the MEPP’s philosophical status is hotly debated: does the MEPP passively translate physical information into macroscopic predictions or actively select the physical solution in multistable systems, granting the connection between scientific models and reality? This paper deals directly with this dilemma by discussing natural determination from three angles: (1) Heuristics help natural philosophers to build an ontology. (2) The MEPP’s ontological status may stem from its selection of new forms of causation beyond physicalism. (3) The MEPP’s ontology ultimately depends on the much-discussed question of the ontology of probabilities in an information-theoretic approach and the ontology of macrostates according to the Boltzmannian definition of entropy.

In a recent work (Grasso et al., 2021 ), practitioners of the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim to have overcome the weaknesses of causal reductionism in producing a coherent account of causation, as causal reductionism would blatantly conflate causation with prediction and could not answer the question of ‘what caused what.’ In this paper, I reject such a dismissal of causal reductionism since IIT anti-reductionists misunderstand the reductionist stance. The reductionists can still invoke a causal account stemming from the causal power of the universe’s basic units and interactions that, eventually, may lead to structures supporting integrated information. Additionally, I claim that the IIT-inspired misunderstanding of causal reductionism originates from the former’s metaphysical deficit, conflating information with causation. However, as a possible way out, if IIT is complemented with a deeper metaphysical ground, such as nested hylomorphism, an improved argument against causal reductionism can be made to work by invoking formal causality as the ultimate cause of integration in natural systems.

La modernidad se caracteriza por una epistemología que ha conducido a la separación de los saberes. Como consecuencia, tanto la teología protestante como la católica han sufrido la falta de una perspectiva unitaria en su razonar sobre Dios. La cultura postmoderna, aceptando la fragmentariedad, presenta una nueva sensibilidad epistemológica que abre posibilidades prometedoras para el redescubrimiento de la trascendencia. Entre ellas, la dialogicidad intrínseca de la Creación apunta a la vía de la belleza como camino privilegiado que la teología ha de explorar en un sentido descendente y, especialmente, ascendente