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522Betting on conditionalsThinking and Reasoning 16 (3): 172-197. 2010.A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose , or void for conditi…Read more
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185Updating: A psychologically basic situation of probability revisionThinking and Reasoning 16 (4): 253-287. 2010.The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 199…Read more
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152Sleeping Beauty and the Absent-Minded DriverTheory and Decision 69 (3): 489-496. 2010.The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent -minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustain…Read more
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147Uncertainty and the de Finetti tablesThinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4): 308-328. 2013.The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning adopts a Bayesian, or prob- abilistic, model for studying human reasoning. Contrary to the traditional binary approach based on truth functional logic, with its binary values of truth and falsity, a third value that represents uncertainty can be introduced in the new paradigm. A variety of three-valued truth table systems are available in the formal literature, including one proposed by de Finetti. We examine the descriptive adequacy of these syste…Read more
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115Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticismMind and Society 5 (1): 1-38. 2006.This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Th…Read more
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62The Psychology of Uncertainty and Three-Valued Truth TablesFrontiers in Psychology 9 394374. 2018.Psychological research on people’s understanding of natural language connectives has traditionally used truth table tasks, in which participants evaluate the truth or falsity of a compound sentence given the truth or falsity of its components in the framework of propositional logic. One perplexing result concerned the indicative conditional if A then C which was often evaluated as true when A and C are true, false when A is true and C is false but irrelevant“ (devoid of value) when A is false (w…Read more
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59Rationality, the Bayesian standpoint, and the Monty-Hall problemFrontiers in Psychology 6 146013. 2015.The Monty-Hall Problem ($MHP$) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of Bayesianism in two ways. First, psychologists have used it to illustrate that people do not revise their degrees of belief in line with experimenters' application of Bayes' rule. Second, philosophers view $MHP$ and its two-player extension ($MHP2$) as evidence that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. Both arguments neglect the Bayesian standpoint, which requires that $MHP2$ (studied here) be describ…Read more
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53New Psychological Paradigm for Conditionals and General de Finetti TablesMind and Language 29 (1): 73-84. 2014.The new Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning aims to integrate the study of human reasoning, decision making, and rationality. It is supported by two findings. One, most people judge the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then B), to be the conditional probability, P(B|A), as implied by the Ramsey test. Two, they judge if A then B to be void when A is false. Their three-valued response table used to be called ‘defective’, but should be termed the de Finetti table. We s…Read more
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50Dual frames for causal induction: the normative and the heuristicThinking and Reasoning 23 (3): 292-317. 2017.Causal induction in the real world often has to be quick and efficient as well as accurate. We propose that people use two different frames to achieve these goals. The A-frame consists of heuristic processes that presuppose rarity and can detect causally relevant factors quickly. The B-frame consists of analytic processes that can be highly accurate in detecting actual causes. Our dual frame theory implies that several factors affect whether people use the A-frame or the B-frame in causal induct…Read more
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50There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language. In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if A then C), is the conditional probability of C given A, P(C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the 'de- fective' truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A hol…Read more
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47Understanding Conditionals in the East: A Replication Study of Politzer et al. With EasternersFrontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
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38Deductive schemas with uncertain premises using qualitative probability expressionsThinking and Reasoning 22 (1): 78-98. 2016.ABSTRACTThe new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inferen…Read more
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27Nested conditionals and genericity in the de Finetti semanticsThought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1): 42-52. 2021.Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10, Issue 1, Page 42-52, March 2021.
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24The psychology of dynamic probability judgment: order effect, normative theories, and experimental methodologyMind and Society 6 (1): 53-66. 2007.The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe is static (revising situations). However, it may happen that individuals have to revise their degrees of belief when the message they learn specifies a change of direction in the universe, which is considered as changing with time (updati…Read more
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20Cooperation in Online Conversations: The Response Times as a Window Into the Cognition of Language ProcessingFrontiers in Psychology 10. 2019.
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20Cycles of maximin and utilitarian policies under the veil of ignoranceMind and Society 15 (1): 105-116. 2016.A conceptual and mathematical model of a social community behavior in a choice situation under a veil of ignorance, where two alternative policies—Rawlsian maximin and Harsanyian utilitarianism—can be implemented through the aggregation of individual preferences over these two policies, is constructed and investigated. We first incorporate in our conceptual model psychological features such as risk-aversion and prosocial preferences that likely underlie choices of welfare policies. We secondly d…Read more
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17The effect of cardinality in the pigeonhole principleThinking and Reasoning 30 (1): 218-234. 2024.The pigeonhole principle is a well-known mathematical principle and is quite simple to understand. It goes as follows: If n items are placed into m containers, and if m
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15Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!Frontiers in Psychology 11 593807. 2020.The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adul…Read more
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14A Study on the Sufficient Conditional and the Necessary Conditional With Chinese and French ParticipantsFrontiers in Psychology 13. 2022.According to the weak version of linguistic relativity, also called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the features of an individual’s native language influence his worldview and perception. We decided to test this hypothesis on the sufficient conditional and the necessary conditional, expressed differently in Chinese and French. In Chinese, connectors for both conditionals exist and are used in everyday life, while there is only a connector for the sufficient conditional in French. A first hypothesis …Read more
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7How the Custom Suppresses the Endowment Effect: Exchange Paradigm in Kanak CountryFrontiers in Psychology 12. 2022.In this paper, Knetsch's exchange paradigm is analyzed from the perspective of pragmatics and social norms. In this paradigm the participant, at the beginning of the experiment, receives an object from the experimenter and at the end, the same experimenter offers to exchange the received object for an equivalent object. The observed refusal to exchange is called the endowment effect. We argue that this effect comes from an implicature made by the participant about the experimenter's own expectat…Read more
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6L'esprit au-delà du droit: pour un dialogue entre les sciences cognitives et le droit (edited book)Éditions Mare & Martin. 2016.
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Base rate neglect: A focus on the methodology of the Engineer-Lawyer paradigmIn Serge P. Shohov (ed.), Advances in Psychology Research, Nova Science Publishers. pp. 183--198. 2002.
Jean Baratgin
Université Paris 8
Université Paris 8
Alumnus
Areas of Interest
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Other Academic Areas |