Jean Campos

The world appears to be in a constant state of flux, with objects changing and events unfolding over time. I refer to this characterisation as the Manifest Dynamic World. I have argued elsewhere that the Manifest Dynamic World involves two fundamentally distinct kinds of dynamism that cannot be reduced to one another: the dynamic character of change and the dynamic character of time. The former concerns the dynamic aspect of objects changing and moving, while the latter concerns the sense of events changing their temporal position. If I am correct, we should adopt what I call the Independence Approach, according to which each distinct kind of dynamism presented in the Manifest Dynamic World must be explained on its own terms, thereby avoiding the conflation of two fundamentally different phenomena. I argue that the block universe contains genuinely dynamic processes, which in turn account for the dynamic character of change. By contrast, I suggest that the dynamic character of time is a false belief generated by our cognitive system. Thus, the Manifest Dynamic World consists of veridical dynamic experiences of objects changing and moving, jointly with a false belief, generated by our cognitive system, that events change their temporal position.

This paper advances the thesis that there is a substantive tension between the Non-Reductionist View of the Self, according to which the self is fundamental (irreducible to physical or psychological states or processes) and indivisible (not composed of parts), and the Block Universe Theory, which holds that all events and moments coexist within a four-dimensional reality. The paper develops this thesis by presenting two arguments: the Temporal Zombie Argument and the Epistemic Zombie Argument. The former argument contends that combining the Non-Reductionist View of the Self with the Block Universe Theory entails the existence of philosophical zombies, whereas the latter argument suggests that we could have lived our entire lives among such entities without realising it. If this line of reasoning is correct, non-reductionists cannot coherently adopt the Block Universe Theory as their temporal framework; conversely, block universe theorists cannot endorse the Non-Reductionist View of the Self without facing these problems.

In this paper, I adopt a negative stance on the metaphysical debate concerning persistence. Rather than proposing a new theory, I argue against four-dimensional endurantism by exposing its underlying assumptions and problems that alternative theories of persistence, such as perdurantism and transdurantism, do not share. My aim, thus, is to undermine the motivation for, and central arguments of, four-dimensional endurantism, demonstrating that adopting this view offers no real advantage to B-theorists (or eternalists) and, in fact, introduces significant problems. Accordingly, I suggest that B-theorists have good reasons to hold a perdurantist, transdurantist, or stage theoretic view of persistence.

This thesis presents a naturalised account of time, consistent with scientific theories such as the Special Theory of Relativity (SR). However, SR leads to counterintuitive conclusions: it denies the existence of an absolute present moment and suggests that reality does not evolve as a three-dimensional space over time. Instead, reality is a four-dimensional manifold in which all moments possess the same ontological and metaphysical status. This gives rise to an explanatory gap between our ordinary temporal experiences, where the present moment appears special and time seems to flow, and the scientific view of time. To address this gap, I present a naturalised account of self-consciousness within a four-dimensional reality. I argue that the four-dimensional brain generates the seeming of being someone through distinct self-models whenever it is capable of doing so. This provides conceptual tools for explaining both the apparent specialness of the present and the experience of temporal passage. First, I argue that we do not experience events as present but simply as given within a temporally extended window of awareness. As complex self-conscious beings situated in a region of spacetime, there is a shift from experience simpliciter — the presence of a world — to a temporal conceptualisation by comparing experiences simpliciter with memories of the past and anticipations of the future. In this way, we come to believe that the present moment appears more vivid, real, or actual than others. Second, I argue that the notion of events changing their temporal position (dynamic time) and the notion of objects changing and moving (dynamic change) are distinct and consequently require a two-part explanation. I account for the dynamic time by proposing that the ‘moving now’ and the ‘moving ego’ are two conceptualisations of the same phenomenon: the seeming that events change their temporal position. This phenomenon is explained by the cognitive error of the enduring self, rooted in episodic memory. Dynamic change, by contrast, is accounted for by our veridical perceptual experiences as of objects moving, changing, and causing one another within a temporal window. If so, reality is dynamic, even though time itself does not pass. By approaching these two aspects of our ordinary temporal experiences, we are a step closer to bridging the explanatory gap completely between the ordinary view and the scientific view of time.

Resumo: O filósofo Bertrand Russell argumentou contra a linha de pensamento, que é geralmente atribuída a Aristóteles, de que a substância é algo que perdura ao longo do tempo. Para Russell, o que há na realidade são séries de particulares estáticos e individualmente distintos ordenados pela relação de sucessão e simultaneidade. Começarei destacando o Paradoxo do Movimento, utilizado por Russell como um dos exemplos para tratar o tempo no viés estático. Zenão de Eléia produz quatro argumentos para sustentar a conclusão paradoxal da inexistência do movimento, são eles: A Dicotomia, Aquiles e a Tartaruga, A Flecha e O Estádio. Além de utilizar o Paradoxo do Movimento, Russell também utiliza a metáfora do projetor para sustentar que as coisas são formadas por uma multiplicidade de particulares estáticos no tempo, ou seja, Russell concorda com Zenão em relação ao tempo estático. Deste modo, na concepção de Russell, há particulares estáticos e em sequência no tempo, igualmente como ocorre com os frames de cada pedaço do rolo de filme. Russell tem a pretensão em anular através da teoria estática do tempo distinções desnecessárias que Aristóteles constrói com os conceitos de substância essenciais e acidentais.

Master's Dissertation: This dissertation aims to analyse two periods of Bertrand Russell's philosophy (Platonism 1899 - 1912 and Constructivism 1913 - 1918), in which he developed his temporal theories that are studied and have an impact until today. Russell might be considered the main defender and exponent of the static theory of time. Although he revised his conception of time during the years of study, he was always in favour of the static theory. Take into account that Russell and Moore revolted against English idealism in the late 19th century, and Russell became a Platonist. At the beginning of the Platonist period, Russell ignores epistemological notions, adopting a vast ontology. The first theory of time that we see in the dissertation is the absolute theory of time, defended between 1899 and 1912. The main characteristic of an absolute theory of time is that it infers instants or moments in reality. However, in the article On Denoting (1905), we see an abandonment over the years of entities that were previously part of Russell's Platonic heaven. Regarding his temporal theory, even in 1912, Russell was against the idea of a theory of relational time, as opposed to the theory of absolute time. Because a relational theory without instants as primitive entities does not guarantee the construction of a time series. Only with the development of the method of construction of instants proposed by Whitehead, Russell's workmate in the philosophical project of Principia Mathematica, a relational theory might be developed, without having to postulate moments prior to the events. From constructivism, and with the Occam's Razor principle to deflate his ontology, Russell does not postulate anything beyond what is given to us, i.e., the sense-data. In this way, all entities that might be constructed from something simpler (what we perceive via acquaintance (sense-data)) will not need to be postulated. In this dissertation, we will see the change that occurs in Russellian philosophy, taking as its starting point its purely logical arguments in favour of the absolute theory, towards a concern with its ontology over the years, in order not to postulate anything beyond what is given to us.