Jean-Luc Solere

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation ex nihilo and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general.

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation _ex nihilo_ and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general.

La conception malebranchiste de la liberté est originale. Malebranche ne croit pas en une liberté d’indifférence absolue, c'est-à-dire en une capacité d’opérer un choix indépendamment de toute motivation. Il ne croit pas non plus que nous puissions indifféremment choisir entre deux motivations de force inégale : au moment où on se détermine, le bien le plus grand (du moins selon l’apparence) l’emporte. La liberté réside seulement dans le fait que l’on n’est pas obligé de se déterminer : nous pouvons toujours suspendre notre consentement. Cette conception est exposée à des objections que Pierre Bayle a formulées et qui tentent de la mettre en contradiction avec d’autres thèses de Malebranche : son occasionalisme, sa théorie de la création continuée, l’obscurité de l’âme à elle-même, sa théologie des voies de l’action divine. Nous discuterons ces objections et verrons si Malebranche est en mesure de leur résister.

In quodlibetal questions disputed in 1303-1304, the secular theologian Thomas de Bailly defended the theory of succession proposed by Godefroid de Fontaines as a solution to the problem of the intensification and remission of qualities. Analyzing the objections and answers formulated in these questions, I show that Bailly was responding not to Duns Scotus but to Thomist opponents, most likely led by Hervaeus Natalis. This article thus contributes to reconstructing the networks and debates of the Parisian university at the beginning of the fourteenth century.

This chapter re-examines the status and role, in Bayle’s reflection, of the dualistic objections to the goodness of a monotheistic God. Bayle’s conclusion that these objections are insoluble by reason alone has been taken as an indication that his aim was to undermine an essential tenet of biblical revelation, with the result that his turn to faith to solve the problem of the existence of evil rings hollow. A closer examination of the historical context and logic of these objections, however, reveals that the charge of dualism (especially Manichaeism) was commonly leveled against the Calvinist doctrine of predestination by Catholics and other Protestant denomina tions throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On a purely philosophical level, Bayle could have drawn the dualistic objections he needed from Plutarch, whom he knew well and quotes in the same discussions. If he invokes the ghosts of Mani and Zoroaster in his turn, it is to prove that the accusation of Manichaeism directed against Calvinist orthodoxy can be reversed against the attackers. The opponents’ own answer to the problem of evil, which in all its variants rests on the responsibility of the human will, does not solve the problem and exposes them no less than the Calvinists to the charge of making God the author of sin. This strategy is the reason why Bayle places so much emphasis on the question of free will in these discussions. His intention, however, is not to draw out this kind of mutual finger-pointing, but, on the contrary, to prove that these controversies are sterile and endless, and to suppress them as they do more harm than good to Christianity.

This article aims to establish that Descartes accepted the scholastic view that God’s duration in itself (“eternity”) is not successive but “all at once,” as opposed to temporal things’ durations. Though most scholars have assumed this to be Descartes’ view, Geoffrey Gorham recently called it into question with a number of strong arguments. We contest his interpretation on multiple grounds. First, we show that when Descartes asserts that a duration which is “all at once” is “inconceivable,” he is not making a metaphysical claim but, rather, is making an epistemological one, based on the limitations of the human intellect in understanding the attributes of God. Second, we object to a number of Gorham’s systematic reconstructions of Descartes’ views. He argues among other things that divine simplicity is consistent with temporal parts and that the laws of Cartesian physics require God to have temporal parts. We refute these claims based on Descartes’ fundamental metaphysical commitments. We thus conclude that Descartes does not think that, per se, God’s existence unfolds successively, moment after moment.

Arguing for a cognition theory that radically rejects the passivity Aristotle attributes to the soul with regard to material things, Olivi has to assume that the soul is always on the alert, that is, that its attention to the body never disappears, even in deep sleep. This is for him the only way to explain why an intense sensation wakes us up without acting on the soul. He thus exposes himself to possible criticism from Aristotelians: his hypothesis is counter-intuitive and seems to be contradicted by our experiencing eclipses of our awareness. I propose a defense of Olivi based on a ‘retort’, showing that Aristotelians must themselves postulate either, like Albert the Great, that the agent intellect is constantly in act, or, like Thomas Aquinas, that it exercises a continual surveillance of phantasms, even when we are not conscious of it. So they cannot deny Olivi the right to hypothesize a permanent attention of the soul.

The Dominican theologian Durand of Saint-Pourçain (ca. 1275–1334), breaking from the wide consensus, made a two-pronged attack on concurrentism (i.e., the theory according to which God does more than conserving creatures in existence and co-causes all their actions). On the one hand, he shows that the concurrentist position leads to the unacceptable consequence that God is the direct cause of man’s evil actions. On the other hand, he attacks the metaphysical foundations of concurrentism, first in the version offered by Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, and then in a more general way. Against Thomas and Giles, he challenges Neoplatonic assumptions about causality and being. More generally, he establishes that God’s action and a creature’s action can be neither identical nor different, and thus cannot both be direct causes of the same effect. Without claiming that Durand’s series of objections are definitely unanswerable, we may at least observe that they have generally been underestimated (which earned him the lowly role of the mere foil of the concurrentist view in the history of philosophy) and are able to do considerable damage to concurrentism.

Contrary to what many interpretations claim, according to Bayle faith does not completely eliminate reason. It intervenes to reveal factual truths that can only be known through revelation (for example, that God allowed Adam and Eve to sin). To these factual truths can be applied a rational principle (an axiomatic and evident one, according to Bayle, which he calls a "common notion"), namely, that "what God does is well done." God allowed sin, so we must think it was justified, even if we don't understand why. This approach is what I call, cum grano salis, Pierre Bayle's theodicy.

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes.

An important step in In Pierre Bayle’s defense of religious tolerance is to refute St Augustine’s claim that heretics who refuse to convert to the true faith do so out of ill will. This claim legitimizes, for Augustine and his followers, the application of temporal sanctions to those heretics, in order to offset their wicked inclination and restore their free will. To counter this view, Bayle uses the theological notions of invincible ignorance and dutiful erroneous conscience, elaborated during the Middle Ages. However, these notions had a very restricted scope, which needed to be extended to so-called heretical beliefs. I show how two early modern scholastics, the Jesuits Gabriel Vázquez and Rodrigo Arriaga, have prepared this evolution and have paved the way for Bayle's denunciation any form of coercion in religious matters.