Jean-Michel Roy

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses. The book’s primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl’s writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology. Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description. This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

RESUMEN La psicopatologia contemporánea sufre de una brecha descriptiva respecto de la experiencia patológica, y la tradición de la psicopatologia contiene un capital descriptivo acumulado que debe ser explotado para la necesaria superación de este déficit. Se argumenta examinando el caso particular de la psicopatologia cognitiva de la esquizofrenia y del contenido de la experiencia del delirio de control, mostrando cómo la teoría de Henri Ey, así como la del automatismo mental del siglo xix en la cual tiene sus raíces, contienen herramientas descriptivas importantes para establecer que la experiencia de un delirio de control es esencialmente diferente de la experiencia de una simple ilusión de control. ABSTRACT This article defends the general view that contemporary psychopathology suffers from a descriptive gap with respect to pathological experience and that the psycho-pathological tradition has accumulated a descriptive capital that should be used in the necessary effort to overcome this gap. This general thesis is argued for by examining the specific case of the cognitive psychopathology of schizophrenia and the experience of the delusion of control, showing how Henri Ey's theory and the 19th century theory of mental automatism in which the former is rooted contain important descriptive tools for establishing that the experience of a delusion of control is fundamentally different from that of a sheer illusion of control.

Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal relevance of these efforts to the fate of the Husserlian tradition. Indeed, it covers a wide array of perspectives on these questions, ranging from tentative demonstrations of the cognitively misleading character of Husserl's ideas, inasmuch as they would incarnate the same foundational errors as cognitivism, to diametrically opposed views arguing that the naturalist bent of contemporary cognitive science is ill-conceived, and that only the brand of transcendentalism defended by Husserl can provide it with adequate foundations.