Jean Paul Van Bendegem

This article focuses on the writings of Hardy, Poincaré, Birkhoff, and Whitehead, in order to substantiate the claim that mathematicians experience a mathematical proof as beautiful when it offers a maximum of insight while demanding a minimum of effort. In other words, it claims that the study of the aesthetic success of theorem-proofs can benefit from the analogy with the economic success of a business, which involves maximizing return on investment. On the other hand, the article also draws on Le Lionnais and Whitehead (again) in order to show that, whereas the kind of aesthetic delight offered by beautiful proofs is typical for well-established branches of mathematics, a romantic and adventurous spirit that goes beyond the search for classical aesthetic delights is needed when the exploration of new mathematics is at stake. The history of mathematics is not only a story of feelings of beauty invoked by perfect products, but also a survey of sublime periods of creative production. No account of mathematical beauty can be complete if it does not complement the classical product aesthetics with a romantic creation aesthetics. © 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

In the first part an outline is presented of the emergent new field of the study and the philosophy of mathematical practices, including (the philosophy of) mathematics education. In the second part the focus is on particular themes within this field that correspond more or less to my personal contributions over a thirty-year period. As the title of this contribution indicates the relations and connections between the study of mathematical practices and ‘mainstream’ philosophy of mathematics need not be antagonistic but rather are to be seen as mutually beneficial.

Context: As one of the major approaches within the philosophy of mathematics, constructivism is to be contrasted with realist approaches such as Platonism in that it takes human mental activity as the basis of mathematical content. Problem: Mathematical constructivism is mostly identified as one of the so-called foundationalist accounts internal to mathematics. Other perspectives are possible, however. Results: The notion of “meaning finitism” is exploited to tie together internal and external directions within mathematical constructivism. The various contributions to this issue support our case in different ways. Constructivist content: Further contributions from a multitude of constructivist directions are needed for the puzzle of an integrative, overarching theory of mathematical practice to be solved.

The paper gives an impression of the multi-dimensionality of mathematics as a human activity. This 'phenomenological' exercise is performed within an analytic framework that is both an expansion and a refinement of the one proposed by Kitcher. Such a particular tool enables one to retain an integrated picture while nevertheless welcoming an ample diversity of perspectives on mathematical practices, that is, from different disciplines, with different scopes, and at different levels. Its functioning is clarified by fitting in illustrations based on actual research.

It has been observed many times before that, as yet, there are no encompassing, integrated theories of mathematical practice available.To witness, as we currently do, a variety of schools in this field elaborating their philosophical frameworks, and trying to sort out their differences in the course of doing so, is also to be constantly reminded of the fact that a lot of epistemic aspects, extremely relevant to this task, remain dramatically underexamined. This volume wants to contribute to the stock of studies filling this perceived lacuna. It contains papers by established, upcoming, as well as beginning scholars, covering general, metaphilosophical themes such as naturalism, semiotics, pragmaticism, or empiricism, next to more specific topics including the unity of mathematical theories, thruth-flow in mathematics, diagrammatic reasoning, erroneous argumentation, or numerical analysis.

Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and the limits of knowledge In this paper a presentation is given of Kurt Gödel’s pathbreaking results on the incompleteness of formal arithmetic. Some biographical details are provided but the main focus is on the analysis of the theorems themselves. An intermediate level between informal and formal has been sought that allows the reader to get a sufficient taste of the technicalities involved and not lose sight of the philosophical importance of the results. Connections are established with the work of Alan Turing and Hao Wang to show the present-day relevance of Gödel’s research and how it relates to the limitations of human knowledge, mathematical knowledge in particular.