Jean Thomas

Many recent arguments about the role of coercive sanctions in law suggest that the importance of coercion is underrated. The question has thus been where the lower threshold for coercion might be within a legal system. Very little attention, by contrast, has been paid to whether, at some upper threshold, coerciveness might itself present a problem for law, even on a positivist account. In this article I therefore interrogate the standard positivist picture from this unorthodox direction: Is it true that there is no degree of coerciveness that is incompatible with a system of law? Or, in other words, have we gone far enough in circumscribing the role of coercion in our account of law? I argue that coercion of a certain kind undermines the conditions necessary for the social normative practices that ground legality on social accounts of law. Sufficiently coercive circumstances, I conclude, can diminish the law’s normativity by inhibiting the conditions necessary for the effective transmission of norms.

The purpose of this paper is to engage with the readers in a theoretical reflection on nursing practices in forensic psychiatric settings. In this paper, we argue that practices of exclusion in forensic psychiatric settings share some common ground with Agamben's description of sovereign power and, consequently, the possible creation of zones of exception in this environment. The concept of exception is, therefore, purposely used to shift our thinking, highlight the political forces surrounding exclusionary practices in forensic psychiatric nursing, and explore the ethical tensions that arise for nurses who become entangled in the control of these zones of exception. We argue that ethical and political discussions regarding this phenomenon are necessary if we wish to further understand the complexities of this field of practice and promote constructive change.