Jeffery Jay Lowder

This section (pp. 51-63) presents a dialogue between the author, Randal Rauser (RR), and atheist philosopher Jeffery Jay Lowder (JL). Lowder defines atheism as "the belief that God does not exist" and argues that the best case for this position rests on the high probability of metaphysical naturalism. He contends that naturalism is a simpler hypothesis than theism and provides a more accurate explanation for a range of facts, including biological evolution, the dependence of the mind on the physical brain, the neurological basis of some moral handicaps, the biological role of pain and pleasure, and the existence of nonresistant nonbelievers. Rauser then introduces the "Rebellion Thesis"—the common Christian claim that such intellectual arguments are merely rationalizations for a deeper, sinful suppression of a "deep-down" belief in God. Lowder refutes this, finding it incoherent to hate a being he does not believe exists. He further counters the thesis by stating that he, like many atheists, wishes theism were true, citing the desires for extended life, a guarantee of perfect justice, and the value of fellowship with God. The conversation concludes that Lowder's thoughtful, non-hostile case serves as strong empirical evidence against the "Rebellion Thesis."

This paper provides a direct and detailed critique of William Lane Craig's ten principal arguments for the historicity of the empty tomb of Jesus. While tentatively accepting that Jesus was placed in a tomb that later became empty, the author argues that Craig's case is inductively weak and fails to establish either the historicity of the Markan empty tomb narrative or that the resurrection is the best explanation for the tomb's emptiness. The essay systematically refutes each of Craig's lines of evidence, including the reliability of the honorable burial story, the implications of Paul's testimony, the antiquity of the pre-Markan tradition, the discovery by women, and the supposed confirmation from Jewish polemic. As a superior naturalistic explanation, the author defends the 'relocation hypothesis.' This hypothesis posits that it is more historically plausible that Joseph of Arimathea temporarily stored Jesus's body in a private tomb due to the encroaching Sabbath, and then later moved the body for a permanent, dishonorable burial in the graveyard for condemned criminals, as required by Jewish law. The author contends this hypothesis has greater explanatory scope and power, accounting for the empty tomb without recourse to supernatural events. The paper concludes that a historian qua historian should remain agnostic on the matter.

This paper assesses Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential argument in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which holds that secular moral obligation is metaphysically incoherent without a divine law framework. This paper reconstructs her argument—dubbed the “divine indispensability argument”—in standard form and then presents eight targeted objections that fall under three general types—challenges to its intelligibility, internal and external inconsistency, and substantive improbabilities—demonstrating that each strand refutes her thesis. Finally, it shows that her proposed remedy inherits the very defects she attributes to secular ethics and concludes that moral obligation remains fully coherent within nontheistic frameworks.