Jeffrey Flynn

Sungmoon Kim’s Confucian Democracy in East Asia: Theory and Practice is a brilliant and engaging contribution to our understanding of democratic theory and practice.1 The title of my comment here emphasizes the innovative way in which Kim moves from practice to theory by relying on the vibrant Confucian civil society in South Korea as both the normative inspiration for and practical reflection of his model of Confucian democracy. In the first section below, I highlight three interrelated ways in which Kim’s book is methodologically quite interesting and then pose some questions about the relation between theory and practice as framed by the book. In the second section, I turn to what I take to be one of the...

Contemporary philosophical pluralism recognizes the inevitability and legitimacy of multiple ethical perspectives and values, making it difficult to isolate the higher-order principles on which to base a theory of justice. Rising up to meet this challenge, Rainer Forst, a leading member of the Frankfurt School's newest generation of philosophers, conceives of an "autonomous" construction of justice founded on what he calls the basic moral right to justification. Forst begins by identifying this right from the perspective of moral philosophy. Then, through an innovative, detailed critical analysis, he ties together the central components of social and political justice—freedom, democracy, equality, and toleration—and joins them to the right to justification. The resulting theory treats "justificatory power" as the central question of justice, and by adopting this approach, Forst argues, we can discursively work out, or "construct," principles of justice, especially with respect to transnational justice and human rights issues. As he builds his theory, Forst engages with the work of Anglo-American philosophers such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen, and critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth. Straddling multiple subjects, from politics and law to social protest and philosophical conceptions of practical reason, Forst brilliantly gathers contesting claims around a single, elastic theory of justice.

The success of any cosmopolitan political project depends on the development of forms of transnational solidarity that go beyond particularist commitments of kin, community, or nation. In this paper, I analyze how transnational solidarity can be generated around basic human rights. Rather than presupposing strong conceptions of a common humanity or a pre-existing sentiment of universal benevolence, I propose that the global discourse on human rights itself – an ongoing, dynamic, and dialogical process carried out within global public spheres – be considered a form of or at least as a developing source for transnational solidarity. Together with the politics of human rights promoted by NGOs within global public spheres, this global discourse can contribute to constructing transnational solidarity around human rights. But a human right to basic subsistence, and commitment to fulfilling the correlative duties to the global poor, must be central to the cross-cultural dialogue on human rights for their to be adequate transnational solidarity around a global human rights regime. I frame my central argument through an engagement with Jürgen Habermas's revision of the Kantian cosmopolitan project.

In this article I challenge two arguments central to Hugh Baxter's critical interpretation of Habermas in his recent book, Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (2011). Both arguments focus on whether Habermas’ system -lifeworld model of society can successfully make space for democratic politics. Baxter highlights problems with both Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action [hereafter cited as TCA] and Habermas’ attempts to fix those problems in Between Facts and Norms [hereafter cited as BFN]. Thus, engaging Baxter on these issues provides an opportunity to think about how to read two of Habermas’ most significant texts in relation to each other. Baxter stresses discontinuities but I draw attention to important continuities. The first discontinuity highlighted by Baxter is between TCA's functionalism and BFN's normative approach. By contrast, in section I my article stresses elements of TCA that have been under-appreciated in general and by Baxter in particular, challenging us to rethink aspects of the standard reading of functionalist versus normative moments in the trajectory of Habermas’ thought. More specifically, in the second discontinuity Baxter identifies in BFN a significant shift in Habermas’ understanding of the nature of a ‘system’. I challenge this interpretation in section II and provide what I think is a superior reconstruction of the model presented in BFN

In this book, Flynn stresses the vital role of intercultural dialogue in developing a non-ethnocentric conception of human rights. He argues that Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory provides both the best framework for such dialogue and a much-needed middle path between philosophical approaches that derive human rights from a single foundational source and those that support multiple foundations for human rights (Charles Taylor, John Rawls, and various Rawlsians). By analyzing the historical and political context for debates over the compatibility of human rights with Christianity, Islam, and "Asian Values," Flynn develops a philosophical approach that is continuous with and a critical reflection on the intercultural dialogue on human rights. He reframes the dialogue by situating it in relation to the globalization of modern institutions and by arguing that such dialogue must address issues like the legacy of colonialism and global inequality while also being attuned to actual political struggles for human rights.

This article critically examines Jürgen Habermas’s theory of democracy as developed in Between Facts and Norms. In particular, it focuses on the concept of communicative power and argues that there is a crucial ambiguity in Habermas’s use of this concept. Since communicative power is the key normative resource that is supposed to counter the norm-free steering media of money and administrative power, its role within the theory must be made clear. The article begins by explaining the normative and social-theoretic foundations of the theory. Then it highlights the normative importance of the public sphere in Habermas’s two-track model of deliberative politics, before turning to the problems with the concept of communicative power. Two alternative readings of its role are provided in order to demonstrate how it needs to be further clarified