Jeffrey Howard

How should social media platforms respond to harmful speech? For some content, platforms respond by removing it. But for other content, platforms allow the speech to be posted, but reduce its distribution throughout their networks to reduce its visibility. This second technique—demotion—is swiftly becoming one of the most significant ways in which our communications are governed. Yet it strikingly remains normatively undertheorized. This article offers a framework for when platforms should demote content instead of removing it. After explaining why demotion policies by platforms stand in need of normative justification, and reviewing the various human rights norms that constrain how demotion should operate, it argues that demotion should be pursued instead of removal in cases where removal would violate principles of necessity or proportionality, yet demotion would satisfy them. By explaining when and why this is so, the article seeks to illuminate how notions of necessity and proportionality—central to both political philosophy and human rights law—should be applied to the distinctive context of online content moderation.

Freedom of speech is among the most cherished values of liberal democracy. But there is a surprising amount of disagreement as to what, exactly, it requires, and what priority it should take over other values. This chapter surveys debates in modern political theory on this topic. After setting out the traditional liberal defence of a strict right to free speech, it considers two critiques of that position: that the value of free speech should be balanced against (and some-times subordinated to) other values such as equality; and that protecting the voices of all citizens sometimes requires restricting speech rather than protecting it. The chapter then reviews recent efforts to defend the traditionalist stance against these critiques. Finally, it considers the way free speech is increasingly dependent on the decisions of private companies that host, curate, and broker public communication. It closes with a case study on whether social-media companies should be expected to restrict hate speech on their networks.

Artificially generated content threatens to seriously disrupt the public sphere. Generative AI massively facilitates the production of convincing portrayals of fabricated events. We have already begun to witness the spread of synthetic misinformation, political propaganda, and non-consensual intimate deepfakes. Malicious uses of the new technologies can only be expected to proliferate over time. In the face of this threat, social media platforms must surely act. But how? While it is tempting to think they need new sui generis policies targeting synthetic content, we argue that the challenge posed by generative AI should be met through the enforcement of general platform rules. We demonstrate that the threat posed to individuals and society by AI-generated content is no different in kind from that of ordinary harmful content—a threat which is already well recognised. Generative AI massively increases the problem but, ultimately, it requires the same approach. Therefore, platforms do best to double down on improving and enforcing their existing rules, regardless of whether the content they are dealing with was produced by humans or machines.

In a recent case, a Facebook user in Iran posted “death to Khamenei,” which the platform removed as a violation of its policy against threats and incitement. Facebook ultimately overturned the decision on the grounds that the speech, while contravening its rules, was newsworthy. Yet the company’s Oversight Board offered a distinct rationale for allowing the post: “death to Khamenei” was not a threat or an incitement at all, but rather a rhetorical expression of criticism, disdain, or disgust. Who was right? Drawing on longstanding distinctions in the philosophy of language, we argue that the answer depends on whether platform rules should primarily target an utterance’s illocutionary force or instead its perlocutionary effects. Using this case study to trace broader lessons for the proper governance of online speech, we argue that platforms’ rules should primarily target illocutionary force, only considering perlocutionary effects in cases where illocutionary force is ambiguous.

Should governments pay ransoms to terrorist organisations that unjustly kidnap their citizens? The United Kingdom and the United States refuse to negotiate with terrorist groups that kidnap and threaten to kill their people. In contrast, continental European countries, such as France and Germany, have regularly paid ransoms to rescue hostages. Who is right? This debate has raged in the public domain in recent years, but no sustained attempt has been made to subject the matter to philosophical scrutiny. This article explores this issue, focusing on the case of ransom payments to terrorist organisations. It contends that the state's duty to protect its citizens from murder grounds a defeasible obligation to pay ransoms. It considers the objection that a policy of paying ransoms endangers citizens abroad by increasing the likelihood of future kidnappings, and it explains why this objection is not sufficiently weighty. It then identifies a more powerful objection: namely, that a state's payment of ransoms makes the state complicit in the serious injustices that its ransom payments fund. It concludes that unless states can offset their contributions to such injustices, paying ransoms is wrong.

Why, exactly, should we punish children who commit crimes more leniently than adults who commit the same offenses? Gideon Yaffe thinks it is because they cannot vote, and so the strength of their reasons to obey the law is weaker than if they could. They are thus less culpable when they disobey. This argument invites an obvious objection: why not simply enfranchise children, thereby granting them legal reasons that are the same strength as enfranchised adults, and so permitting similarly severe punishment? Yaffe answers this question by arguing that child enfranchisement would objectionably undermine the values of political equality and self-government. This article explores some serious doubts about these arguments. It closes by questioning Yaffe’s reliance on a retributivist theory of punishment, contending that, once we reject retributivism in favor of more humane and productive alternatives, the thesis that child criminals deserve a break—which Yaffe assumes to be undeniably correct—becomes less plausible.

© 2015 by The American Association of Immunologists, Inc. Acute respiratory distress syndrome is a devastating disorder characterized by increased alveolar permeability with no effective treatment beyond supportive care. Current mechanisms underlying ARDS focus on alveolar endothelial and epithelial injury caused by products of innate immune cells and platelets. However, the role of adaptive immune cells in ARDS remains largely unknown. In this study, we report that expansion of Ag-specific abTh17 cells contributes to ARDS by local secretion of IL-17A, which in turn directly increases alveolar epithelial permeability. Mice with a highly restrictive defect in Ag-specific αβTh17 cells were protected from experimental ARDS induced by a single dose of endotracheal LPS. Loss of IL-17 receptor C or Ab blockade of IL-17A was similarly protective, further suggesting that IL-17A released by these cells was responsible for this effect. LPS induced a rapid and specific clonal expansion of αβTh17 cells in the lung, as determined by deep sequencing of the hypervariable CD3RβVJ region of the TCR. Our findings could be relevant to ARDS in humans, because we found significant elevation of IL-17A in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid from patients with ARDS, and rIL-17A directly increased permeability across cultured human alveolar epithelial monolayers. These results reveal a previously unexpected role for adaptive immune responses that increase alveolar permeability in ARDS and suggest that abTh17 cells and IL-17A could be novel therapeutic targets for this currently untreatable disease.

The proposal that the criminal justice system should focus on rehabilitation – rather than retribution, deterrence, or expressive denunciation – is among the least popular ideas in legal philosophy. Foremost among rehabilitation’s alleged weaknesses is that it views criminals as blameless patients to be treated, rather than culpable moral agents to be held accountable. This article offers a new interpretation of the rehabilitative approach that is immune to this objection and that furnishes the moral foundation that this approach has lacked. The view rests on the principle that moral agents owe it to one another to maintain the dependability of their moral capacities. Agents who culpably commit criminal wrongs, however, betray an unacceptable degree of moral unreliability. Punishment, on this theory, consists in the enforcement of the duties that offenders have to reduce their own likelihood of recidivism.

The idea that victims of social injustice who commit crimes ought not to be subject to punishment has attracted serious attention in recent legal and political philosophy. R. A. Duff has argued, for example, a states that perpetrates social injustice lacks the standing to punish victims of such injustice who commit crimes. A crucial premiss in his argument concerns the fact that when courts in liberal society mete out legitimate criminal punishments, they are conceived as acting in the name of all citizens—on behalf of the whole political community. Resisting this premiss, Peter Chau has suggested that courts ought to be conceived as acting only in the name of “just citizens”: citizens who cannot be plausibly seen as having contributed to distributive injustice. When conceived in this way, Chau argues, courts can no longer plausibly be regarded as lacking standing to punish. This article uses the debate between Duff and Chau to explain why the question of whether to punish socially deprived offenders can only be answered adequately when connected to broader concerns of democratic theory. Specifically, it argues that Chau’s proposal is not available within the context of the kind of political community upon which (Duff rightly believes) a system of liberal criminal law depends for its justification and maintenance: a community in which citizens see the law as embodying shared norms whose specific demands they disagree about. State officials are morally permitted to see themselves as acting on behalf of a subset of the citizenry, I argue, only in circumstances of democratic crisis : circumstances in which a moral community can no longer be plausibly said to exist