Jelena Govedarica

In his discussion of the state’s right to punish in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant appears to claim that an unmarried woman who kills her newborn in order to preserve the “honor of her sex” finds herself in a state of nature. Consequently, the state cannot punish her in the same manner as it punishes other murderers. Nevertheless, at the end of the paragraph, he concludes that infanticide, like any other form of murder, must be punished by death, even if public opinion considers this punishment unjust so long as the legislation remains “barbaric and undeveloped.” In this paper, I claim that Kant at no point advocates a punishment lighter than the death penalty. I further argue that the implications of the metaphor of the state of nature, as well as the analogy between infanticide and the right of necessity, render Kant’s argument internally contradictory. For this reason, the problematic parts of the text should be read as views Kant attributes to Beccaria, rather than endorses himself. Thus, the entire paragraph is best understood as a continuation of Kant’s explicit polemic with Beccaria concerning the legitimacy of the death penalty

In this article, we will argue that the interpretation that Kant was a racist is not based on the main arguments of Kant’s race theory nor on normative discrimination. Furthermore, this interpretation usually relies upon a literal reading of Kant’s notorious statements, which may not always be suitable. To support these arguments, we will lay out Kant’s theory of race in the first chapter, emphasizing the goals and intentions he explicitly stated, and conclude that the central arguments of his theory are non-discriminatory and non-racist. In the second part of the paper, we will present a non-racist reading of some of Kant’s most frequently cited statements. While we do not dispute that Kant’s comments about certain races sound extremely discriminatory, we will argue that we should consider the historical and philosophical context, philological analysis, and arguments surrounding the statement in question when interpreting Kant’s words. Our goal is not to prove conclusively that Kant was not a racist, but to demonstrate that it is possible to interpret Kant’s thoughts on race in a non-racist key, consistent with his normative theories.

By interpreting the basic concepts of Kant’s definition of enlightenment, as well as pointing out the importance of discussion for the development of understanding and explaining the role of state power in educating citizens, the author argues that enlightenment ought to be understood as an imperfect duty of every human being. This duty belongs to the duty of virtue according to which we are obligated, among other things, to advance our own perfection. In order to better understand the responsibility for one’s own minority and meaning of the independent use of one’s own understanding, she explains the cultivation of character as an educational phase in the moral development of an autonomous person. The last chapter responds to a critique of Kant’s theory and offers an interpretation of his „motto of enlightenment.”

Ontological dualism of human rights, their ideal and real aspect, is what makes them paradoxical. Having this dual nature, do human rights serve to "moralize" or "civilize" people? Analyzing the basic concepts of Kant's philosophy of public law and history, the author concludes that the term "moral rights" is contradictory , that one cannot talk about them in both senses simultaneously and avoid the paradox. If we regard them as juridical law, human rights play a constitutive role in the legislation of a particular country and what analytically follows is the law as coercion. However, if we understand them as moral laws, they will not be regarded as coercion and their function will be strictly regulative.

This dissertation provides a comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s views on the conditions of possibility of moral progress and moralization, understood as the achievement of the final purpose of nature. Although education of people and nations is the condition that contributes the most to the achievement of moralization, its only necessary condition of possibility is transcendentally grounded public right. This form of law meets the conditions of universality and necessity, because it is based solely on freedom. In this sense, moral progress of humanity requires strict restrictions on every person’s freedom of choice in accordance with a priori juridical principles and a more frequent determination of their will merely by the representation of the moral law. The main thesis of this dissertation is that juridical freedom of humanity could only be fully guaranteed if the world federal republic is established, while the ethical freedom of humanity could be attained only through constant struggle against the radical evil, which is more likely to succeed if people establish the ethical community; thus, the achievement of the final purpose of nature is conceivable only under the presumption of the constitution of the legal world state and the ethical world state. Additionally, this dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the most important ideas of Kant's philosophy of public right, both its transcendental and empirical side. The role of the empirical legal and political theory is to explain how metaphysical principles of right could be realized to the greatest possible extent, while Kant's anthropological theories and his reflections on the historical development of humanity should show the way human nature works in favour of the implementation of the pure principles of public right, sometimes even against people's intentions. These theories, together with his philosophy of education, show what guidelines people should follow on the way towards transcendental public right, so that humanity’s moral (legal and ethical) progress would be more efficient and less difficult.

The first chapter provides an insight into the ruling belief that the theory of reductive physicalism can not explain personal identity and that the narrative paradigm is a more adequate theoretical framework for understanding the self. In other chapters, the author interprets Galen Strawson’s theory, who has firmly denied the adequacy of the explanation that the self can be constituted only through the narrative. An adequate ontological conception of the self as the SESMET and the accompanying ethical theory by which Strawson responded to numerous criticisms of his ideas all show that opposition to narrative theory is not just for the sake of contradiction. In conclusion, the author draws attention to surprisingly strong reactions that followed in response to Strawson’s texts, which underline the fact that the narrative theory has become a kind of academic orthodoxy.

This paper offers a critical evaluation of the arguments that Kleingeld and Bernasconi used to support their claims regarding the idea that Immanuel Kant held racist beliefs. Firstly, we will criticize the views on which they agree, aiming to emphasize our understanding of Kant’s thoughts on race. Secondly, we will assess the significance of Kant’s draft for Towards Perpetual Peace when considering the debate over Kant’s racism, and show that Bernasconi’s interpretation — according to which Kant presented racist views in the third Critique and in his writings on history — is problematic. Although we will not systematically present our understanding of Kant’s thoughts on race, our critique of Kleingeld’s and Bernasconi’s claims will reflect our basic views: Kant was not a racist, and he never advocated for slavery and colonization. Kleingeld is right to insist that we must interpret Kant’s thoughts on race diachronically, as it is clear that his views evolved over the course of his life, but did not fundamentally change.

After analyzing Grotius’ formulation of the state of nature and natural law, social contract and international law, the author places emphasis on two insights. First, that a certain heuristic principle plays a central role in Grotius’ argument - the analogy between individuals and states in the state of nature. Second, his firm belief that within the international framework the protection of natural law of people and communities comes before respect for state sovereignty. The author will argue that morally unacceptable implications of these characteristics of Grotius’ theory, when we take into account the way in which he defines the rights of punishment and property, are in fact legitimation of interventionism and colonialism. The author will also argue that Grotius initiated an influential tradition in international law, characterized by a lack of clear boundaries between legal and moral norms.