Jelena Issajeva

This article attempts to give a plausible explanation to the long-debated question about the nature of mental imagery (MI). The traditional approach to this question is based on the representational paradigm, which, I claim, is misguided. Instead of representational aspects of mental imagery, I emphasize the functions of mental imagery, the variety of properties that images exhibit in experimental studies, and the relations between diff erent characteristics of images, their functions and the subject of imagery. That is, I propose to account for mental imagery as a sign system, consisting of different types of signs. A mental image can contain important properties as parts of the complex sign. This approach to the explanation of the nature of MI is beneficial, since it suggests the phenomenon of mental imagery, which overcomes some long-standing controversies on the issue.

This article addresses the problem of the nature of mental imagery from a new perspective. It suggests that sign-theoretical approach as elaborated by C. S. Peirce can give a better and more comprehensive explanation of mental imagery. Our empirical findings follow the methodology of cognitive semiotics and they show that (i) properties of mental images are heterogeneous in nature; (ii) properties of mental images are dependent on the characteristics of object-stimulus; (iii) properties of mental images are dependent on individual differences in imaginary capacities. This suggests that, contrary to representational accounts, mental imagery is not based on one dominant representational format. Imagery constitutes a complex system of signs consisting of several sign elements and dynamic relations. A sign-theoretical account may give a better explanation of the nature of mental imagery, as it accommodates heterogenous evidence from this experiment.

Peirce’s theory of signs is a rich and expansive theoretical option for cognitive sciences that does not assume the presence of the distinction between the methods of natural and those of the human sciences. The potential of the sign-theoretic account remains largely unacknowledged, however. The reason may be the conceptual jungle that one encounters at the moment one tries to penetrate it. The present paper explains the key terms of Peirce’s theory from the viewpoint of the theory of cognition. In Peirce’s own terms, this is to take the theory of signs to be influenced by phaneroscopy, the science of phenomenology that prepares ground for the sign-theoretic study of mind. We review the main technical terms of Peirce’s phaneroscopy and provide an explanation of its central nomenclature, often drawing from unpublished manuscript sources. This extended glossary can serve as an integrated aid to both Peirce’s theory of signs as well as to its phenomenological underpinnings, illustrating the unique character of this early method for the theory of cognition.

Traditionally it is taken for granted that mental imagery (MI) is a mental representation (MR) of some kind or format. This yields that theory of MR can give an adequate and exhaustive explanation of MI. Such co-relation between the two is usually seen as unproblematic. But is it really so? This article aims at challenging the theoretical claim that the dominant ‘two-world’ account of MR can adequately explain MI. Contrary to the standard theory of MR, there are reasons to believe that: (a) MI has different cognitive architecture, (b) the relations between elements of MI are dynamic, (c) relations between elements of MI are context-dependent. Consequently, it follows that dominant account of MR neglects important characteristics of MI and, thus, fails to give a comprehensive explanation of the latter. Alternatively, I will argue that a sign-theoretic approach, proposed by C. S. Peirce, can suggest a promising explanation of MI and fully account for the divergent empirical data on the matter.