Jelscha Schmid

Throughout different versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, J. G. Fichte uses the term ‘experiment’ in reference to his philosophical method. This paper presents an account of Fichte’s methodological understanding of experiments in philosophy and their role in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95). I show that Fichte in Part One and Two of the Grundlage describes and conducts a type of philosophical experiment that draws on key elements of Kant’s conception of an “experiment of pure reason” in the Critique of Pure Reason. On this account, Fichte introduces the notion of a philosophical experiment to explain how the Grundlage can establish its foundational principles by virtue of a synthetic method. Moreover, I argue that Fichte in Part Two further distinguishes between explorative and demonstrative experiments, each serving a distinctive role in proving the possibility and reality of theoretical knowledge. By way of this reading, I arrive at new conclusions concerning Fichte’s conception of the synthetic procedure to be employed in philosophy and the argumentative strategies employed in the Grundlage.

Der Beitrag argumentiert, dass eine Analyse von Maimons Konzeption des Verfahrens einer transzendentalen Deduktion im Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie (1790) einen neuen Zugang zu seiner philosophischen Position eröffnet. Maimon rekonstruiert Kants Deduktion als transzendentales Argument mit antiskeptischer Funktion; seine Kritik an den Fragen quid juris? und quid facti? richtet sich dabei nicht gegen die Form des Kantischen Arguments, sondern gegen die Gewissheit seiner Prämissen. Einerseits zeigt sich, worin Maimon einen unbezweifelbaren Ausgangspunkt für eine transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien sieht, andererseits, dass er diesen Ausgangspunkt nur unter der transzendentalen Annahme der Idee eines unendlichen Verstandes und des damit verbundenen Anspruchs auf vollständige Rechtfertigung durch zureichende Gründe denken kann. Daraus ergibt sich, dass Maimon die Frage quid juris? und ihre Beantwortung durch eine transzendentale Deduktion für seine eigene Philosophie letztlich als überflüssig erachtet und stattdessen auf die Möglichkeit eines neuen, im Prinzip der Bestimmbarkeit gegründeten Verfahrens abzielt.

Thought about scientific models and modelling practices in the sciences has a long tradition. It has recently been argued that this practice of science also exists in metaphysics. In this paper, I show that this view has two significant historical forerunners: Hans Vaihinger and Salomon Maimon. Vaihinger provided what is today often seen as the starting point of the contemporary debate on scientific models as fictions. He argued that fictions can be equally useful in the sciences as in metaphysics. However, Vaihinger‘s position is problematic. Firstly, he mainly credits Kant for providing the first comprehensive account of the method of fictions in the sciences. I will argue that contrary to his claims, it was Maimon – whom Vaihinger only mentions in passing – who first adapted Kant‘s doctrine of ideas to serve the purposes of a fictionalist agenda. I will show that Maimon‘s account of scientific fictions already contains many of the features which Vaihinger claims to have discovered himself. Secondly, Vaihinger’s failure to distinguish between the use of fictions in the sciences and metaphysics creates a problem for some types of metaphysical fictions. I show that Maimon‘s account of metaphysical fictions identifies and avoids this problem.

Throughout different versions of the Wissenschaftslehre J. G. Fichte uses the term ‘experiment’ in reference to his philosophical method. This paper presents an account of Fichte’s methodological understanding of experiments in philosophy and their role in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95). I show that Fichte in Part One and Two of the Grundlage describes and conducts a type of philosophical experiment that draws on key elements of Kant’s conception of an “experiment of pure reason” in the Critique of Pure Reason. On this account, Fichte introduces the notion of a philosophical experiment to explain how the Grundlage can establish its foundational principles by virtue of a synthetic method. Moreover, I argue that Fichte in Part Two further distinguishes between explorative and demonstrative experiments, each serving a distinctive role in proving the possibility and reality of theoretical knowledge. By way of this reading, I arrive at new conclusions concerning Fichte’s conception of the synthetic procedure to be employed in philosophy and the argumentative strategies employed in the Grundlage.

In this paper, I show how Maimon’s method of fic- tions deals with the specific problems raised by one of his skeptical arguments, namely the quid facti. This argument leads Maimon to adopt what is sometimes called a ‘system interpretation’ of the necessity of empirical laws. Since Maimon thinks that transcendental philosophy cannot prove the fact that the categories have objective validity, he infers that hence systematization, and not the catego- ries, is what constitutes the source of necessity in empirical laws. Yet, systemat- ization can only ever yield high probability but never apodictic necessity. Conse- quently, Maimon proposes to understand theoretical philosophy as science that employs and indeed can only employ the method of fictions. Since neither phil- osophical, nor physical laws can claim objective validity, philosophical princi- ples must be understood as useful fictions. Thereby, philosophy engages in a form of modeling-practice that delivers descriptions of the conceptual conditions that would be required for our scientific judgments to be justified.

This paper reconstructs a neglected line of development from Kant’s A-Deduction, through Maimon’s skeptical fictionalism, to Fichte’s early Wissenschaftslehre, with the productive imagination as its central thread. I first examine Kant’s account of the transcendental operation of the imagination as the condition for the objective validity of empirical cognition, highlighting its role in grounding the affinity of appearances and the unity of apperception, and in linking sensible manifolds to the categories of understanding. I then turn to Maimon’s critique, which rejects Kant’s heterogeneity thesis and conceives sensibility as an unconscious, spontaneous activity of the understanding. For Maimon, the imagination produces only a secondary, pictorial order whose syntheses lack objective necessity, rendering empirical objects intelligible yet “fictional.” In the final section, I show how Fichte redeploys Maimon’s insights while rejecting his fictionalist conclusion. Fichte argues that the productive imagination is the original synthetic activity that generates both empirical reality and its objective representation, preserving Kant’s critical spirit while securing the possibility of objectively valid cognition.

On the basis of an examination of Kant's, Maimon's and Schelling's metaphilosophies, this book investigates how, starting from Kant's diagnosis of a "groping metaphysics", a philosophical research program, whose goal is to elucidate the nature and method of philosophy itself, develops. What unites theirprojects is the thesis that philosophy must begin with an investigation of its own nature, and that this investigation, because of its special object, must be accompanied by a reflection on its method. To this end, their methods are discussed on the assumption that these methods arise from a particular engagement with the theories and practices of the 18th century sciences. Finally, this discussion provides the basis for showing in what ways philosophical experiments, fictions, or models offer methodological solutions to the problem of developing a scientific metaphysics.

This paper argues that Maimon’s metaphilosophy presents a distinctive view on what the scientific role and method of philosophy should consist in: in the production of fictions of systematicity. It shows how Maimon’s philosophy of science links to metaphilosophical views, and ultimately leads him to adopt the so-called “method of fictions” to transform philosophy into a proper science. By connecting his remarks on scientific fictions and their methodological role with Kant’s doctrine of regulative ideas and the latter’s conception of systematicity, the paper develops a systematic account of the method of fictions, its employment in theoretical philosophy and the scientific image resulting from this view.

Winner of Fichte-Preis für Nachwuchsforscher*innen. In this paper I develop an account of Fichte’s conception of philosophical construction. Following the latter’s definition of philosophy as the ‘science of science’, philosophy is to be understood as a normative theory of what should qualify as science. In order to ground scientific knowledge-production as such, philosophy itself has to acquire a scientific method, through the application of which the constitution of scientific knowledge is secured. In systematic continuity to Kant’s account of geometrical construction, Fichte develops a philosophical method that exploits the special epistemic conditions of performativity. Construction is then defined as an experimental, self-reflexive performance that exemplifies consciousness. Throughout its acts of exemplification this reflexive kind of self-observation yields a particular type of experience, which ultimately satisfies the Science of Knowledge’s demand for certainty, that is intellectual intuition.

Philosophies after Kant maybe more than ever, were confronted with a particular epistemic problem: how can representations correspond with the objects they refer to, that is, how is knowledge possible? Against Kant’s negative solution of the problem, proponents of German idealisms sought to establish a philosophical method that would close the gulf between what our concepts and the world they try to grasp. In his writings on a philosophy of nature, the young Schelling put forward methodological solution, which in interesting ways relates to Kant’s statements on philosophical and mathematical methods of knowledge-acquisition. Far away from being a relapse into pre-critical philosophy, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie offers a solution to the epistemic aporia through the concept of Darstellung [presentation]. Taking up on Kant’s theory of mathematical presentation, Schelling devises a philosophical method capable of ‘presenting its concepts’. I take ‘presentation’ to denote a reflective performance, which describes the genesis of its object while simultaneously bringing it into existence. By means of his conception of scientific experiments, Schelling introduces a way of mediating the ideal realm of philosophical construction with real realm of material nature; it is the role of the experiment to make nature present itself.

In this paper, I propose an existentialist-phenomenological model that conceives of mental illness through the terminology of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In particular, the concepts of existentiality, disturbance and the relation between ‘being-with’ and ‘the one’, will be implemented in order to reconstruct the experience of mental illness. The proposed model understands mental illness as a disturbance of a person’s existentiality. More precisely, mental illness is conceptualized as the disturbance of a person’s existential structure, the process of which leads to a becoming explicit of the otherwise implicit dynamical structure that constitutes a person’s experience. In particular, the existential component of ‘being-with’ comes to play a central role in the disturbance of existentiality, thus, I will claim, that it enables a person’s structure of experience to be ‘open for normativity’. By adopting a pragmatist stance on Heideggerian phenomenology, the suggested model proves compatible with naturalist and normativist theories of mental illness while still offering a phenomenological description of the phenomenon.