Jennifer Hodges-Moore

Insider trading is illegal, and is widely believed to be unethical. It has received widespread attention in the media and has become, for some, the very symbol of ethical decay in business. For a practice that has come to epitomize unethical business behavior, however, insider trading has received surprisingly little ethical analysis. This article critically examines the principal ethical arguments against insider trading: the claim that the practice is unfair, the claim that it involves a misappropriation of information and the claim that it harms ordinary investors and the market as a whole. The author concludes that each of these arguments has some serious deficiencies; no one of them by itself provides a sufficient reason for outlawing insider trading. This does not mean, however, that there are no reasons for prohibiting the practice. The author argues that the real reason for outlawing insider trading is that it undermines the fiduciary relationship that lies at the heart of American business.

This article evaluates New Zealand’s Medicines Amendment Bill 2011. This Bill is currently before Parliament and will amend the Medicines Act 1981. On June 20, 2011, the Australian and New Zealand governments announced their decision to proceed with a joint scheme for the regulation of therapeutic products such as medicines, medical devices, and new medical interventions. Eventually, the joint arrangements will be administered by a single regulatory agency: the Australia New Zealand Therapeutic Products Agency. The medicines regulations in Australia and New Zealand will be updated as part of this process. The Medicines Amendment Bill addresses some of the well-recognised deficiencies in the Medicines Act 1981. However, a comprehensive overhaul of the Act is not being undertaken. I argue that repealing and replacing the Medicines Act 1981 would be preferable and advisable, given the number of legal difficulties with the Act and, in particular, where it does not align with equivalent current international law

Most of the debate about drug testing in the workplace has focused on the right to privacy. Proponents of testing have had to tackle difficult questions concerning the nature, extent, and weight of the privacy rights of employees. This paper examines a different kind of argument — the claim that because corporations are responsible for harms committed by employees while under the influence of drugs, they are entitled to test for drug use. This argument has considerable intuitive appeal, because it seems, at least at first glance, to bypass the issue of privacy rights altogether. The argument turns, not on rights, but on the nature and conditions of responsibility. We may therefore call it an ought implies can argument.In spite of its initial appeal, however, the argument does not succeed in circumventing the claims of privacy rights. Even responsibility for the actions of others does not entitle us to do anything at all to control their behavior; we must look to rights, among other things, to determine what sorts of controls are morally permissible. In addition, the argument rests on unjustified assumptions about the connection between drug testing and the prevention of drug-related harm.

The present article is the second in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article are Skinner’s academic and research experiences between 1928, when he entered graduate school at Harvard, and the late 1930s, when he had assumed his first academic position. The article also examines the intellectual climate that emerged during the second quarter of the twentieth century, which is the context out of which radical behaviorism developed as a unique position. Overall, the views for which Skinner is recognized were significantly influenced by such figures as Francis Bacon, Percy Bridgman, William Crozier, Jacques Loeb, Ernst Mach, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson

The present article is the first in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism. The series seeks to identify milestones in the development of Skinner’s position, as well as assess the impact of particular factors and events on Skinner himself. Of special interest in this article are the biographical details of Skinner’s life between June, 1926, when he received his undergraduate degree, and September, 1928, when he entered graduate school. The article also examines the intellectual climate at the start of the second quarter of the twentieth century that led Skinner to become interested in the empirical study of behavior. Overall, Skinner’s views during this period were significantly influenced by such literary figures in the modernist tradition as H.G. Wells and Sinclair Lewis; and such scientific/philosophical figures as Francis Bacon, Jacques Loeb, Ivan Pavlov, Bertrand Russell, and John B. Watson

The present article is the third in a series of three that outlines the historical and conceptual background of B.F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science. Of special interest in this article is the intellectual context of a paper on operationism Skinner published in 1945, in which he first used the term “radical behaviorism” in print. Overall, Skinner’s radical behaviorism was a thoroughgoing behaviorism that provided a naturalistic account of the full range of human functioning, including the influence on both verbal and nonverbal behavior of phenomena identified as "subjective."

The present paper explores some of the characteristics and implications of the approach to scientific theories and theoretical concepts that developed under the auspices of mediational S—O—R neobehaviorism during the middle of the present century. Of special interest is the evaluation of scientific theories and theoretical concepts, notably "hypothetical constructs" and "intervening variables," in terms of realism, instrumentalism, and pragmatism. The paper argues that many contemporary behavioral theorists who embrace the aforementioned approach often fail to understand the verbal processes by which scientific verbal behavior develops. The result is an unfortunate confusion of epistemological principles that does not adequately distinguish among realism, instrumentalism, and pragmatism

A persistent challenge for nominally behavioral viewpoints in philosophical psychology is how to make sense of psychological terms that appeal to the mental. Two such viewpoints, logical behaviorism and conceptual analysis, hold that psychological terms appealing to the mental must be taken to mean (i.e., refer to) something that is publicly observable, such as underlying physiological states, publicly observable behavior, or dispositions to engage in publicly observable behavior, rather than mental events per se. However, they do so for slightly different reasons. A third viewpoint, behavior analysis, agrees that (a) some terms are functionally related to (i.e., occasioned by) the link between publicly observable behavior and publicly observable features of the environment, (b) some terms are dispositional, and (c) a purely private language could not arise. However, behavior analysis also recognizes that some psychological terms relate to private behavioral events, such as occur when speakers report internal sensations or engage in covert behavior.

Professor Foxall suggests the radical behaviorist language of contingencies is fine as far as it goes, and is quite suitable for matters of prediction and control. However, he argues that radical behaviorist language is extensional, and that it is necessary to formally incorporate the intentional idiom into the language of behavioral science to promote explanations and interpretations of behavior that are comprehensive in scope. Notwithstanding Professor Foxall's arguments, radical behaviorists hold that the circumstances identified by the use of the intentional idiom are accommodated by the radical behaviorist language of contingencies, not only for prediction and control but also for explanations and interpretations. Of central importance is that individuals may have histories that lead them to generate descriptions of past and present behavior, as well as descriptions of prevailing circumstances that have caused that behavior or are likely to cause that behavior in the future. The resulting verbal behavior may then enter into contingencies influencing their behavior, although the extent to which it does so varies across individuals as a function of their histories. Overall, the way that the pragmatism of radical behaviorism conceives of the nature and contribution of covert events differs appreciably from the way Professor Foxall conceives of the nature and contribution of intentional phenomena.