Jennifer Jill Fellows

. Trust-building has implicitly been characterized in epistemology as necessitating the adoption of shared belief. If this is so, such models of trust-building appear at odds with a metaphysical commitment to pluralist realism. In this article I offer the first steps in modeling how a pluralist realist might understand trust building. I argue that entertaining pluralist realism as a possibility may actually be more fruitful for trust building than a monist conception because each side is given an important concession: the possibility that their knowledge claims might be correct. The case of polar bear conservation in the Canadian arctic illustrates that trust-building without shared belief is possible. I wish the members of these round-table discussions success in the future.

In the following critique of Sandra Harding’s 2015 book Objectivity and Diversity I will raise three sets of interrelated issues. One: that Harding’s arguments for re-conceptualizing the term ‘objectivity’ may not be persuasive to those who continue to cling to the ‘view from nowhere’ understanding of the term. Two: that because of this entrenchment of the view from nowhere, Harding’s rhetorical strategy of referring to traditional knowledge as ‘science’ may result in further marginalization of already marginalized groups. And Three: that not all cases of multiple and conflicted selves are necessarily cases of increased access to knowledge and increased empowerment. Thus, while I am deeply sympathetic to the arguments being made in Harding’s book, I think this new scientific self that Harding proposes at the end of her book needs to be developed and clarified further.