Jenny Hung

The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
  •  1
    What are we? The ontology of subjects of experience
    Dissertation, Lingnan College. 2018.
    What am I? There are a number of possible answers: I am a person, a mind, a human animal, a soul, part of a human being (e.g., a brain), I do not exist, and even more. Philosophers have been asking this for thousands of years and were not satisfied. In the contemporary analytic tradition, philosophers are attracted to a naturalistic, scientific ontology hence a materialistic personal ontology that matches the huge success in scientific discoveries. They think that we are material objects. Howeve…Read more
  •  22
    Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts
    Philosophical Psychology 36 (3): 580-600. 2023.
    A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally conscious because they prohibit any a priori correlation between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts. I make my argument by first discussing se…Read more
  •  26
    Zhiyi is the most important scholar of Tiantai Buddhism. He uses the term ‘ji即,’ which is normally translated as ‘equals to’ or ‘is identical to,’ to illustrate the relation between...
  •  26
    A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View
    History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (3): 217-235. 2020.
    Nāgārjuna, the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catuṣkoṭi in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catuṣkoṭi: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma wh…Read more
  •  19
    Is Zhuangzi a Wanton? Observation and Transformation of Desires in the Zhuangzi
    Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 19 (2): 289-305. 2020.
    This essay considers how the Zhuangzi 莊子 sheds light on a new direction to the contemporary discussion of desires. Harry Frankfurt proposes an account of personhood based on a hierarchy of desires. He defines a wanton as a being that does not have second-order volitions, the desires that a certain desire of action becomes her will. J. David Velleman proposes, in the context of the Zhuangzi, that when a Daoist sage performs her skills she can be regarded as a “higher” wanton because her actions a…Read more
  •  74
    The Theory of the Self in the Zhuangzi: A Strawsonian Interpretation
    Philosophy East and West 69 (2): 376-394. 2019.
    This essay investigates the Zhuangzian theory of the self, which has long been the subject of a heated and controversial debate in Chinese intellectual history. According to an interpretation that has been quite prominent since the 1990s, the self in the Zhuangzi is a substantial, persisting self; it is a simple, basic object that is distinct from its properties. A substance, generally speaking, is an object or entity that has properties. Substance metaphysicians claim that substances, as primar…Read more
  •  43
    The early Yogācāra theory of no-self
    Asian Philosophy 28 (4): 316-331. 2018.
    I reconstruct early Yogācāra theory of no-self based on works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. I introduce the idea of the cognitive schema (CS) of the self, a conception borrowed from the developmental psychologist, Jean Piaget. A fundamental CS is a psychological function that guides the formation of perceptions. I propose that Manas can be understood in terms of being the CS of the self, a psychological mechanism from which perceptions of external objects are formed. In addition, I argue that non-im…Read more