Jenny Keefe

This chapter recounts the philosophical development and writings of James Frederick Ferrier. Professor of Moral Philosophy at St Andrews and regarded by many as the greatest metaphysician of his time, Ferrier was also at the centre of two hotly contested professorial appointments in Edinburgh. The chapter gives special attention to Ferrier’s role as an early proponent of an Idealist philosophy, his rejection of the ‘common sense’ philosophy of Thomas Reid, and his formulation of a version of Idealism in which a return to Bishop Berkeley is especially important. The chapter considers the significance of Ferrier’s major work, the ‘Institutes of Metaphysic’, a work that was largely ignored and underlined his philosophical isolation. It concludes with an extended discussion of the truth in Ferrier’s protestation that, despite his criticisms of Reid, he remained a Scottish philosopher.

This volume contains selections from the philosophical writings of James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864). Ferrier was the Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of St Andrews between 1845 and 1864 and he was one of the earliest post-Hegelian British idealists. He develops a system of absolute idealism via a rejection of the Scottish school of common sense and Enlightenment philosophy in general. These selections focus on his primary philosophical interests: epistemology and ontology. Ferrier denies the possibility of a science of man and suggests that philosophy should focus on self-consciousness, the defining feature of humanity. Jennifer Keefe is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside.

James Frederick Ferrier developed his philosophy from a common sense background. However, his rejection of common sense philosophy in particular and Enlightenment philosophy in general results in the development of a system of idealism. In his series of lectures ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness - Parts I to VII’, which appeared in Blackwoods Magazine (1838–39), he outlines the problem with modern philosophy and argues that philosophy should follow a new direction. In his view, the most peculiar and interesting aspect of humanity is consciousness. He contends that the attempt to develop a ‘science of man’ is impossible because it transforms a person into an object of study and thereby fails to capture the most distinctive aspect of humanity, namely, consciousness. According to Ferrier, philosophy should be an extension of consciousness itself; it is: ‘consciousness sublimed’. This paper will outline the central arguments in ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness’ and show that an early example of British idealism was not only developed out of the common sense tradition but shares with common sense philosophy a focus on the immediate evidence of consciousness, placing the relationship between thought and world at the centre of philosophical inquiry.

James Frederick Ferrier was one of the first post-Hegelian British idealists, developing his idealism via a rejection of Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy and from a reappraisal of Berkeley’s idealism. This chapter is a critical consideration of his major work, the Institutes of Metaphysic in which he develops a complete system of metaphysics. From an examination of the laws of knowledge and by applying the deductive method he determines that the absolute in cognition is an indivisible subject-object synthesis and it follows from this that absolute existence must involve some self in union thoughts and things. His move from knowing to being is problematic and in this way his ontology falls short of his ambitious aims. Nevertheless, Ferrier provides an unusual and astute idealist epistemology several years before idealism became influential in British philosophy.