Jenny Shaw

The aim of this chapter is to discuss questions about the mind and body from both Indian and Western perspectives. Hence, I discuss how mind is related to body, beginning with the modern philosopher René Descartes. In this context I discuss the views of Cartesian as well as non-Cartesian philosophers, such as Wittgenstein and Peter Strawson. In the context of Western philosophy, I discuss some of the contemporary theories of consciousness, including the identity theory, as well as the representational theory of consciousness, and the neural basis of consciousness. Regarding the nature of consciousness, I discuss the psychological states expressed by propositional attitudes such as, belief, knowledge, hopes, desires, fears, etc., as well as non-intentional or phenomenal, referred to by the word “qualia.”All the theories of consciousness in Western philosophy may be classified as emergentism, reductionism, or panpsychicism. Since all of them have shortcomings, Seager claims that it leads to “mysterianism.” Regarding the referent of the word “I,” in the context of Indian philosophy, I discuss both the classical and nonclassical theories. Hence, I have referred to the views of the Upaniṣadic thinkers, as well as the views of the followers of the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, SāṃkhyaYoga, Advaita-Vedānta Buddhism, Śākta Āgama, Yogavāśiṣṭha and Pratyabhijñā Śaiva Darśana. I have also developed the views of non-classical philosophers, such as Swamji Vivekananda and the neo-Advaitin K.C. (Krishna Chandra) Bhattacharyya.Regarding the Nyāya conception of cognition or mental states, it is claimed that it cannot be equated with the Western concept of representation, as the Nyāya philosophers do not postulate propositions, images or concepts. In this context I have explained how the Nyāya philosophers would explain false beliefs without postulating any possible worlds or intermediaries.Western philosophers by and large have emphasised materialism, behaviourism, eliminativism, functionalism, reductionism or naturalism. But the Indian philosophers by and large, have emphasised non-materialism, or non-reductionism. This may be due to the fact that they have emphasised certain values, such as mokṣa or liberation, the realisation of which presupposes consciousness.Regarding different theories or mind, or the referent of the word “I,” I think they have suggestive meanings, as the question of truth or falsehood does not arise with reference to metaphysical expressions.

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One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the nyaya philosophers. this discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. a discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. according to the nyaya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. the distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. i have also discussed the question whether the nyaya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different terms. a distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context

Throughout my philosophical journey, I have tried to bridge the gap between contemporary western philosophy and the analytical traditions of the Indian philosophical systems, especially Navya-Nyāya. Hence my aim has been to promote a dialogue between these two traditions where each can derive insights from the other. I have focused on new or better solutions to some contemporary problems of epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, as well as global issues, and think Indian philosophy can be integrated with current western philosophy, adding a new dimension to global culture and understanding.

This paper focuses on the relevance of Indian epistemology and the philosophy of language to contemporary Western philosophy. Hence it discusses (1) how perceptual, inferential and verbal cognitions are related to the same object, (2) how to draw the distinction in meaning between transformationally equivalent sentences, such as ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ and ‘Caesar was killed by Brutus’, and (3) why the predicate-expression is to be considered as unsaturated but the subjectexpression as saturated. In order to answer these questions the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the distinction between several pairs of terms, such as ‘subject–predicate’, ‘qualificand–qualifier’ and ‘the first term–the second term’. This paper also deals with the Nyāya conception of inference for others, and the interpretations of the premise called ‘upanaya’ (‘application’) or the cognition called ‘parāmarśa’ (‘operation’)