Indifference objections to the fine-tuning argument hold that the probability of fine-tuning on theism itself is very low or inscrutable, due to the vast range of alternatives God has for creating a life-permitting universe. We defend this response against a litany of recent objections. First, we develop a Bayesian model showing that one cannot relegate facts about alternative law structures into the background, since the very facts about those structures that make fine-tuning unlikely are thems…
Read moreIndifference objections to the fine-tuning argument hold that the probability of fine-tuning on theism itself is very low or inscrutable, due to the vast range of alternatives God has for creating a life-permitting universe. We defend this response against a litany of recent objections. First, we develop a Bayesian model showing that one cannot relegate facts about alternative law structures into the background, since the very facts about those structures that make fine-tuning unlikely are themselves unlikely on theism in a way that cancels out any evidence from fine-tuning. Second, we point out that since God’s options for producing a life-permitting universe always exceed the naturalistic possibilities, that we find ourselves in a universe with physical parameters counts as evidence against theism. Third, we show how our model addresses important defenses of the fine-tuning argument. For instance, we respond to the charge that certain objections to the fine-tuning argument ‘prove too much’, because it would follow from these objections that miracles such as the stars spelling out ‘made by God’ would be no evidence for theism. We show both that our model has unique resources to address this objection and further that this objection is independently mistaken.