68Two Sorts of ConstitutivismAnalytic Philosophy. forthcoming.Some things, but only some things, are by nature subject to standards. Why? I explain a constitutivist answer to this question in terms of certain genera possessing essential properties which their particulars can possess or lack. When something is by nature subject to a standard, it is so subject because it is a particular of a genus with such properties, and it is subject to a standard with respect to those very properties. I then explain the account of the nature and structure of normativity …Read more
50The Error ConditionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1): 34-48. 2020.The possibility of error conditions the possibility of normative principles. I argue that extant interpretations of this condition undermine the possibility of normative principles for our action because they implicitly treat error as a perfection of an action. I then explain how a constitutivist metaphysics of capacities explains why error is an imperfection of an action. Finally, I describe and defend the interpretation of the error condition which follows.
81Intellectual IsolationMind 127 (506): 491-520. 2018.Intellectualism is the widespread view that practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, distinguished from others by its objects: reasons to act. I argue that if practical reason is a species of theoretical reason, practical judgments by nature have nothing to do with action. If they have nothing to do with action, I cannot act from my representation of reasons for me to act. If I cannot act from those representations, those reasons cannot exist. If they cannot exist, neither can a spec…Read more
Oxford UniversityFaculty of Philosophy, Keble CollegeDepartmental Lecturer and Fixed-Term Fellow In Philosophy
Oxford, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland