Jeremy David Fix

Does morality corrupt intimacy? While this challenge against modern ethical theory is familiar, the chapter argues that with respect to a certain strand of Kantian ethical theory, it does not so much as make sense. The chapter presents Kantian accounts of the function of morality and of the role of the motive of duty in the moral psychology of the virtuous human being. Morality is fundamentally about giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The motive of duty is the motive to so relate to each other. In the virtuous human being, it shapes and informs the content of other motives, including those characteristic of intimacy. I argue that so relating to an intimate is a constitutive part of any proper intimate relationship and action. To relate to another intimately just is in part to relate to another morally because an intimate relationship is a type of interpersonal relationship and morality is the form of interpersonal relationships. To the extent that a subject does not so integrate their motive of duty with their other motives, their moral and intimate relationships are compromised, and on the same grounds. Intimacy without morality is thus corrupt.