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326Creating CarnistsPhilosophers' Imprint. forthcoming.We argue that individual and institutional caregivers have a defeasible moral duty to provide dependent children with plant-based diets and related education. Notably, our three arguments for this claim do not presuppose any general duty of veganism. Instead, they are grounded in widely shared intuitions about children’s interests and caregivers’ responsibilities, as well as recent empirical research relevant to children’s moral development, autonomy development, and physical health. Together, t…Read more
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837Racism as Civic ViceEthics 131 (3): 539-570. 2021.I argue that racism is essentially a civic character trait: to be a racist is to have a character that rationally reflects racial supremacist sociopolitical values. As with moral vice accounts of racism, character is my account’s primary evaluative focus: character is directly evaluated as racist, and all other racist things are racist insofar as, and because, they cause, are caused by, express or are otherwise suitably related to racist character. Yet as with political accounts of racism, socio…Read more
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184Mark Alfano, Moral Psychology: An Introduction (review)Syndicate Philosophy 13. 2018.A review of Mark Alfano's Moral Psychology: An Introduction. Includes a reply from Alfano.
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1361Feeling Racial Pride in the Mode of Frederick DouglassCritical Philosophy of Race 9 (1): 71-101. 2021.Drawing on Frederick Douglass’s arguments about racial pride, I develop and defend an account of feeling racial pride that centers on resisting racialized oppression. Such pride is racially ecumenical in that it does not imply partiality towards one’s own racial group. I argue that it can both accurately represent its intentional object and be intrinsically and extrinsically valuable to experience. It follows, I argue, that there is, under certain conditions, a morally unproblematic, and plausib…Read more
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443Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism About "Possessive" EmotionsSouthwest Philosophy Review 36 (2): 87-104. 2020.Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of o…Read more
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756The Creeps as a Moral EmotionErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 191-217. 2020.Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object is agential activi…Read more
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465Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen – By Kwame Anthony Appiah (review)Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1): 96-99. 2011.
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365Self‐Assessment and Social PracticesJournal of Social Philosophy 48 (2): 144-164. 2017.This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.
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716Pride and Moral ResponsibilityRatio 30 (2): 181-196. 2015.Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are suit…Read more
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943Being Proud and Feeling Proud: Character, Emotion, and the Moral Psychology of Personal IdealsJournal of Value Inquiry 46 (2): 209-222. 2012.Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion and the trait cor…Read more
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509The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride, Self-Sufficiency, and ModestyPhilosophical Papers 45 (3): 365-399. 2016.This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets one’s person…Read more
Jeremy Fischer
Independent Scholar
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Independent ScholarOther
Chicago, IL, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Moral Psychology |
Moral Emotion |
Philosophy of Race |
Areas of Interest
Social and Political Philosophy |
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
PhilPapers Editorships
Pride |