•  218
    Racism as Civic Vice
    Ethics 131 (3): 539-570. 2021.
    I argue that racism is essentially a civic character trait: to be a racist is to have a character that rationally reflects racial supremacist sociopolitical values. As with moral vice accounts of racism, character is my account’s primary evaluative focus: character is directly evaluated as racist, and all other racist things are racist insofar as, and because, they cause, are caused by, express or are otherwise suitably related to racist character. Yet as with political accounts of racism, socio…Read more
  •  29
    Method in Moral Psychology (review)
    Syndicate Philosophy 13. 2018.
    A review of Mark Alfano's Moral Psychology: An Introduction. Includes a reply from Alfano.
  •  162
    Feeling Racial Pride in the Mode of Frederick Douglass
    Critical Philosophy of Race 9 (1): 71-101. 2021.
    Drawing on Frederick Douglass’s arguments about racial pride, I develop and defend an account of feeling racial pride that centers on resisting racialized oppression. Such pride is racially ecumenical in that it does not imply partiality towards one’s own racial group. I argue that it can both accurately represent its intentional object and be intrinsically and extrinsically valuable to experience. It follows, I argue, that there is, under certain conditions, a morally unproblematic, and plausib…Read more
  •  116
    Why Are You Proud of That? Cognitivism About "Possessive" Emotions
    Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (2): 87-104. 2020.
    Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of o…Read more
  •  317
    The Creeps as a Moral Emotion
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (6): 191-217. 2020.
    Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object is agential activi…Read more
  •  198
    Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen – By Kwame Anthony Appiah (review)
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1): 96-99. 2011.
  •  114
    Self‐Assessment and Social Practices
    Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2): 144-164. 2017.
    This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.
  •  107
    The Ethics of Reflexivity: Pride, Self-Sufficiency, and Modesty
    Philosophical Papers 45 (3): 365-399. 2016.
    This essay develops a framework for understanding what I call the ethics of reflexivity, that is, the norms that govern attitudes and actions with respect to one’s own worth. I distinguish five central aspects of the reflexive commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals: the extent to which and manner in which one regards oneself from an evaluative point of view, the extent to which one cares about receiving the respect of others, the degree to which one interprets one’s person…Read more
  •  289
    Pride and Moral Responsibility
    Ratio 30 (2): 181-196. 2017.
    Having the emotion of pride requires taking oneself to stand in some special relation to the object of pride. According to agency accounts of this pride relation, the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence or excellence of the object of one's pride. I argue that agency accounts fail. This argument provides a strong prima facie defence of an alternate account of pride, according to which the self and the object of pride are suit…Read more
  •  559
    Much of the philosophical attention directed to pride focuses on the normative puzzle of determining how pride can be both a central vice and a central virtue. But there is another puzzle, a descriptive puzzle, of determining how the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride relate to each other. A solution is offered to the descriptive puzzle that builds upon the accounts of Hume and Gabriele Taylor, but avoids the pitfalls of those accounts. In particular, the emotion and the trait cor…Read more