Jeremy Kirby

In "Contextualism and Confusability" I defend Epistemological Contextualism. Contextualists think that the statements "I know that I have hands," "I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat," and "if I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat, I don't know that I have hands," are all true—albeit not simultaneously. The first statement is true when an individual is not cognizant of the hypothesis that he might be a brain in a vat receiving just those sense impressions he is currently receiving. However, once the hypothesis is considered, the standards for knowing become more strict—so strict that the statement "I know that I have hands" is false. People have mistakenly thought that the three statements present a paradox because they have failed to recognize that the skeptical hypothesis really does issue in stricter standards for knowing.The main critic of this approach has been Stephen Schiffer. Schiffer believes that it is implausible that language users would overlook the context sensitivity at work. I begin by explaining and setting out the virtues of accepting the contextualist approach to skepticism. Subsequently, I set out Schiffer's argument and attempt to meet Schiffer's criticism. Specifically, I argue that people can confuse the context of an utterance when that context is relatively unfamiliar. The reason one mistakenly thinks that he knows he has hands, while entertaining the skeptical hypothesis, is that he is overwhelmingly more familiar with the context in which he knows that he has hands

In Metaphysics Book Z, chapter eight, Aristotle seems to say that Callias and Socrates are compounds of matter and form—compounds that have the same form but are individuated by their matter. Stipulate that the material elements that compose Callias are redistributed to serve as the material elements of Socrates, and that Callias and Socrates share the same form, i.e., that of being a human. In addition, let it be assumed that any material thing is identical to its form and its matter. If it is impossible for Socrates and Callias to be identical, there is a problem. Ex hypothesi, Socrates and Callias have, albeit at different times, the same matter. Less controversially they have the same form. As it has been assumed that that which has the same form and the same matter is the same thing, Socrates and Callias will, and of course will not, so runs the reductio ad absurdum, be identical. The above difficulty has been raised for Aristotle’s metaphysics by Kit Fine. Following Fine’s terminology, I call it “The Puzzle of Simple Composition” (PSC). I reconstruct an answer on Aristotle’s behalf that rests upon an appreciation of the status of living organisms and their persistence conditions

Hume considers the extent to which the Deity might be held responsible for resultant sin, given that he is responsible for the necessary chain of events leading thereto. Were we to place the responsibility with God, it would not, seemingly, be placed upon ourselves. If we countenance a necessary chain of events, and a perfect Deity, so the argument goes, we lack culpability. Hume rejects this line of reasoning, maintaining that the mind of man is by nature formed to attribute praise and blame to action. Surprisingly, Hume accepts what appears to be the contraposition of the claim he has just rejected. He seems to think that the presence of criminality presents a problem for those who would attribute perfection to the Deity. I argue that the conditionals in questions are subjunctive, thus Hume is not committed to the rejection of a claim and the acceptance of its contraposition.