Jeremy Shaw

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One of the aims of this paper is to discuss the different senses of the term 'existence' as used by the nyaya philosophers. this discussion leads us to a discussion on absence or negation and its role in logic. a discussion on empty terms has also been introduced in this context. according to the nyaya, existence, knowability and nameability are considered as universal properties. the distinction between these universal properties has been discussed in this context. i have also discussed the question whether the nyaya has used redundant terms in designating the same imposed property by using three different terms. a distinction between different senses of the term 'property' has also been discussed in this context

This paper focuses on the relevance of Indian epistemology and the philosophy of language to contemporary Western philosophy. Hence it discusses (1) how perceptual, inferential and verbal cognitions are related to the same object, (2) how to draw the distinction in meaning between transformationally equivalent sentences, such as ‘Brutus killed Caesar’ and ‘Caesar was killed by Brutus’, and (3) why the predicate-expression is to be considered as unsaturated but the subjectexpression as saturated. In order to answer these questions the Nyāya philosophers have discussed the distinction between several pairs of terms, such as ‘subject–predicate’, ‘qualificand–qualifier’ and ‘the first term–the second term’. This paper also deals with the Nyāya conception of inference for others, and the interpretations of the premise called ‘upanaya’ (‘application’) or the cognition called ‘parāmarśa’ (‘operation’)