Jeremy Shearmur

If unremunerated blood donors are willing to participate, and if the use of them is economical from the perspective of those collecting blood, I can see no objection to their use. But there seems to me no good reason, moral or practical, why they should be used. The system of paid plasmapheresis as it currently operates in the United States and in Canada would seem perfectly adequate, and while there may always be ways in which the safety and efficiency of supply could be increased, there seems no reason whatever to think that there would be an improvement if the current system changed so as to rely entirely on unpaid donors. Further, given the adequacy of paid plasmapheresis, I could see no problem if the collection of whole blood were to take place on a similar, fully-commercial, basis. Such a view is controversial. To argue for it, this paper offers just one strand in a complex argument: a critique of Richard Titmuss’s Gift Relationship, which holds an iconic position in the critical literature on the paid provision of blood. As I conclude: all told, there seems no good basis for rejecting supply of whole blood for money—let alone the supply of blood plasma

This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.

Popper was also a critic of the idea that it was possible – or necessary – to give a positive response to the problem of induction. He was also a critic of many probabilistic theories of induction. He suggested that instead of seeking for a positive way of resolving the problem of induction – or, more generally, of trying to justify our claims that our ideas were true – we should, instead be concerned to make our claims open to criticism. All this, and its strengths and weaknesses, have been much discussed. But it seems to me that not enough attention has been paid to what is distinctive about Popper’s work – and to the question of how it addresses our various problem-situations today.

Popper’s methodological individualism faces some problems. It is not clear if we should interpret it as Weberian or along the lines of rational choice theory. As contrasted with what was done in Ian C. Jarvie’s admirable The Revolution in Anthropology, the theory was not addressed to concrete problem situations in social theory and does not fit well with Popper’s early ideas about methodological rules or his later ideas about metaphysical research programs. Further, its defenders–including Jarvie–interpret it in ways that give it little content, or which, I think mistakenly, take its thrust to be moral. In reinterpreting this nonetheless important idea, I think that we should take our lead from Jarvie in The Revolution in Anthropology.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that socialism is over. Be that as it may, it is now widely accepted that socialism, understood as involving the social ownership of the means of production and the abolition of markets, faces real and perhaps insuperable difficulties. For without both markets and individual ownership, it is difficult to see how problems of individual motivation and information transmission are to be tackled—to say nothing of Ludwig von Mises's underlying concern with how to make economic decisions about the utilization of resources within an economy.

This paper addresses the intellectual motivation of some of those involved in the intelligent design movement. It identifies their concerns with the critique of the claim that Darwinism offers an adequate explanation of prima facie teleological features in biology, a critique of naturalism, and the concern on the part of some of these authors including Dembski, with the revival of 'Old Princeton' apologetics. It is argued that their work is interesting and is in principle intellectually legitimate. It is also suggested, however, that it needs to be appraised qua 'research programme' (after the fashion of the early work of Lakatos), and that, seen in that light, what needs to be accomplished might seem daunting.

Karl Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His criticism of induction and his falsifiability criterion of demarcation between science and non-science were major contributions to the philosophy of science. Popper's broader philosophy of critical rationalism comprised a distinctive philosophy of social science and political theory. His critique of historicism and advocacy of the open society marked him out as a significant philosopher of freedom and reason. This book sets out the historical and intellectual contexts in which Popper worked, and offers an overview and diverse criticisms of his central ideas. The volume brings together contributors with expertise on Popper's work, including people personally associated with Popper, specialists on the topics treated, and scholars with special interests in aspects of Popper's work

lecture 1. Setting the table -- lecture 2. Liberalism introduced -- lecture 3. Liberalism -- lecture 4. Liberalism in dispute -- lecture 5. Libertarianism -- lecture 6. Conservatism, part 1 -- lecture 7. Conservatism, part 2 -- lecture 8. How society works -- lecture 9. Social capital, part 1 -- lecture 10. Social capital, part 2 -- lecture 11. Socialism -- lecture 12. Non-Marxist socialism -- lecture 13. Socialism, problems & objections -- lecture 14. Ecological ideas, part 1 -- lecture 15. Ecological ideas, part 2 -- lecture 16. Feminism -- lecture 17. Problems of liberal feminism -- lecture 18. Feminism concluded -- lecture 19. Nationalism -- lecture 20. Multiculturalism -- lecture 21. Gay & lesbian politics -- lecture 22. Religion & politics in the West -- lecture 23. Toleration, censorship & pornography -- lecture 24. The end of history.

Hayek's philosophy of law has Kantian features, but he offers indirect utilitarian arguments for them. Hayek's argument might be strengthened by considering that the utilitarian has an interest in issues of truth and falsity and thus in the individual as the bearer of critical judgments. Individuals might thus be accorded “dialogue rights”; upon a (Popperian) episte‐mological basis, an idea which is further strengthened by the consideration that dialogue may be extended to the appraisal of the validity of utilitarianism. Moreover, such dialogue rights should be interpreted in large part as property rights.