University Of Mary
  •  2
    Animalism, the view that human persons are human animals in the most straightforward, non-derivative sense, is typically taken to conflict with the intuition that a human person would follow her functioning cerebrum were it to be transplanted into another living human body. Some animalists, however, have recently called into question the incompatibility between animalism and this “Transplant Intuition,” arguing that a human animal would be relocated with her transplanted cerebrum. In this paper,…Read more
  •  7
    Complex Survivalism, or: How to Lose Your Essence and Live to Tell About It
    Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 91 185-199. 2017.
    Of those who defend a Thomistic hylomorphic account of human persons, “survivalists” hold that the persistence of the human person’s rational soul between death and the resurrection is sufficient to maintain the persistence of the human person herself throughout that interim. According to survivalists, at death, and until the resurrection, a human person comes to be temporarily composed of, but not identical to, her rational soul. One of the major objections to survivalism is that it is committe…Read more
  •  13
    Existential Import and the Contingent Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths
    International Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3): 309-319. 2019.
    Descartes famously states that God could have made any and all of the “eternal truths” that are now in place false. This has led scholars to attribute to Descartes’s God a radical sort of power: the power to do the logically impossible. While Descartes does claim that God could have made any of the eternal truths that are now in place false, I do not think that this commits him to the view that God could have made twice four equal to nine, or anything of that sort. In this paper I show how, by p…Read more
  •  26
    From Potency to Act: Hyloenergeism
    Synthese 1-26. forthcoming.
    Many contemporary proponents of hylomorphism endorse a version of hylomorphism according to which the form of a material object is a certain kind of complex relation or structure. Structural approaches to form, however, seem not to capture form’s traditional role as the guarantor of diachronic identity, since more “dynamically complex” material objects, such as living organisms, seem to undergo, and survive, various structural changes over the course of their existence. As a result, some contemp…Read more
  •  24
    Three Concerns for Structural Hylomorphism
    Analytic Philosophy 58 (4): 360-408. 2017.
    Many contemporary proponents of hylomorphism, the view that at least some material objects are comprised of both matter and form, endorse a version of hylomorphism according to which the form of a material object is a certain complex relation or structure. In this paper, I introduce three sorts of concerns for this “structural” approach. First, I argue that, in countenancing an abundance of overlapping yet numerically distinct material objects, “structural hylomorphists” are committed to a certa…Read more
  •  27
    Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle
    Metaphysica 18 (2): 207-229. 2017.
    According to Jeffrey Brower’s hylomorphic account of material substances, prime matter and substantial forms together compose material substances, and material substances and accidental forms together compose accidental unities. In a recent article, Andrew Bailey has argued that Brower’s account has the counter-intuitive implication that no human person is ever the primary possessor, the primary thinker, of her own thoughts. In this paper, I consider various ways in which Brower might reply to t…Read more
  •  8
    A Better Solution to the General Problem of Creation
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1): 147-162. 2017.
    It is often suggested that, since the state of affairs in which God creates a good universe is better than the state of affairs in which He creates nothing, a perfectly good God would have to create that good universe. Making use of recent work by Christine Korgaard on the relational nature of the good, I argue that the state of affairs in which God creates is actually not better, due to the fact that it is not better for anyone or anything in particular. Hence, even a perfectly good God would n…Read more