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Jeroen Geurts

  •  Home
  •  Publications
    9
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Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
19th Century Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
17th/18th Century Philosophy
4 more
  • All publications (9)
  •  123
    Discussie: Kennen AlS orde-scheppende of orde-ontsluitende activiteit?
    Philosophia Reformata 45 (1): 77-87. 1980.
  •  15
    Feit en theorie: kernproblemen in de wetenschapsleer
    Van Gorcum. 1978.
    Een wijsgerig-methodologische studie welke zich alleen bezighoudt met het van de ervaring afhankelijke karakter van het empirisch onderzoek.
    German Philosophy
  •  9
    Grondslagen van het wetenschappelijk denken (edited book)
    Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitg.. 1970.
  •  31
    Feit en theorie: inleiding tot de wetenschapsleer
    Van Gorcum. 1974.
  • Operational Identity of Meaning, Metaphor and Religious Discourse in Metaphor and Analogy
    with A. W. M. Meijers and J. van Brakel
    Communication and Cognition. Monographies 22 (1): 39-45. 1989.
  •  114
    The Network Theory of Psychiatric Disorders: A Critical Assessment of the Inclusion of Environmental Factors
    with Nina S. de Boer, Leon C. de Bruin, and Gerrit Glas
    Frontiers in Psychology 12. 2021.
    Borsboom and colleagues have recently proposed a “network theory” of psychiatric disorders that conceptualizes psychiatric disorders as relatively stable networks of causally interacting symptoms. They have also claimed that the network theory should include non-symptom variables such as environmental factors. How are environmental factors incorporated in the network theory, and what kind of explanations of psychiatric disorders can such an “extended” network theory provide? The aim of this arti…Read more
    Borsboom and colleagues have recently proposed a “network theory” of psychiatric disorders that conceptualizes psychiatric disorders as relatively stable networks of causally interacting symptoms. They have also claimed that the network theory should include non-symptom variables such as environmental factors. How are environmental factors incorporated in the network theory, and what kind of explanations of psychiatric disorders can such an “extended” network theory provide? The aim of this article is to critically examine what explanatory strategies the network theory that includes both symptoms and environmental factors can accommodate. We first analyze how proponents of the network theory conceptualize the relations between symptoms and between symptoms and environmental factors. Their claims suggest that the network theory could provide insight into the causal mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders. We assess these claims in light of network analysis, Woodward’s interventionist theory, and mechanistic explanation, and show that they can only be satisfied with additional assumptions and requirements. Then, we examine their claim that network characteristics may explain the dynamics of psychiatric disorders by means of a topological explanatory strategy. We argue that the network theory could accommodate topological explanations of symptom networks, but we also point out that this poses some difficulties. Finally, we suggest that a multilayer network account of psychiatric disorders might allow for the integration of symptoms and non-symptom factors related to psychiatric disorders and could accommodate both causal/mechanistic and topological explanations.
    Mental DisordersCognitive Disabilities and Disorders
  •  62
    Responding to Human Brain Surrogates Research: The Value of Empirical Ethics
    with Suzanne Metselaar and Gerben Meynen
    American Journal of Bioethics 21 (1): 64-66. 2021.
    Greely argues that surrogates for living human brains in vivo might be of tremendous benefit to understanding human brain function—and eventually to curing devastating brain diseases—without...
    Biomedical Ethics
  •  77
    Internal Realism, Truth and Charity
    with Jaap van Brakel
    Dialectica 42 (1): 37-44. 1988.
    Internal Realism
  •  129
    Pragmatic identity of meaning and metaphor
    with J. van Brakel
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (2). 1988.
    No abstract
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsMetaphor
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