Jerry Reyes

Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1 1.1 Statement of purpose 1 1.2 Glossary of relevant concepts 3 1.3 Methodology and precedents 7 1.4 Value versus virtue 8 1.4.1 The discovery of Filipino “values” 9 1.4.2 The problem with Filipino “values” 13 1.4.3 The philosophical advantage of “virtues” 20 1.4.4 The international revival of virtue ethics 25 Chapter 2: The Three Intellectual Traditions in the Philippines 28 2.1 Southeast Asian tribal and animist tradition 33 2.1.1 Tribalism 35 2.1.2 Animism 39 2.2 Spanish Catholic tradition 43 2.2.1 Textualization and translation 46 2.2.2 The medieval time warp 48 2.2.3. Thomism as philosophical canon 50 2.3 American modern tradition 55 2.3.1 American education and democracy 57 2.3.2 Exclusive individualism 61 2.3.3. Three traditions in confusion 65 2.4 Filipino virtue ethics as a synthesis of three traditions 69 Chapter 3: The Two Pillars of Filipino Virtue Ethics: Loób and Kapwa 72 3.1 Loób 73 3.1.1 The modern Cartesian confusion 75 3.1.2 Loób as voluntas ut potentia animae 78 3.1.3 The Filipino virtues as “habits” of the loób 85 3.1.4 The “holism” of loób 89 3.1.5 The “relationality” of loób towards the kapwa 92 3.2 Kapwa 96 3.2.1 What is kapwa? 97 3.2.2 Norris Clarke and a Thomistic metaphysics for kapwa 104 3.2.3 Kapwa in comparison to other ethical theories 110 3.3 Pagkakaisa: the goal of Filipino virtue ethics 115 Chapter 4: The Filipino Virtues 118 4.1 Thomist virtue ethics as the organizing framework 119 4.2 Kagandahang-loób 125 4.2.1 Kagandahang-loób actualizes the kapwa 125 4.2.2 The mother as the source and inspiration 129 4.2.3 Kagandahang-loób and Aquinas’ charity and benevolence 132 4.3 Utang-na-loób 137 4.3.1 Children towards their parents 144 4.3.2 Marcel Mauss and tribal gift exchange 146 4.3.3 Utang-na-loób and Aquinas’ justice 148 4.3.4 The exploitation of utang-na-loób in Philippine corruption 149 4.4 Pakikiramdam 152 4.4.1 Is pakikiramdam prudence or empathy? 152 4.4.2 Jokes, lambing and tampo 158 4.4.3 The problem with pakikiramdam 161 4.5 Hiya 163 4.5.1 The virtue of hiya versus the passion of hiya 163 4.5.2 Hiya and Aquinas’ temperance 169 4.5.3 Amor propio, pakikisama, and “crab mentality” 172 4.5.3.1 Amor propio 172 4.5.3.2 Pakikisama 174 4.5.3.3 “Crab mentality”/group amor propio 175 4.6 Lakas-ng-loób 178 4.6.1 Lakas-ng-loób and the bayani 178 4.6.2 Bahala na for the sake of the kapwa 181 4.6.3 Lakas-ng-loób and Aquinas’ courage and martyrdom 184 4.7 The Filipino virtues working together 186 Chapter 5: Conclusion 188 Bibliography 192.

This article presents two approaches for computer simulations of virtue ethics in the context of agent-based modeling, a simple way and a complex way. The simple way represents virtues as numeric variables that are invoked in specific events or situations. This way can easily be implemented and included in social simulations. On the other hand, the complex way requires a PECS framework: physical, cognitive, emotional, and social components need to be implemented in agents. Virtue is the result of the interaction of these internal components rather than a single variable. I argue that the complex way using the PECS framework is more suitable for simulating virtue ethics theory because it can capture the internal struggle and conflict sometimes involved in the practice of virtue. To show how the complex way could function, I present a sample computer simulation for the cardinal virtue of temperance, the virtue that moderates physical desires such as food, drink, and sex. This computer simulation is programmed in Python and builds upon the well-known Sugarscape simulation.1

How should national societies build legitimate and inclusive collective identities amidst prolific multiculturalism and linguistic diversity? We argue that cultural ownership of particular ways of framing ethics should be part of this collective identity building process. We should avoid unfair domination of minority cultural identities, but how do we do this when ethical discourses themselves tend to be shaped by particular dominant identities? We look into the case of the challenges that a particular multicultural society, the Philippines, faces in its ongoing collective identity building project on three levels: ethnic and linguistic differences, the historical layers of foreign culture that have each influenced these distinct cultural identities in different degrees, and the apparent domination of Tagalog linguistic culture over others. Our answer to the question of legitimate and inclusive collective identity comes from an inter-linguistic dialogue that can be effected between cultures by harnessing similarities of ethical concepts, without compromising cultural differences. We present three different possible approaches under the following headings: Pilipino ethics, Filipino ethics and Philippine ethics, each representing a particular stance to the dominant Tagalog linguistic culture. We argue for the third option, which is the most inclusive because of how it equalizes the status of all participating cultures in the dialogue. We also draw from the possibilities afforded by the phenomena of Scandinavian semicommunication and what this practice offers in making collective identity building more inclusive.

ABSTRACTThe Filipino concept of hiya, often translated as ‘shame’ or ‘embarrassment’, has often received ambivalent or negative interpretations. In this article I make an important distinction between two kinds of hiya: the hiya that is suffered as shame or embarrassment and the hiya that is an active and sacrificial self-control of one’s individual wants for the sake of other people. I borrow and reappropriate this distinction from Aquinas’ virtue ethics. This distinction not only leads to a more positive appraisal of hiya, it also leads to a new understanding of associated concepts that are often confused with hiya such as amor propio, pakikisama and the infamous ‘crab mentality’. Defending hiya as a virtue is part of an even wider philosophical project, the move from ‘Filipino values’ to a ‘Filipino virtue ethics’, which I already introduced in a previous article in this journal

This is an introduction to a Filipino virtue ethics which is a relationship-oriented virtue ethics. The concepts to be discussed are the result of the unique history of the Philippines, namely a Southeast Asian tribal and animist tradition mixed with a Spanish Catholic tradition for over 300 years. Filipino virtue ethics is based on two foundational concepts in Filipino culture. The first is loób, which can easily be misunderstood when literally translated into English as ‘inside’ but which is better translated as ‘relational will’, and the second is kapwa, which is literally translated as ‘other person’ but is better understood as ‘together with the person’. These serve as pillars for a special collection of virtues which are not individualistic virtues in the same way as most of the cardinal virtues of the Western tradition but are all directed towards the preservation and st..