• Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitiv…Read more
  • An Essay on Self-Awareness
    Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 2003.
    The dissertation is a response to Hume's contention expressed in the Treatise that in introspection one is not aware of oneself but only of perceptions of oneself, which is to be compared to his similar contention that we do not perceive external material objects but only our perceptions of those objects. By considering what is implicit in a correct representational account of perception, I argue that it is a mistake to consider the relation between a perceiver and the mental representations of …Read more