Jerzy Brzozowski

Autor niniejszego artykułu stawia tezę, iż w _Biblii Paulistów_, w szczególności zaś w tłumaczeniu Ewangelii i Psalmów, zastosowano tylko pozornie „język współczesny”, gdyż jej tekst w wielu wypadkach zapożycza pełne frazy z _Biblii Tysiąclecia_. Powstaje w ten sposób pewna hybryda językowa, mieszająca język potoczny i już utrwalony tradycją „polski styl biblijny”. Tezę tę ilustrują liczne przykłady oparte o analizowany tekst. Kolejną poruszaną kwestią jest teoretyczna i praktyczna zasadność samego faktu sięgania po język współczesny, a w istocie po język potoczny w przekładzie Pisma Świętego. Z teoretycznego punktu widzenia jest to jednoznacznie sprzeczne z tradycją wyznaczoną przez _Wulgatę _św. Hieronima, którego przekładowy język naruszał kanony łaciny cycerońskiej (a więc języka naturalnie brzmiącego dla ówczesnego wykształconego odbiorcy) w trosce o jak największą wierność wobec oryginału. Święty Hieronim zderzał łacinę ze strukturami składniowymi języka hebrajskiego, w wyniku czego powstała pewna nowa jakość, odbierana jeszcze długi czas później jako „dobroczynny zgrzyt językowy” (sformułowanie A. Bermana), prowadzący również do poszerzenia zasobów języka docelowego. Ta zasada została przyjęta w późniejszych katolickich przekładach Biblii, w tym w przekładzie ks. Jakuba Wujka, i odrzucona dopiero przez nową tradycję protestancką zainaugurowaną przez Marcina Lutra. Z praktycznego natomiast punktu widzenia wolno zadać pytanie o duszpasterską skuteczność używania takiego języka i sięganie do tradycji protestanckiej w sytuacji, gdy kościoły protestanckie Europy pustoszeją mimo propozycji „chrześcijaństwa ułatwionego”.

The so-called ‘type method’ widely employed in biological taxonomy is often seen as conforming to the causal-historical theory of reference. In this paper, I argue for an alternative account of reference for biological nomenclature in which taxon names are understood as descriptive names. A descriptive name, as the concept came to be known from the work of Gareth Evans, is a referring expression introduced by a definite description. There are three main differences between the DN and the causal account. First, according to the DN account, rather than fixing a name to a referent, the assignment of a type specimen to serve as the name-bearer for a taxon should be seen as performatively establishing a synonymy between a name and a definite description of the form “the taxon whose type is t”. Each taxon name is therefore associated with a criterion of application, a semantic rule that establishes the connection between the name and the descriptive content. This is the second major difference from the causal account: taxon names do have some descriptive content associated with them. The final locus of dissent concerns the strength of the modality resulting from the usage of taxon names. In order to address this point, I use the DN account to focus on the debate between Matt Haber and Joeri Witteveen concerning misidentification of type specimens, misapplication of names, and the truth conditions of Joseph LaPorte’s de dicto necessary sentence “Necessarily, any species with a type specimen contains its type specimen”. Using a pragmatic variant of the distinction between attributive and referential uses of descriptions, I argue that a metalinguistic version of the de dicto sentence is in fact falsified, as previously argued by Haber.

ABSTRACT: In this article, we intend to address the role of memory and narrative in the constitution of personal identity, based on Alice Munro’s short story “The Bear Came Over the Mountain” and the theoretical concepts of Paul Ricoeur (especially in Oneself as Another). This movement will allow us to underscore the idea that, contrary to what part of the analytical literature on identity and narrative has held, it is not just what we might call self-narrative that plays a role in maintaining personal identity. Instead, we recover the Ricoeurian idea of a network of narratives or tangled of stories, in which self- and hetero-narratives are entangled, thus providing support to the identities it captures.

In 2017, Pope Francis appointed a commission to investigate the continued suitability of the Liturgiam Authenticam Instruction, approved by John Paul II, on the rules of translating liturgical texts. This article shows the genesis of this event, not necessarily the one which is marking the next stage of a “dewojtylization” of the Church, as conservative Vatican commentators would have it. The main reason for the establishment of this commission is the controversy over the two translations into English: the official one, approved in 2010, which is maintained in the spirit of Liturgiam Authenticam, and the earlier one, from 1998, done in accordance with the principles of the Instruction of Paul VI of 1969, which, in fact, recommended the use of the so-called dynamic equivalence, which in practice implied the usage of contemporary colloquial language. In order to understand the essence of the dispute, the author of this article presents the concept of dynamic equivalence developed by Pastor Eugene Nida, pointing to its strengths and weaknesses. The former mainly lies in the fact that in the years around the Council it was the first serious scientific theory of translation. That concept is also full of weaknesses, which are reflected in the significant development of translation theory over the past 60 years. The most serious of these is the fact that it reduces the act to the already existing resources of the target language thus inhibiting its development. Therefore, it is essentially the opposite of the method of St. Jerome, adopted in the Catholic tradition. According to the author the Liturgiam Authenticam Instruction takes into account several decades of biblical translation practice in the post-Conciliar spirit, with its successes and failures. The conclusions of this analysis are as follows: The absolutization of dynamic equivalence as “the only scientific theory of translation” proves that there is no cooperation between the biblical studies communities and those developing contemporary theories of The Liturgiam Authenticam Instruction focuses on what is preventing the process of desacralization of liturgy, as occurring in many Protestant Churches, but also in many post-conciliar Catholic

El objetivo de este trabajo es poner al descubierto los principales valores cognitivos y epistemológicos desde los que Warren Weaver puso en marcha el Programa de Biología Experimental, un programa que llevado a cabo desde la presidencia de la división de ciencias naturales de la Fundación Rockefeller, marcó y condicionó en buena medida el posterior desarrollo de la investigación biológica. Para tal fin se mostrará, en primer lugar, cómo fue la llegada de Weaver a la Fundación Rockefeller, así como las razones bajo las cuáles el consejo de esa institución decidió entre 1932 y 1933 dar prioridad a las investigaciones biomédicas, y la manera por la cual lo hicieron. En un segundo momento, el más extenso e importante, veremos algunos de los elementos más significativos de la perspectiva epistemológica y cognoscitiva de de Weaver. Finalizaremos viendo cómo esa perspectiva, desarrollada en conexión con el Programa de Biología Experimental, inter-actuó con la visión reduccionista de la biología a la que el programa parecía apuntar. The aim of this article is to uncover the main cognitive and epistemological values that influenced Warren Weaver in starting the Experimental Biology Program, a program carried out from the time that he became president of the Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, and which significantly marked and conditioned the subsequent development of biological research. To this end, we first describe the arrival of Warren Weaver at the Rockefeller Foundation, and the reasons for which the Board of this Foundation, between 1932 and 1933, decided to prioritize biomedical research, and the manner in which they did so. Then, secondly, in the largest and most important part of the article, we will present some of the most significant elements of Weaver's epistemological and cognitive perspective. Finally, we will show how this perspective, developed in connection with the Experimental Biology Program, interacted with the reductionist view of biology to which the program seemed to point

The object of this paper is to suggest how the Frege–Dummettian notions of criterion of identity and criterion of application can be put to work within Putnam’s account of reference for natural kind terms in “Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. By doing so, some light can be shed on Putnam’s earlier views on “necessity relative to a body of knowledge” as well as his later views on sortal identity. If the Frege–Dummettian criteria are indeed at work within Putnam’s account, then we must either give up rigidity or else give up the division of linguistic labor hypothesis. I will give an example from biological nomenclature that may sway us towards giving up the former.