Jerzy Gołosz

The paper tries to demonstrate that the process of the increase of entropy does not explain the asymmetry of time itself because it is unable to account for its fundamental asymmetries, that is, the asymmetry of traces (we have traces of the past and no traces of the future), the asymmetry of causation (we have an impact on future events with no possibility of having an impact on the past), and the asymmetry between the fixed past and the open future, To this end, the approaches of Boltzmann, Reichenbach (and his followers), and Albert are analysed. It is argued that we should look for alternative approaches instead of this, namely we should consider a temporally asymmetrical physical theory or seek a source of the asymmetry of time in metaphysics. This second approach may even turn out to be complementary if only we accept that metaphysics can complement scientific research programmes.

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the conviction about the harmony and order of the world was a fundamental metaphysical principle of the Pythagoreans. This harmony and order were primarily sought in the structures of arithmetics, yet following the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes (irrational numbers, as we now call them), the Pythagoreans began to see geometrical structure as a fundamental part of the world. On the example of the Pythagoreans’ metaphysics and science, the paper shows the mutual relations between metaphysics and science. It demonstrates— on the one hand—the necessity of the first as a guide for the latter, and—on the other—how our scientific research can change its basic metaphysical principles when these are found to be inappropriate. The paper also tries to show the need for a realistic approach in our scientific research by means of the same example of the Pythagoreans, that is, the need to discern something which is below the surface appearance.

It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the detensed or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the same time the dynamism of the presentists' ontology. The paper takes for granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value

The paper can be logically divided into two parts. In the first part I distinguish two kinds of metaphysics: basic metaphysics, which affects scientific theories, and a second kind, which is an effect of interpretations of these theories. I try to show the strong mutual relations between metaphysics and science and to point out that the basic metaphysics of science is based on realistic assumptions. In the second part of my paper I suggest that we should consider the basic metaphysics of science and its realistic foundations in order to better understand scientific realism and to properly resolve the debate around it. The methodology of Imre Lakatos is applied in the paper.

The paper tries to develop Bartels’s modern essentialism as a structural-role theory of identity for spacetime points. I adopt Hoefer’s idea of denying primitive identity for this theory and apply it to GTR and prerelativistic physics to find different versions of essentialism and different definitions of determinism which are coherent with them. I also try to argue that modified essentialism helps us to refute objections raised against essentialism and offers us the best understanding of prerelativistic and relativistic theories.

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space-time to be substance since it ascribes field properties to space-time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space-time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space-time to be a substance.

The paper analyzes the philosophical consequences of the recent discovery of direct violations of the time–reversal symmetry of weak interactions. It shows that although we have here an important case of the time asymmetry of one of the fundamental physical forces which could have had a great impact on the form of our world with an excess of matter over antimatter, this asymmetry cannot be treated as the asymmetry of time itself but rather as an asymmetry of some specific physical process in time. The paper also analyzes the consequences of the new discovery for the general problem of the possible connections between direction of time and time-asymmetric laws of nature. These problems are analyzed in the context of Horwich’s Asymmetries in time: problems in the philosophy of science argumentation, trying to show that existence of a time–asymmetric law of nature is a sufficient condition for time to be anisotropic. Instead of Horwich’s sufficient condition for anisotropy of time, it is stressed that for a theory of asymmetry of time to be acceptable it should explain all fundamental time asymmetries: the asymmetry of traces, the asymmetry of causation, and the asymmetry between the fixed past and open future. It is so because the problem of the direction of time has originated from our attempts to understand these asymmetries and every plausible theory of the direction of time should explain them.

Callender [2017] claims that contemporary science demonstrates that there is no objective present and no objective flow of time, especially since all sensed events come from the past, our various senses need different amounts of time to react, and there are enough asymmetries in the physical world to explain our experience of time. This paper holds that, although Callender’s arguments for the subjectivity of the flow of time are unconvincing, the scientific discoveries and arguments he indicates can still be applied to improve theories of the objective flow of time. The paper develops precisely such a theory, one which introduces multiple individual proper presents for all of the objects that make up our world.

The paper examines the relations between presentism and the thesis concerning the existence of the flow of time. It tries to show that the presentist has to admit the existence of the passage of time and that the standard formulation of presentism as a singular thesis saying that only the present exists is insufficient because it does not allow the inference of the existence of the passage of time. Instead of this, the paper proposes a formulation of presentism with the aid of the notion of becoming; not only does a formulation state the existence of the flow of time in such a way as to avoid the question of the rate of the passage of time, it also allows the inference of the existence of only present things and events. The paper demonstrates that the proposed conception of presentism also has other virtues, such as homogeneity, non-triviality, and ability to express dynamicity of presentists’ image of the world which testify for it.

The paper consists of two parts. The first critically analyses Meyer’s [2005] version of the triviality objection to presentism (according to which, presentism is either trivial or untenable), and tries to show that his argument is untenable because – contrary to what he claimed – he did not take into account the entire possible spectrum of interpretations of the presentist’s thesis. In the second, positive part of the paper, it is shown that a leading form of tensed theory of time postulates the same ontology as presentism and that it avoids the triviality problem which means that it can be used to generate an alternative formulation of presentism which is no longer vulnerable to the triviality objection.

This collection of papers consists of mostly previously published articles which develop a scientific research program designed to defend a dynamic view of reality, which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. The vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. In this book, the author analyzes different aspects of the problem of the flow of time and attempts to show that the reasons for the difficulty with acceptance of its reality may lie in inadequate metaphysics and a wrong approach to relations between metaphysics and physics. The papers are intended to answer such fundamental questions as: What is the origin of dynamics of the world?; What is the origin and nature of time?; What is the origin of the asymmetry (arrow) of time?; Does the flow of time really exist and what it consists in?; Is physics consistent with the existence of the flow of time?; Why don’t we have a physical theory of the flow of time?; What is the relationship between metaphysics and modern physics? The defended position is presented in many aspects—ontological, methodological, and scientific (physical).

The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain in agreement with our everyday experience and self-consistent. It is demonstrated that both empirical and theoretical arguments indicate that the presentist should replace the notion of this static existence with the notion of a dynamic existence and that this maneuver allows the presentist to treat his/her existential thesis as equivalent to the thesis that time flows. Not only does this strategy allow us to express presentism in a simple, homogenous way which remains in agreement with our experience, but also permits us to solve some of the difficult problems which presentism faces, such as, for example, the objection of triviality and the question about the rate of time passage. Moreover, such an approach to presentism allows us to solve fundamental metaphysical problems concerning time such as the problem of the openness of the future and the fixity of the past, direction of causation, and relations between presentism and persistence through time by endurance.

Resumo Este artigo analisa, as recentes versões, da objecção à existência de um fluxo do tempo, com base na pergunta: “Com que velocidade flui o tempo?”. O autor mostra que as soluções existentes para o problema não são plausíveis e, que em vez disso, a resolução deve ser encontrada numa nova concepção de fluxo temporal, que evite tais dificuldades. A teoria metafísica proposta desenvolve as ideias de Broad e Prior sob um novo enquadramento, que invalida a objecção resultante da questão sobre o ritmo da passagem do tempo e das respostas “segundo a segundo”. Neste texto também se procura mostrar, que esta teoria metafísica, aqui proposta, possui outras virtudes que testemunham a seu favor. Palavras-chave : existência dinâmica, fluxo do tempo, presentismo, velocidade de passagem do tempoThe paper analyzes some recent versions of the objection to the existence of the flow of time based on the question: “How fast does time flow?”. It shows that the replies given to the problem are implausible and instead proposes a solution for the issue in the form of a conception of the flow of time which can avoid such a difficulty. The proposed metaphysical theory develops the ideas of Broad and Prior in a radical way and invalidates the objection resulting from the question about the rate of passage and answers “second per second”. The paper also tries to show that this metaphysical theory has other virtues which testify in favor of it. Keywords : flow of time; rate of time’s passage; presentism; dynamic existence

Presentism faces the following well-known dilemma: either the truth-value of past-tense claims depends on the non-existing past and cannot be said to supevene on being, or it supervenes on present reality and breaks our intuition which says that the true past-tense claims should not depend on any present aspect of reality. The paper shows that the solution to the dilemma offered by Kierland and Monton’s brute past presentism, the version of presentism according to which the past is supposed to be both a fundamental and present aspect of reality, is implausible and proposes how to cure presentism: the dillema can be avoided by taking a third road consisting of introducing dynamics into presentism in the form of the real passage of time. Dynamic presentism, which is constructed in such a way, can overcome the dilemma by providing an ontological basis for the past-tense propositions in the form of the real past. Dynamic presentism also offers a rationale for treating the future as being open.

The paper discusses the properties of spacetime we recognize by analyzing the phenomenon of motion. Problems of special interest are the spacetime symmetries, the spacetime structures and the ontological status of spacetime. These problems are considered on the grounds of the classical theories of motion contained in Newtonian physics, special and general theory of relativity. The controversy between an absolute and a relational conception of motion and its ontological implications are also analyzed

The paper defends a dynamic view of reality which is founded on the assumption of the existence of the flow of time. This vindication makes use of a metaphysical theory of the flow of time developed by the author which is based on the notion of dynamic existence. It is shown that such a conception allows one to explain the fundamental phenomena connected with the flow of time, namely the continuous changing of the present, the endurance of things, and the asymmetry of time. It is also argued that the proposed approach may be of some virtue for the empirical sciences because it explains the ubiquitous interest of scientists in the evolution of dynamic systems of different kinds, and provides us with an arrow of time which is lacking in theories describing fundamental physical interactions. The argument is advanced which aims to show that physics is unable to provide us with a theory of the flow of time and that we should look for such a theory in metaphysics. Thus, an approach to the relation between metaphysics and physics is vindicated that may help to overcome the difficulties blocking our understanding of reality as a dynamic one.

In the article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space-time to be a substance, since it ascribes field properties to space-time points. The fundamental flaw of this argument, I suggest, is the incompatibility of Field's interpretation of field theory with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory and at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should take into account not only the way it functions but also the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space-time to be a substance

Th author submits to a critical analysis the argument of the hole, which has been formulated by Einstein and later developed by Earman and Norton. The aim of the analysis is an evaluation of the assumption made in the argument and the possibility of avoiding its indeterministic consequences. It turns out that it is a particular form of substantivalism assumed by Earman and Norton which is responsible for the indeterministic consequences of the argument. It follows that those consequences can be avoided by rejecting either substantivalism as a whole or its particular form accepted by both authors. None of the non-substantivalist interpretations proposed can be accepted, including also the one that Earman himself has tried to develop. The presented forms of the structural substantivalism and the substantivalism rejecting the transworld identification of points are hardly aceptable, either. Hence, there are two alternatives left: either one of the versions of essentialism or else instrumentalism, i.e. giving up doing ontology. Since the author regards instrumentalism as cognitively fruitless, he prefers the first option