Jeske Toorman

Research in experimental philosophy of language has been taken to show that non-philosophers do not uniformly assign reference in accordance with the causal-historical account of reference determination. The setup most frequently used in this research is one that is modelled on Kripke’s Gödel case. This paper will distinguish three cognitive mechanisms behind participants’ responses that might potentially result in responses of relevance to theories of reference. If participants utilize the first cognitive mechanism, their response is based on what I call their “acquired use”, that is, on how they understand the reference of the target term in their own idiolect. If participants utilize the second or third cognitive mechanism, their response is based on their explicit or implicit theories of reference, respectively. I will argue that the first and second way of answering the probe question cannot deliver responses that tell us anything about which theory of reference is true. Additionally, I will argue that if the third way of answering the probe question can result in responses that tell us something about which theory of reference is true, such responses cannot be distinguished from those that don’t. If correct, Gödel-style setups cannot properly support a theory of reference.

According to temporal externalism, the meaning and reference of at least some of our terms depend on facts about the future. Temporal externalists claim that their view provides the best explanation of our linguistic practices. This paper will argue that, assuming a metametasemantic dispositionalist view, the linguistic practices temporal externalists appeal to can be accounted for without appealing to temporal externalism, insofar as these linguistic practices correspond to our use of terms. Temporal externalism is therefore not obviously the best explanation of our linguistic practices. Additionally, this paper will argue against recent claims to the effect that a metametasemantic dispositionalist view motivates a form of temporal externalism.

All the experimental work on the reference of proper names during the last 20 years has utilised setups modelled after Kripke’s Gödel and Jonah cases. Doubts remain, however, about the viability of the setup. This paper reports the results from a new experiment, using a different and novel kind of setup. The novel setup is simultaneously used on proper names, artefact terms, and definitional terms, with the last two categories serving as controls. Our vignettes describe cases of potential reference swaps, where two referring expressions begin, due to a mix-up, to be used with the intention of referring to each others’ original referents. In otherwise analogous cases, it was found that a majority of Western subjects understand proper names to continue to refer to their original referents, whereas this was not the case for the two other classes of expression. The results indicate, first, that this experimental setup, unlike earlier ones, succeeds in distinguishing between different mechanisms of reference determination, and second, that proper names indeed do refer differently from the other classes of expression that were used.

Recent research in experimental semantics seems to indicate that, contrary to most philosophers, non-philosophers do not (uniformly) assign reference in accordance with physical externalism as traditionally understood. This paper will argue that the purported incompatibility between physical externalism and social externalism indicates that from this research, it cannot be concluded that philosophers and non-philosophers assign reference in accordance with different theories of reference. This is so because the purported incompatibility indicates that philosophers do not uniformly assign reference in accordance with physical externalism as traditionally understood, either. Additionally, this paper will argue for a view about the facts by virtue of which philosophers assign reference. From this view, it follows that in order to test whether philosophers and non-philosophers agree in assigning reference in accordance with physical externalism, physical externalism cannot be tested without testing deference.

Two recent experimental studies, by Shaun Nichols et al. and by Michael Devitt & Brian Porter claim to find evidence for the view that both causal-historical factors and descriptive factors play a role in determining the extensions of natural kind terms. Both studies use versions of a vignette featuring the fictional natural kind term “Catoblepas”. We conducted an experiment where we used vignettes and corresponding tasks that were otherwise fully analogous, but featured terms which are not natural kind terms. We found that such terms received the same patterns of response which Nichols et al. and Devitt & Porter took to justify their conclusions. We conclude that either the kind of view they arrive at applies more widely than just for natural kind terms or, as we think is more likely, the original results do not support such a two-factor view in the first place.

Ever since Machery et al. first decided to test whether non-philosophers assign reference in accordance with the causal-historical account, the reference of proper names has been tested by means of setups modelled on Kripke’s Gödel and Jonah cases. Over the years, the use of these setups as a means to test theories of reference has attracted much criticism. However, previous follow-up studies have supposedly accounted for these criticisms, for the most part without changing the original outcome. We conducted experiments suggesting that participants’ responses in these setups never tracked what they are supposed to track. In our study, we tested the setup itself by using analogues of different setups modelled on Kripke’s Gödel and Jonah cases. Instead of proper names, our analogues featured terms for which we have independent reason to believe that the causal-historical account is not true. The analogues elicited large proportions of supposed causal-historical responses.

Recent experimental studies have claimed to find evidence for the view that natural kind terms such as “water” are ambiguous: that they have two extensions, one determined by superficial properties, the other by underlying essence. In an online experiment, we presented to 600 participants scenarios describing discoveries of novel samples that differ in deep structure from samples of a familiar kind but are superficially identical, such as a water-like substance that is not composed of H2O. We used three different types of question sets to probe whether the participants considered the sample as a member of the kind or not. Our results did not confirm the predictions of the ambiguity view. They were, rather, consistent with views that take underlying essences to be the sole criterion for membership in a natural kind.