Jesse Kirkpatrick

The concept of trust can take various forms, from interpersonal trust to institutional trust to trust in oneself or one’s government. As robotic technologies approach autonomy, and in increasing cases achieve it, scholars have turned their attention to the relationship between trust and human–robot interactions. This chapter explores that relationship using a multidisciplinary approach that includes philosophy, law, and neuroscience. The first section explicates the concept of human–robot interaction. The second articulates a normative account of interpersonal trust in service of the third section’s exploration of whether human–robot interactions could approach or achieve interpersonal trust. In answering this question in the affirmative, the fourth section flags some of the potential deleterious consequences of facilitating interpersonal trust in human–robot interactions. The fifth concludes with a call for future scholarship to address the philosophical, empirical, legal, and policy issues related to trust in human–robot interactions.

As part of the roundtable, “Moral Injury, Trauma, and War,” this essay explores the relationship between revisionist just war theory and moral injury. It proceeds in four sections. First, it offers a brief overview of the just war tradition, focusing on traditionalist and revisionist accounts, respectively. Next, it explores the relationship between moral injury and armed conflict. Then, it explores the links between moral injury and revisionist accounts of just war theory. Finally, by way of conclusion, the essay signals two potential complementary paths forward that future research could use to clarify the revisionist position and its link with moral injury.

ABSTRACTThis article explores the relationship between the operation of combat drones and the martial virtue courage. The article proceeds in three parts. Part one develops a brief account of virtue generally, and the martial virtue courage in particular. Part two discusses why critics suggest that drone operation does not fit the orthodox conceptualization of courage and, in some instances, even erodes the virtue. Part three explores how these criticisms are flawed. This section of the paper goes on to argue that the criticisms are predicated on a twofold misunderstanding. The first involves improperly truncated conceptualizations of courage, which are, in part, predicated upon a narrow definition of risk. From this narrow definition of risk springs the conclusion that drone operation must be riskless. The second misunderstanding follows from the first and involves the failure to grasp properly how courage can be cultivated and required in drone operation. The paper concludes with a discussion of how, pr..