Jesse Peterson

Contemporary philosopher David Benatar has advanced the self-evidently controversial claim that “coming into existence is always a harm.” Benatar’s argument turns on the basic asymmetry between pleasure and pain, an asymmetry he seeks to explain by the principle that those who never exist cannot be deprived. Benatar’s import is almost incredible: humans should cease to procreate immediately, thereby engendering the extinction of the species—a view known as “anti-natalism.” According to many of his readers, the ancient Hebrew sage Qoheleth expresses a pessimistic nihilism that runs as thick as Benatar’s. Prima facie grounding for this assertion is that Qoheleth, like Benatar, raises the issue of whether coming into existence may be a harm—and gives an affirmative answer. In two passages, Ecclesiastes 6:1-6 and 4:1-3, Qoheleth declares that an unborn hypothetical person is “better off” than their existent counterpart. Yet the meaning and implication of these words is far from obvious. Does Qoheleth imply that the non-exister’s state, and non-existence in general, is universally superior to existence? Or is he instead speaking exceptionally, of particular persons in rare circumstances? By examining the two “better”-statements in their literary context, I will argue that Qoheleth intends these examples as exceptions. He does not go so far as to make the supremely nihilistic claim that coming into existence is always, or even generally, a net harm; yet, he does concede that in certain cases, it can be. Beyond this, I will explore how the two thinkers’ divergent conclusions can be traced to a deeper difference of philosophical method. This question concerning non-existence opens a window to Qoheleth’s broader scheme of values and therefore serves as a surprisingly useful entry point by which to engage his philosophy. The paper utilizes the methodology Jaco Gericke has recently termed “philosophical criticism,” but specifically applied to Qoheleth.

This essay examines Qoheleth’s Catalogue of the Times poem in Eccl 3:2–8. I argue that the two most common scholarly interpretations of the poem’s overall meaning fail to sufficiently account for its literary context and that an underdeveloped alternative reading is to be preferred. When we read the poem in light of two other closely related passages, 1:4–11 and 3:9–15, it becomes clear that a poem ostensibly about “time” is much less concerned with “timing” than is typically thought, but instead signifies Qoheleth’s frustration with the inevitable equilibrating tendency embedded into every human task.

The dissertation aims at a comprehensive understanding of Qoheleth’s system of values, his thought as to what is good and bad in the human experience and how these values relate. It utilizes both standard exegetical methods as well as certain strands of contemporary philosophy—including value theory, theory of well-being, meaning of life philosophy, philosophy of death, and philosophy of pleasure—in order to clarify Qoheleth’s concepts and implicit philosophical assumptions. The work proceeds by uncovering and reconstructing the layers of Qoheleth’s value-centered philosophical vision with each consecutive chapter, at each step articulating his views in the terms of contemporary philosophy, as well as comparing Qoheleth’s constructive philosophy to the views of certain contemporary philosophers. My central thesis is that, among the variety of Qoheleth’s themes, his message is unified by the concept of value and he expresses a distinct, coherent vision as to where value is found—and not found—in human lives. Part I one of the work (Chapters 2 through 4) concerns the negative side of Qoheleth’s values by coming to grips with Qoheleth’s conception and denial of “meaning” in human life. Chapter 2 articulates this notion of meaning, Chapter 3 explores the hindrance it finds in death, and Chapter 4 examines Qoheleth’s concept of time’s cyclicality as a further obstacle to meaning. Part II of the dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6) transitions to the more positive side of Qoheleth’s values, his understanding of “what is good” in human life despite the absence of meaning. The question of the value of existence as such is taken up, as are Qoheleth’s understandings of well-being and enjoyment. The conclusions about the sage’s theme of enjoyment lead to a wider conclusion that, while he denies a certain type of human value in his resistance to the prospect of attaining meaning, Qoheleth does nonetheless subscribe to the possibility of genuine value in the human project.