Jessica Moss

If there is any consensus about knowledge in contemporary epistemology it is that there is one primary kind: knowledge-that. I put forth a view, one I find in the works of Aristotle, on which instead knowledge-of - construed in a fairly demanding sense as being well-acquainted with things - is the primary kind. As to knowledge-that, it is not something distinct from knowledge-of, let alone more fundamental, but instead a species. To know that such-and-such, just like to know a person or place, is to be well-acquainted with a portion of reality - in this case a fact. In part by comparing classic Gettier cases to cases in which one has true impressions of but fails to know a person, I argue that this account not only respects our intuitions about knowledge-that - in particular that it is or entails non-accidentally true justified belief - but also explains them, providing a compelling analysis.

Aristotle's De Anima discusses the psychological causes of what he calls locomotion – i.e, roughly, purpose-driven behavior. One cause is desire. The other is cognition, which falls into two kinds: thought (nous) and imagination (phantasia). Aristotle’s discussion is dense and confusing, but I argue that we can extract from it an account that is coherent, compelling, and that in many ways closely anticipates modern psychological theories, in particular Dual Processing theory. Animals and humans are driven to pursue objects that attract us. Objects take on that power when we cognize them as valuable. If we rely on imagistic, automatic, uncontrolled processing mechanisms – Aristotle’s phantasia, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 1 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be impulsive. If we rely instead on rational, critical, deliberative capacities – Aristotle’s thought, which closely anticipates the modern notion of Type 2 processing – our resulting desires and actions will be reflective. Animals are capable only of the first kind of behavior; the human psyche is constituted of an animal psyche united with an intellectual one, so we are capable of both.

Stoics and Sceptics distinguish belief (doxa) from a representationally and functionally similar but sub-doxastic state: passive yielding to appearance. Belief requires active assent to appearances, that is, affirmation of the appearances as true. I trace the roots of this view to Plato's accounts of doxa in the Republic and Theaetetus. In the Republic, eikasia and pistis (imaging and conviction) are distinguished by their objects, appearances versus ordinary objects; in the Theaetetus, perception and doxa are distinguished by their objects, proper perceptibles versus ‘commons’, including being. But underlying these ontological distinctions is a psychological one: the lower mental states are confined to their lower objects because they are passive; the higher mental states have access to higher objects because they result from questioning appearances and making active affirmations about how things are. This doctrine of doxa anticipates both the Hellenistic one and modern accounts of belief as ‘aiming at truth’; it also shows Plato's views of doxa to have more in their favour philosophically and to cohere better with one another than generally thought

did plato and aristotle have anything to say about belief? The answer to this question might seem blindingly obvious: of course they did. Plato distinguishes belief from knowledge in the Meno, Republic, and Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the Posterior Analytics. Plato distinguishes belief from perception in the Theaetetus, and Aristotle does so in the De anima. They talk about the distinction between true and false beliefs, and the ways in which belief can mislead and the ways in which it can steer us aright. Indeed, they make belief a central component of their epistemologies.The view underlying these claims—one so widespread these days as to remain largely unquestioned—is that when Plato and Aristotle talk...

de Anima III.10 characterizes akrasia as a conflict between phantasia (“imagination”) on one side and rational cognition on the other: the akratic agent is torn between an appetite for what appears good to her phantasia and a rational desire for what her intellect believes good. This entails that akrasia is parallel to certain cases of perceptual illusion. Drawing on Aristotle's discussion of such cases in the de Anima and de Insomniis , I use this parallel to illuminate the difficult discussion of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3, arguing that its account of akrasia as involving ignorance is compatible with, and in fact crucially supplements, the more straightforward account we find elsewhere in the corpus of akrasia as a struggle between desires.

Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason

Abstract:Why is the Protagoras’ final argument premised on Hedonism? I argue for a new interpretation that shows Plato to be concerned with the very issues that motivate the Republic’s tripartite psychology. Socrates introduces Hedonism to deflect a threat to his view that virtue is knowledge. If the pleasant is an end – an ultimate object of desire – distinct from the good, then desires for the pleasant are different in kind from, and can potentially conflict with and overwhelm, desires for the good. Socrates attempts to neutralize this threat through the hypothesis that there is only one end of human desire: in desiring what they think of as the pleasant, people are in fact desiring the good. In the Republic he will reject this hypothesis: there are three distinct ends, the pleasant, the beneficial, and the noble, and with them three distinct species of desire; hence motivational conflict is possible, and virtue involves more than just knowledge.

Aristotle repeatedly claims that character-virtue “makes the goal right“, while Phronesis is responsible for working out how to achieve the goal. Many argue that these claims are misleading: it must be intellect that tells us what ends to pursue. I argue that Aristotle means just what he seems to say: despite putative textual evidence to the contrary, virtue is (a) a wholly non-intellectual state, and (b) responsible for literally supplying the contents of our goals. Furthermore, there are no good textual or philosophical reasons to reject this straightforward interpretation. Contrary to widespread opinion, Aristotle does not characterize Phronesis as supplying ends. Instead, its ethical import lies wholly in its ability to “determine the mean“. Moreover, because character involves non-rational cognition of the end as good, Aristotle can restrict practical intellect to deliberation without abandoning his anti-Humean view that we desire our ends because we find them good

Plato believes that part of philosophy's task is to persuade people to pursue virtue and wisdom instead of the things they falsely believe worth having. I argue that Plato considers the appetites---desires for pleasure---to be a major obstacle to this task, and turns to spirit as a solution to this dilemma. ;The Gorgias shows Socrates attempting but failing to persuade others, and offers an explanation for his failures. Socrates' method is beneficial but unpleasant: he frustrates people's desires to be confirmed in their values and ways of life. Rhetoric, meanwhile, is persuasive precisely because it is pleasant: it gratifies the very desires that dialectic frustrates. Most people confuse pleasure with benefit, and therefore resist dialectic but are persuaded by rhetoric. These facts raise the possibility that rhetoric could aid philosophy, exploiting the appetites for philosophy's ends. The dialogue concludes pessimistically, however: given the nature of the appetites, they cannot be used to lead people to virtue. ;I show that Plato's mistrust of the appetites is explained by his idea that pleasure is a deceiver: it appears to be good when it is not. Plato develops this idea in the Protagoras, Gorgias and Republic . Ultimately, it leads him to abandon the Socratic view that all desires are rational desires for the good in favor of the view that desires for pleasure are non-rational and must be suppressed. ;How can one make people see that the life of virtue is good if they are deceived by the appearance that the pleasant but vicious life is best? The Gorgias' discussion of shame suggests an answer to this problem. What is shameful appears bad, and what is kalon appears good. These appearances often conflict with, and can overcome, the false appearances generated by pleasures. Therefore appeals to shame and admiration can succeed where appeals to reason will fail. With its introduction of thumos the Republic develops this insight into a new picture of the soul, and a new program for moral education

Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general.