Jiahe Zed Zhang

A popular view holds that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome is proportional to the causal contribution of their actions to that outcome, all else being equal. This paper challenges this view. I argue that there are counterexamples because some causal difference-makers (i.e., factors that can influence the degree of causal contribution) are morally irrelevant. I further contend that the proportionality relation is not as explanatorily indispensable as its proponents claim. This is because differences in moral responsibility can be explained by other theories, such as the quality of will account, without referencing causal contribution.

When we make transformative choices, there is always a risk of regret. While a decision-maker may predict that she will not regret her choice, others might predict the opposite and attempt to prevent her from proceeding to shield her from future regret. This paper argues that there is a pro tanto epistemic reason against such intervention because, ceteris paribus, it is prima facie irrational for others to maintain their belief (that she will regret) without deferring to the decision-maker’s own prediction. This is because, unlike others, the decision-maker knows what it is like to live her current life, which puts her in a better epistemic position to make the regret prediction.