Jiangmei Liu

The resurgence of interest in war as punishment calls for a critical reexamination of Hugo Grotius’s theory of punitive war. Bridging intellectual history and colonial studies, this article engages two key debates: the philosophical foundations of Grotius’s conception of punishment as one just cause for war, and its entanglement with Dutch colonial violence. On the philosophical side, although existing scholarship has identified Grotius’s innovation in conceptualizing punishment as a subjective right within a secular natural law framework, important conceptual ambiguities persist. This article addresses three foundational questions: first, how Grotius’s distinctive conception of human nature as self-preservation and sociability enables a novel reconceptualization of punishment as a subjective right, given the growing doubts about its subjectivity; second, whether and to what extent this theory can be considered secular, given its undeniable theological roots; and third, how the shift from divine to human enforcement of natural law—through the right to punish—reshapes its status as universally obligatory law within a genealogical trajectory. On the historical-political side, through close textual and contextual analysis of De iure praedae commentarius and De iure belli ac pacis, the article further demonstrates how Grotius’s evolving account of punitive war may be closely linked to the justification of Dutch colonial expansion. It concludes by reflecting on Grotius’s complex legacy and the dangers posed by contemporary efforts in reviving the idea of war as punishment.

The longstanding debate over Jean Bodin’s (1530–1596) Six Books of a Commonweale—whether it championed an ideology of absolutism or pioneered a normative doctrine of the modern sovereign state—has profoundly influenced our understanding of Bodin’s intellectual legacy. This article challenges the influential absolutist reading by re-examining Bodin’s ideas of violence against tyrants. Proponents of the absolutist interpretation often view Bodin’s rejection of resistance against the tyrant as compelling evidence of his defense of absolutism, suggesting that this stance negates the constitutional constraints imposed by fundamental and natural laws on the sovereign. However, this article contends that such a reading is overly simplistic. A closer analysis of Bodin’s nuanced perspective reveals that he does not remove the constitutional limitations established by both fundamental and natural laws. Instead, Bodin posits that sovereigns who violate these higher laws could face either domestic resistance or a just war of punishment. Thus, labeling Bodin merely as an absolutist ideologue is inappropriate, as it risks overshadowing the profound intellectual legacy he offers as a serious political thinker, jurist, and the father of modern state theory.

This paper challenges the colonial reading of Thomas Hobbes’s use of America. Firstly, by analysing all the references and allusions to America in Hobbes’s writings, I claim that Hobbes simply uses America to support his central theory of the state of nature, showing the fundamental significance of a large and lasting society to our being and well-being. Secondly, I argue that Hobbes’s use of America does not serve a second purpose that is similar to Locke’s justification of English land appropriation. Even extending such a Lockean colonial theme from Hobbes’s theory would fail due to Hobbes’s unique property theory. Lastly, with a more nuanced contextual analysis of Hobbes’s involvement in the Virginia Company and relevant textual analysis, I propose that Hobbes is not only not a supporter of English colonialism, but rather an opponent of the Virginia Company, imperial expansion, and colonial conquest. I am not denying the fact that later thinkers like Locke develop Hobbes’s notion of the American state of nature to justify European colonization in America. However, the received history should not be confused with Hobbes’s own writing purpose. Nor should we ignore Hobbes’s opposition to imperial expansion.