Jimmy Yab

In this chapter I will demonstrate how Kant’s theory of race switches to the pragmatic understanding of the notion of the “Charakteristik.” The “orthodox reading” has always argued that Kant wrote three essays on race (1775, 1785 and 1788). It is my contention in this book that apart from these essays, it is worth taking into account two other writings: Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime of 1764, which is the foundational book of his racial philosophy, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View of 1798, which is the completion of his theory. As I have already demonstrated why Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is the foundational writing of the theory, in this chapter I will show why Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is the completion of his theory. Kant, on the one hand, asserts the unity of human nature and, on the other, he insists on the inner and outer features of the “Charakteristik” of the human species (person, gender, nationality and race). In the second part of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, the “Anthropological Charakteristik,” he reaffirms the role that “character” plays in human destiny, a role he had already defined in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. He reconfirms that the definite and efficient meaning of the concept of race is reflected in both the empirical and moral character through its natural predispositions. It is precisely in the circumstance of natural predispositions that Kant sustains his theory of race with his racial hierarchy. In this chapter I will show, through a historical investigation of Kant’s account of natural predispositions, that Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View completes Kant’s theory and also offers a definitive answer as to whether Kant changed his mind on race. To prove my point, I will come back to Kleingeld’s claims that have not received sufficient attention. These are: (1) that Kant “makes no mention of a racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the 1790s” and (2) that (2) “The oft-defended thesis that Kant’s racism remained constant thus needs correction, and one should not use evidence from the 1780s in support of claims about his views in the 1790s.” I will refute these claims and demonstrate first that, with regard to claim (1), the “Anthropological Charakteristik” in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View encompasses racial hierarchy through Kant’s consideration of human natural predispositions which remained unchanged throughout his writings, and therefore expresses Kant’s two moral problems described in Chap. 2. Second, if the preceding is true, no corrections should be made regarding claim (2). My underlying assertion is that because of Kant’s concept of natural predispositions (potentialities which are responsible for both the inner and outer features of the “Charakteristik” of the human species including the racial hierarchy), in order to claim that Kant changed his mind on race and hence on racial hierarchy, it is necessary to first prove that he changed his mind on his account of natural predispositions. However, Kleingeld fails to prove this point. She does not note the role of “Charakteristik” in Kant’s theory and furthermore even admits that his conception of natural predispositions did not change in the 1790s. Consequently, I argue that her claim regarding Kant’s changes of mind on race and racial hierarchy is demonstrably inaccurate.

The “orthodox reading” of Kant takes for granted that Kant’s philosophy is divided into two parts and that these parts are qualitatively different. This reading essentially says that the critical writings have predominance over Kant’s pre-critical writings because they contain what is considered to be Kant’s main philosophical claims. My contention in this chapter is to argue against this reading because, as I show below, it is not only a misleading approach, it is also inaccurate. This approach is misleading because it promotes the idea that Kant’s pre-critical writings are not of significant importance. This has the consequence of deterring Kant scholars and the general public from reading these texts. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why we have had decades of neglect of Kant’s anthropology, geography, history and education. The “orthodox reading” of Kant is inaccurate because it is not in line with the content of Kant’s anthropology; either it removes Kant’s theory of race from his philosophy or it affirms that it is peripheral. In doing so, the “orthodox reading” promotes its interpretation over Kant’s own understanding of the place of the theory of race in his philosophical system. Furthermore, because it focuses attention on Kant’s racial comments over a systematic analysis of the theory itself, it generates a polarized debate that leaves unaddressed the critical question of why Kant took his philosophical system to require a theory of race in the first place. I consider two objections to the “orthodox reading.” These objections are intended to illustrate that the debate concerning Kant on race has taken an obstructive approach. I also turn the discussion on its head by suggesting an alternative reading. Our ultimate aim in this chapter is to raise doubts about the soundness of various features of the “orthodox reading” of Kant’s racial theory that invite the objections we’ll look at. And at the end of the chapter, I suggest an alternative approach, the “heterodox” reading, that offers a global contextual analysis and which sees Kant’s theory of race as a cohesive component of his philosophy, since his notion of “Charakteristik” through his account of natural predispositions functions as the unifying link for all the parts of his anthropological thought and has considerable significance for his system as a whole.

When exploring natural history, Kant claims that sometimes causal explanations are insufficient to account for the whole truth and this is why we must call for teleological judgements that attribute ends to nature. From a teleological outlook, there is a fundamental purpose in natural predispositions that form the “Charakteristik” of the human species. This chapter addresses the teleological dimension of the notion of “Charakteristik.” In the 1780s Kant published two further essays on race. “Determination of the Concept of Race” was published in the period in which Kant had already laid the foundations of his critical philosophy, philosophy of history and ethics. After the first essay that based his theory on observation, Kant’s main objective in his second essay is to affirm that observation alone is not sufficient to justify such an important concept as race; we should be guided also by an initial goal that will direct our research. Kant here is responding to his former student, Johann Gottfried Herder, who has rejected his concept of race. Kant now affirms that the concept of race is based on the necessity of the transmission of racial character. It is the purposiveness of germs, which Kant defines as the grounds of a determinate unfolding, that are resting in the nature of plant or animal, and the one “predisposition” that can account for this necessity. Kant’s emphasis on theory over facts provokes another critique, this time from the young anthropologist Georg Forster. Kant then published a third essay in 1788, “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” largely in response to that critique. The essay appears right after the publication of Critique of Practical Reason. Kant responds here to Georg Forster, who accused him of being dogmatic and anti-empiricist. Forster had objected to the primacy of theory over observation, and to the exclusive focus by Kant on skin colour as the sole determinant of race. Kant’s response to Forster insists on the importance of conceptual analysis within a scientific approach, and he states that, without directorial principles, the description is no more than investigation in the dark. Races may not be perceived as a real object in the world but they exist in our mind, and the character of race recommends itself when reason thinks to unite a diversity of generation with the common phylum. Kant will reaffirm that the main “Charakteristik” of the human species, the racial character which is signalled by skin colour, is a necessity and therefore a priori because it allows a difference of character to adjust to different climates through germs and natural predispositions, and at the same time obstructs migrations of characters from a hot climate to a cold one. Here Kant also reiterates his claims about the Native American race and the Negro race who lack a drive to activity and, because all their germs and predispositions have stopped developing, will never transcend their inapt condition, barring them from moral achievement, whereas the White race will continue to develop their moral predispositions. This chapter will show how Kant develops his theory from a scientific to a philosophical understanding of the “Charakteristik,” while providing a philosophical grounding for the two moral claims exposed in Chap. 2.

What is the impact of Kant’s racial theory on his philosophy and political thought? Is Kant a consistent egalitarian or a partisan Universalist thinker? Is he the symbol of racist prejudices of his time? What is the influence of his racial hierarchy on his cosmopolitan right? Or, more simply, is Kant a racist thinker? These are some of the questions that will guide this book. Charles Mills in Kant’s Untermenschen argues that “Kant, as one of the most important philosophers of the modern period…if racist ideas were in turn central to his thought, then this implies a radical rethinking of our conventional narratives of the history and content of Western philosophy.” He posits that Kant’s racial views affect the core argument of his philosophy, including his moral philosophy. He claims that for Kant, because of their racial characteristics, not all biological humans are full humanoid, that is, humans with an equal moral status that meet the condition for full personhood. In his view, Kant’s anthropology distinguishes full persons (White race) who are human beings possessing all the characteristics of full moral status from “sub-persons” [Untermenschen] (Negro race), a kind of human who lacks the requisite for morality. Regarding Mills’ account, this therefore reveals a genuine contradiction between Kant’s anthropology and the orthodox interpretation of his moral and political claims. This introductory chapter provides an overview of what is to come in the following chapters of the book.

In this chapter, our question is that of how exactly to comprehend Kant’s theory of race: both how to go about forming a better interpretation of his theory and more precisely how to appreciate the theory itself. I begin by situating Kant’s theory within the contemporary debate, which defines Kant as an inconsistent or consistent egalitarian. I display the major interpretations of the “orthodox reading” and in the process also uncover the assumptions that underline these interpretations. I argue that although Kleingeld’s interpretation is the most classy “orthodox reading” because it gives Kant an intellectual rebirth certification as it allows him to change his mind on race, it still falls short in providing real evidence for Kant’s rebirth since her analysis misses his notion of “Charakteristik.” Having done this, I expose what I perceive to be the real problems of Kant’s theory and argue that his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is the foundational text of his theory for it not only introduces the content and form of the “Charakteristik,” the notion he will systematize later, but also exposes the two problems that are the cause of so much controversy. These are (1) the completeness of the character of the White race and (2) the dispossession of the character of the beauty and the dignity of the Negro race. Then I demonstrate that the “orthodox reading” has failed because it has adopted an apologetic approach. This approach, I argue, is misrepresentative in some significant respects. It ultimately leads to a failure to note that the notion of “Charakteristik,” which is predetermined by Kant’s conception of natural predispositions, is the cornerstone of the theory. The objective of this chapter is to show that the purpose of the “orthodox reading” is either to defend or to accuse Kant’s racial comments. Neither attempt is of much value in the understanding and interpretation of his theory of race in particular and his anthropology as a whole.

At the end of this book, I can say that Kant’s theory of race is, in fact, a showcase of his conception of human nature(s). It is about multiple natures of the human being because, although my investigation was not directly intended to identify what Kant’s theory of human nature is, the evidences I gathered from the historical analysis of his accounts of natural predispositions suggest that Kant conceived a plurality of human natures within the possibility of a single species. He claimed that there is one human species and yet four races which are physically and morally different and which in turn constitute quite different human natures. The human nature of the White race is characterised by the completeness of their natural predispositions, which allow them to be part of the pragmatic project, the project by which human beings are what they can make of themselves instead of what nature makes of them. However, the pragmatic project is predetermined by natural predispositions of morality, which are possessed only by the White race. The human nature of the White race, because of its predetermined natural predispositions to morality can achieve the ultimate end of nature. That stands in contrast to the human nature of other races and specifically of the Negros race, which is characterised by its dispossession of the character of the “feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature.” The causes of that dispossession are to be found in the will of nature that chose not to favour the development of the predispositions to morality within that specific race. The character of the “feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature” is the distinguishing features between the White race and the Negro race’s human nature. Consequently, the Negro race cannot be part of the pragmatic project, which is precisely about the capacity of a human being to use moral predispositions. If the Negro race cannot use moral predispositions because it lacks them all and that Kant cosmopolitan project is concerned with the development of human natural predispositions, it implies that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is addressing the White race. Therefore, Kant’s theory of human nature(s) is predetermined by his account of the natural predispositions.

Chapter 4 is the beginning of the real exegetical work. A fundamental condition for Kant’s account of the “Charakteristik” of the human species is that of a formal division between descriptive natural history and progressive history of nature. Kant argues for natural history, which designates a science that involves historical movements that have taken place over time, which includes the cause of things. It implies historical changes, and it is also concerned with issues of the origins of the human species. Kant’s account of the human species is therefore concomitant with his wish to differentiate these two methodological approaches. I therefore address Kant’s theory as a scientific understanding of the “Charakteristik” of the human species. I confirm that Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime of 1764 is the foundational book of Kant’s theory because it constitutes the genesis of Kant’s “Charakteristik” thinking. Following this book, Kant wrote his first scientific essay on race in 1775, entitled “Of the Different Races of Human Beings,” which he revised in 1777. The essay is based on methodical observation. Kant defends the unity of the “Charakteristik” of the human species as predetermined by natural predispositions and manifested through different colours of skin that in turn signal four different races. The colour of the skin is the distinctive mark of the character of specific types of human beings (White, Yellow, Red and Black). Thus we talk about the “Charakteristik” of the human species and of the character of the human being. The character of human beings is passed on unfailingly within a given race, and when mixed with another race results in half breeding. Kant claims that there are two origins of the character of the human being: germs and predispositions. They are purposively placed in the original phylum by nature in order to make human beings fit for all climates. However, not all races possess them all or develop them perfectly. The natives of America, for example, have them incompletely, which is why they lack a drive towards activity. Only the White race possesses them all and perfectly. In this chapter, I also show also how Kant’s moral claims developed in Chap. 2 are attached to his scientific notion of “Charakteristik.”

In the seventh and final chapter, I examine the extent to which Kant’s theory impacts his cosmopolitan project and conclude that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is a de facto exclusive form of right (i.e. non-universalist) because of its addressees and content. The investigation into his account of natural predispositions would have already led us to conclude that in Kant’s view only the white race is included in his pragmatic project because it is the only race which possesses all natural predispositions for moral development. From this standpoint, in this chapter I first posit the link between Kant’s racial theory and his cosmopolitanism. Second, I demonstrate that the “orthodox reading” of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with Kant’s account of the development of his natural predispositions and subsequently with his account of human history. To this end, through the understanding of James Tully, who is one the few critics to elaborate a global contextual analysis of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which takes into account not only Towards Perpetual Peace but also Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, I show that the “orthodox reading’s” narrative which sees Kant’s cosmopolitanism as an expression of egalitarian racial theory and anti-colonialism is far removed from Kant’s contextual reality. Two scholars from the “orthodox reading” will serve as examples to prove my point. The first is Pauline Kleingeld, who, although she apprehends correctly that Kant’s final end of history is the full development of human natural predispositions, fails to take the next step and to identify the link between Kant’s conception of race through the development of natural predispositions and his cosmopolitan project. In other words, Kleingeld fails to see that Kant’s account of natural predispositions determines his cosmopolitanism. The second scholar is Lea Ypi, who in her very recent essay “Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy,” published in Kant and Colonialism, argues in line with Kleingeld that Kant changed his mind on his account of germs and predispositions in the 1790s. For Ypi, Kant not only changed the meaning of his natural predispositions, but he also abandoned the notion of germs which was responsible for the development of the moral and physical features of the race. However, she fails to provide evidence in support of her claim. I reject this assumption because it is founded upon a misleading abstraction. I provide evidence which supports my argument that not only did Kant not even once consider changing his account of natural predispositions but also that he continues to elaborate and rely on it well after the period of his presupposed rethinking. Therefore, I conclude that the “orthodox reading” of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is inadequate and misleading. This leads me finally to posit the “heterodox reading,” which demonstrates that Kant’s cosmopolitanism, because it relies on his account of natural predispositions, its addressees and content, is in fact, a de facto exclusive (i.e. non-universal) form of right.

This book proposes an account of the place of the theory of race in Kant’s thought as a central part of philosophical anthropology in his political system. Kant’s theory of race, this book argues, is integral to the analysis of the “Charakteristik” of the human species and determined by human natural predispositions. The understanding of his theory as such suggests not only an alternative reading to the orthodox narrative we have seen so far but also reveals the underlying centrality of the notion of human natural predispositions in a way that is consequential for Kant’s philosophy as a whole. What is the impact of Kant’s racial theory on his philosophy and political thought? Is Kant a consistent egalitarian or a partisan Universalist thinker? Is he the symbol of racist prejudices of his time? What is the influence of his racial hierarchy on his cosmopolitan right? Or more simply, is Kant racist? From a systematic examination of Kant relevant writings, this book provides answers to these questions and shed light on two fundamental problems of his theory of race for moral philosophy, namely: the completeness of the character of the White race and the dispossession of the character of the beauty and the dignity of human nature of the Negro race. These two issues, unperceived from the “orthodox” reading’s perspective, however, uncovered by the “heterodox” reading, not only shape Kant’s race thinking from the beginning to the end of his life, transform his cosmopolitan right into a non-universalist form of right, but merely define Kant as a fundamental racist thinker since he developed the anthropology, the philosophy, and the politics of racism in a systematic way.