Jincheng Li

This book addresses central issues in the philosophy and metaphysics of science, namely the nature of scientific theories, their partial truth, and the necessity of scientific laws within a moderate realist and empiricist perspective. Accordingly, good arguments in favour of the existence of unobservable entities postulated by our best theories, such as electrons, must be inductively grounded on perceptual experience and not their explanatory power as most defenders of scientific realism claim. Similarly, belief in the reality of dispositions such as causal powers which ground the natural necessity of scientific laws must be based on experience. Hence, this book offers a synthetic presentation of an original metaphysics of science, namely a metaphysics of properties, both categorical and dispositional, while at the same time opposing strong versions of necessitarism according to which laws are true in all possible worlds. The main theses and arguments are clearly presented in a non-technical way. Thus, on top of being of interest to the specialists of the topics discussed, it is also useful as a textbook in courses for third year and more advanced university students.

The existence of simultaneous causation has long been a subject of controversy. In the literature, the most direct strategy for defending simultaneous causation has been to appeal to everyday examples in which simultaneous causation are alleged to occur. While earlier discussions offered case-specific defenses, they lacked a systematic account of the full range of possible cases. This article reconstructs and evaluates a largely neglected set of defense strategies developed in Indian Buddhist philosophy, especially within the Sarvāstivāda tradition. First, I distinguish two patterns of simultaneous causation discussed in Buddhist sources: the simultaneous dynamic following pattern and the static equilibrium pattern. I then reconstruct the Buddhist arguments advanced by Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra. Vasubandhu provides the earliest defenses, appealing to counterfactual analysis for the former pattern and to a powers-based account for the latter. Saṃghabhadra develops a genuinely systematic strategy. He first establishes distinctness through a sufficiently fine-grained individuation of the relata, then determines causality by appeal to an interventionalist account, and finally establishes simultaneity on the basis of the causal relation so determined. I argue that Saṃghabhadra’s strategy applies to both patterns and that his account of simultaneity is more successful than those currently popular in the contemporary literature. More generally, the Buddhist discussion reveals an important methodological point: once these two patterns are successfully defended, commitment to simultaneous causation need not depend on the availability of an uncontroversial concrete case.

Can non-existence be perceived? While the answer may seem obviously negative, proving this is not straightforward. This article extracts several arguments for the claim that "non-existence cannot be an object of perception" from the reasoning provided by Saṃghabhadra regarding "non-existence cannot be an object of *buddhi. Two main arguments are reconstructed and both are reductio ad absurdum. The first suggests that if any non-existence could be perceived, all instances of non-existence would be perceived. Combined with Saṃghabhadra's causal theory of perception, this implies that one perception could perceive all instances of non-existence. The second posits that if non-existence were an object of perception, it would result in no perception occurring at all. As a problem-oriented study, this article reconstructs and evaluates Saṃghabhadra's arguments, demonstrating that "non-existence cannot be perceived" is not as easily proved as it appears, and Saṃghabhadra’s insightful arguments, though vulnerable to challenges, hold promise for further defense.

This article examines Saṃghabhadra's theory of simultaneity. Drawing on his account of time, I argue that his system must be taken to entail two types of simultaneity between events/entities: one grounded in their occurring at the same moment, and another grounded in the impossibility of further distinguishing them as earlier or later. I further contend that the latter type of simultaneity shifts with changes in the reference point, whereas the former does not. Thus, Saṃghabhadra affirms both absolute and relative simultaneity. Finally, I analyse the features of these two types and suggest that in his attempt to balance theoretical analysis with experiential considerations, Saṃghabhadra rejects the everyday notion of a global present while maintaining the idea of a local present. This distinctive stance sets his account apart both from everyday thought of simultaneity and from those shaped by special relativity.

The co-existent cause (_sahabhūhetu_) is a type of cause proposed by the Sarvāstivāda school, which arises simultaneously with its effects. However, there is significant disagreement on how define a _dharma_ as the co-existent cause of its effects. One of the central debates revolves around how to interpret the _common effects_ (_*ekaphala_) criterion employed by the Vaibhāṣikas, especially Saṃghabhadra, to define the co-existent cause. Previous studies have largely overlooked Saṃghabhadra’s nuanced application of the concept of _common effects_ when discussing specific cases, leading to various misunderstandings. In this article, I begin by analyzing two main scenarios in which Saṃghabhadra applies the concept in question, identifying two distinct usages: common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects. I then propose an integrated understanding, according to which Saṃghabhadra in fact maintains that if a _dharma_ is the co-existent cause of another by virtue of satisfying the _common effects_ criterion, it must share both common subsequent effects and common simultaneous effects with that _dharma_. On this interpretation, all cases in which Saṃghabhadra explicitly applies the _common effects_ criterion to define co-existent causes can be coherently explained and no counterexamples arise under this understanding. Finally, I extend this understanding to the third scenario and demonstrate its coherence in that context as well.

A number of analytical philosophers have recently endorsed the view that the world itself is indeterminate in some respect. Intriguingly, ideas similar to the view are expressed by thinkers from Chinese Madhyamaka Buddhism, which may shed light on the current discussion of worldly indeterminacy. Using as a basis Chinese Madhyamaka thought, together with Jessica Wilson’s account of indeterminacy, I develop an ontological conception of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy, which centres on two complementary ideas—conclusive indeterminability and provisional determinability. I show that OI is well-equipped to tackle several issues of worldly indeterminacy. My overarching aim is to present a viable and sustainable perspective on the subject of indeterminacy to enrich analytical philosophers’ insights into the intricate nature of reality.