Jing Iris Hu

Some influential scholars in Confucian philosophy argue that roles rather than virtues are at the centre of Confucian ethics. The advocates of this Confucian Role Ethics maintain that roles are not only important for providing ethical guidance for those who fulfil them; roles also constitute the Confucian moral agent. This chapter defends a controversial claim—roles do not constitute moral agency for Confucian women, and nor can they offer sufficient moral guidance; instead, they are supplemented by virtues. The argument for this claim recognizes that, historically, Confucian women, unlike men, experienced—and were educated to expect—a drastic change of roles and social relationships when leaving their maternal family and moving in with their husbands and in-laws. These changes prepared Confucian women to embrace a view of moral agency through which they learn to focus on virtues as a more reliable source of moral guidance than roles.

What is an appropriate response to insults? The question is not only relevant to contemporary discourse but also once piqued the curiosity of thinkers in classical Chinese philosophy. This paper brings Songzi (~382 BCE–~305 BCE), a much-neglected thinker who maintains one should remain indifferent to insults, into the dialogue and discusses how Songzi prompted the Confucian Xunzi to address a long-standing ambiguity within Confucian doctrine. Specifically, the Confucius and Mencius believe that an individual’s internal virtues can shield them from hostile external stimuli, but they also believed that the external environment can and should affect one’s moral life in meaningful ways. In response to Songzi, Xunzi reaffirms the importance of cultivating one’s moral self, including the ability to experience shame in response to one’s own moral lapses, but he also acknowledges that purely external factors can induce negative emotions like shame even in the virtuous.

This chapter advocates for a naturalistic ethical framework that bases normative components in basic human functions, such as emotions, as an effective approach to address intergenerational ethics questions. Using Mencius’s ethical framework as an example, which establishes emotional pivot points to incorporate others’ concerns and worries into moral deliberation, the chapter argues that this approach provides significant theoretical advantages over frameworks that rely on a familial-role-based relational understanding of Confucian ethics and moral cultivation through rituals. The chapter also highlights the flexibility and adaptability of Mencian ethics, which was redeveloped over a thousand years later during the Neo-Confucian flowering and serves as evidence of its philosophical framework’s ability to connect people emotionally and ethically across time.

Is shame an accomplice of external oppressive values or an introspective emotion that reveals one’s true moral character? We track these conflicting intuitions about shame and argue that they point to several understudied social features of shame. We then lay out a more nuanced and inclusive view of shame that accounts for meaningful life-long interactions between self and community. This view emphasizes both personal agency in navigating shame-related experiences and the social challenges to such agency, namely the social structures and values that breed shame for some people while exempting others. We argue that individuals demonstrate their agency in managing the emotion of shame not just through their private attitudes, by accepting, negotiating, or rejecting specific values, but also through social action, by identifying with some communities and distancing themselves from others. In pointing out that shame is a double-edged sword—harmful in ways not discussed before, yet also morally potent by propelling individual agency—we hope to add much-needed complexity to the discussion of shame.

In this chapter, I propose to use the layered structure of a Russian Doll Model initially used by Frans de Waal and some of the most recent and influential empirical studies to interpret ceyin zhi xin. At the core of ceyin zhi xin, I argue, lies the Perceptive-Affective-Motive Triplet that includes perceptive, affective and motivational aspects. The Russian Doll Model helps to illustrate the structure of ceyin zhi xin as containing both the multifaceted triplet as its inner layer and higher cognitive activities—such as long-term memory, taking perspectives other than one’s own, semantic processing and imagination—as its outer layers. These outer layer faculties make the normative and cultural development of ceyin zhi xin possible. The higher cognitive capacities are in close contact and constantly interacting with the triplet. I argue that this model is the best interpretative model for ceyin zhi xin because of its rich support from empirical studies, its emphasis on the interactions of the different aspects of ceyin zhi xin, as well as how it explains the normative and cultural potential of ceyin zhi xin.

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two-part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In this paper, Part 1, I stress the importance of holding an integrated view of the sprouts as consisting of three components: cognitive, affective, and motivational. Through examining scholarly accounts that do not adhere to such a view, I demonstrate why the integrative perspective is necessary for understanding the dynamic nature of human moral potential and the centrality of moral cultivation in Mencian ethics.

Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress.

As a 4th century BCE Confucian text, Mencius provides a rich reflection on moral emotions, such as empathy and compassion, and moral cultivation, which has drawn attention from scholars around the world. This two‐part discussion dwells on the idea of natural moral motivation expressed through the analogy of the four sprouts—particularly the sprout of ceyin zhixin (the heart of feelings others' distress)—as the starting point, the focus, and the drive of moral cultivation. In Part 1, I presented an integrated view of the sprouts as including cognitive, affective, and motivational aspects. In Part 2, I discuss the cultivation and application of natural moral motivation. I illustrate how the sprouts inform moral deliberation and drive moral cultivation, while also being its subject. I also demonstrate how emotional responses are managed and regulated according to the sprouts and discuss why moral cultivation is sometimes unsuccessful.

Seeking an alternative metaphysical view to anthropocentrism, which problematically places humans at the center of nature, Brasovan brings together the Neo-Confucian Wang Fuzhi’s account with ecological humanism. He aims to contribute a view of humans and nature that consists of continuous, dynamic and complex systems. Through critically engaging Brasovan’s account, I discuss Wang’s anti-anthropocentric metaphysics, his qi monism, and the spiritual side of his philosophy. I then criticize Brasovan’s project on two accounts: his categorization of Wang’s qi monism as materialism (with provisos) and his lack of discussion of anthropocentric concepts in Wang’s philosophy. Lastly, I draw the reader’s attention to the rich resources presented by Wang, who witnesses and partakes in the interaction amongst the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions; I also emphasize the significance and promises brought by Brasovan’s approach of engaging Neo-Confucian thinkers with modern philosophical concerns such as the demand of ecological humanism.

This article challenges the pessimistic view that empathy and other fellow feelings are biased and erratic motivation for morality. By discussing Mencius’ account on how to develop empathy from its biased and erratic beginnings, I argue that empathy can be extended to less common objects, such as non-kin, the faraway, the unfamiliar, and the abstract. The extension facilitated by empathy in turn enhances one’s moral cognition toward the sufferings of less common objects; the extension also helps to include less common objects into one’s circle of care. I respond to critics of empathy such as Prinz by highlighting the dynamic cultivational process of empathy that they overlook, and further point out that empathy can be cultivated so as to provide a remedy for the biases that no emotion is immune to. This article contributes to the ongoing discussion on moral cultivation in the Chinese philosophy community and the dispute over empathy’s role in morality in contemporary ethics.