Jinglin Zhou

Conceptual improvements are a significant dimension through which local moral progress occurs, both at the individual and societal levels. Michele Moody-Adams (1999) offers a narrow view of moral progress, suggesting that only a deepened understanding of complex, existing moral concepts can constitute moral progress. Consequently, she views the role of moral philosophy as limited to constructing deeper accounts of these concepts. We broaden Moody-Adams’s (1999) account by identifying three distinct types of conceptual improvements that can constitute moral progress: deepening the understanding of existing concepts, creating new concepts, and enhancing the ability to apply concepts. We support this typology with historical examples where such improvements constituted moral progress. Based on this typology, we argue that the role of moral philosophy extends beyond developing and refining moral theories to include the active creation of new concepts and the facilitation of conceptual application.

Agential moral enhancement refers to the improvement of a moral agent qua moral agent through the application of technology. Anda Zahiu et al. recently argue that virtual reality can support such enhancement by fostering perspective-taking and, in turn, extending empathic concern. In this paper, we build on their proposal by arguing that virtual reality simulations of problematic situations offer a particularly promising pathway to agential moral enhancement. We contend that expanding empathic concern is insufficient for improving moral agency, as morally relevant situations are often characterized by uncertainty and conflicting interests, and empathic motivation alone may not be sufficiently durable. By contrast, we argue that to become morally better, an agent should refine moral beliefs, cultivate deliberative capacity, and develop moral character. Drawing on John Dewey’s theory of moral growth, we argue that exposure to problematic situations is crucial for facilitating these improvements. We further demonstrate that VR holds four distinct advantages over traditional media in simulating such situations and propose two design models for implementing virtual reality moral enhancement. We also examine our approach in light of potential risks and argue for implementation within professionally supervised and safeguarded contexts.

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s article “Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?” offers profound insights grounded in virtue ethics, emphasising that moral improvement should rely on autonomy and practice. The authors’ proposition that traditional methods of moral enhancement hold advantages in terms of both ethical and practical feasibility is well taken. However, their proposed implementation of this approach appears conservative, as the article overlooks the potential of non- biotechnological tools such as artificial intelligence and virtual reality to supplement traditional moral cultivation. Furthermore, the authors propose an exception for bioenhancement in cases of “weakness of will” (akrasia). However, the ambiguous boundaries of this exception could lead to a “slippery slope” whereby the scope of intervention is expanded to the point at which technology gradually substitutes for the internal effort essential to moral growth. Overall, while the article constructs a solid ethical defence in theory, it falls short in demonstrating practical feasibility in an era of advanced technology.

Conceptual improvements are a significant dimension through which local moral progress occurs, both at the individual and societal levels. Michele Moody-Adams () offers a narrow view of moral progress, suggesting that only a deepened understanding of complex, existing moral concepts can constitute moral progress. Consequently, she views the role of moral philosophy as limited to constructing deeper accounts of these concepts. We broaden Moody-Adams’s () account by identifying three distinct types of conceptual improvements that can constitute moral progress: deepening the understanding of existing concepts, creating new concepts, and enhancing the ability to apply concepts. We support this typology with historical examples where such improvements constituted moral progress. Based on this typology, we argue that the role of moral philosophy extends beyond developing and refining moral theories to include the active creation of new concepts and the facilitation of conceptual application.

Scholars have recently debated whether deep brain stimulation (DBS) threatens personal identity. Françoise Baylis advances a relational identity-constitution framework, asserting that the purported threat of DBS to personal identity becomes problematic when identity is viewed through dynamic, narrative, and relational lenses. This paper offers a more nuanced perspective. While we acknowledge the significance of Baylis’s relational identity-constituting framework, we contend that her conclusion warrants further examination. Our analysis reveals that DBS can indeed pose significant challenges to personal identity, specifically by compromising the narrative subject’s capacity to construct their relational identity. From the perspective of the relational identity-constituting approach, we demonstrate that the fundamental issue lies in the disruption of the equilibrium between self-perception and social recognition. Specifically, DBS can disrupt the balance between self-ascription and ascription by others. To address potential identity disruptions caused by DBS, we proposed that identity restoration should focus on two key aspects: enhancing patients’ capacity to construct and internalize coherent life narratives, and strengthening their capacity to engage in meaningful dialogue with others to foster mutual understanding and recognition.

In this paper, we propose incorporating virtual-reality-presented thought experiments (VRTEs) to enhance the quality of undergraduate courses on classic works in applied ethics. Thought experiments are a key method in applied ethics for eliciting intuitions as evidence for or against theories. However, our interviews and surveys show that undergraduates often struggle with imagination deficiencies, add undescribed details, apply pre-endorsed theories, lack seriousness, and show disinterest when reading written thought experiments, hindering their engagement and critical thinking. We argue that VRTEs may mitigate these challenges by providing concrete visualisations, immersive experiences, embodiment, interactivity, and controlled reaction times. Feedback from our pilot practice indicates that VRTEs have the potential to mitigate these challenges. To enhance the benefits, we recommend allowing sufficient time for the development of VRTEs and alternating between traditional paper-based teaching and VRTE sessions. We also address potential objections to our teaching approach.

As science and technology advance, human civilization is confronting existential crises such as the depletion of resources, climate change, and the use of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, many bioethicists are proactively exploring the utilization of biomedical technology to improve human morality and overcome ethical challenges associated with scientific progress. Moral bioenhancement can be categorized into two types: moral-motivational enhancement and moral-cognitive enhancement. However, every proposed method of moral bioenhancement has raised both technical and ethical concerns. This article sequentially reviews the two categories of technical means for moral bioenhancement, illustrate their shortcomings, and briefly analyze the potential direction of moral enhancement with an eye to the current progress in artificial intelligence.

In this article, I explore the method of genealogy in moral philosophy, with a focus on evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments. Despite genealogy becoming a new trend in this field, I critique three types of defective grand narrative genealogies represented by the works of Peter Railton, Michael Huemer, and Nicholas Smyth. I argue that their genealogies fail to be adequate for evaluating moral progress judgments’ credibility. Railton’s genealogy lacks specificity regarding the relatum of the causal story he presents, Huemer’s fails to withstand the scrutiny of historical evidence, and Smyth’s gives no clear verdict on the credibility of the moral progress judgments it explains. These failures, I argue, stem from grand narratives’ neglect of the particularities in each case of moral belief emergence. The disregard for details renders grand narratives generally inadequate for credibility evaluation. Instead, I propose a case study approach that takes into account four types of particulars in each case. I argue that this approach is more methodologically adequate in evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments since these case-specific details are essential in determining the credibility of a moral belief.