Jingsi Teng

This project examines Derek Parfit’s (1984) non-identity problem, which suggests that our actions cannot harm future people if they would not exist without those actions. David Boonin’s (2014) non-identity argument proposes that if distant future people’s lives are worth living, our current actions, such as burning fossil fuels and causing climate change, cannot be bad for them. This argument relies on the person-affecting view, which is the belief that an action can only be bad if it is bad for some particular person(s). Therefore, if an action does not affect any particular person(s), it cannot be considered a harm. Boonin’s argument has led to a knotty problem: if we cannot appeal to the harm our actions do to future people who would not otherwise exist if we acted in other ways, it is difficult to explain why certain actions of that sort are wrong. Philosophers have proposed three strategies to confront it: accept the conclusion that no one is harmed, reject the person-affecting view, or accept the person-affecting view but reject the conclusion that no one was harmed. I offer a solution by attacking the person-affecting view and proposing a non-person affecting type of harm called “group-affecting harm” or “group harm”. The idea is that even though our actions cannot harm any particular person(s), they can harm particular groups of people. These groups of people can be harmed by climate change even if our actions do not make any of their particular members worse off than they otherwise would have been. I argue that groups of people are independent entities over and above the mere aggregate of their constituents and can also have their own interests and well-being that can be improved or diminished. Therefore, even when our actions affect what people come to exist and change the membership of certain groups, those actions can still harm the groups themselves, which gives us strong reasons not to act in those ways.

On a business-as-usual policy, it seems inevitable that people in the distant future will live in a world with a more harmful climate. But can we really harm distant future people? If so, to what extent can we harm them? Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem (1984) has been taken by other scholars, such as David Boonin (2014), to support the idea that, as long as distant future people’s lives are still worth living (though harsh), they cannot be harmed generally since shutting down our business-as-usual would eliminate their very existence in the future. John Nolt (2018) counterargues that they can still be harmed if some of the consequences of our business-as-usual makes them worse off, although they benefit in general. In this paper I aim to show how these contemporary theories fail to fully account for the harm we may do to distant future people. Their mere focus on the concreteness of harm has missed something morally relevant. To address this, I argue that “endangering someone” also counts towards “harm”, since it causes the reasonable expectation of injury or death occurring, practically boosts the process of making people worse off, and negatively impacts the victim’s interest not to be endangered. Therefore, distant future people will start to be “invisibly” harmed once they are exposed to reasonably expectable worse-off situations, such as climate change, energy shortage, and environmental degradation in the future, before actual consequences occur.

In this book a voice opposing Confucianism has been criticized by Confucians who engage in the preservation of traditional values of Chinese culture. The key issue is whether the concept of concealment between relatives (qinqin xiangyin 親親相隱) should have a place in modern legislative systems. Two opposing camps accuse each other of having a narrow and short-sighted perspective. Confucians hold that people should have a higher tolerance of the crimes committed by their family members than of those committed by strangers. They claim that mutual concealment follows from the virtue of benevolence (ren 仁), the essential element of Confucian morality. However, the traditional point of view, namely that people ought to protect their biological relatives as much as they can even if it is against the law to do so, has been challenged by anti-Confucians. This is because they see the potential for corruption within Confucian theory.