Jinyu Sun

Avia Pasternak argues that intentional citizens who are genuine participants of their state should share the liability for state wrongdoings. In real-world states, how prevalent is intentional citizenship? This commentary concerns the application of the theoretical model. I argue that there are two problems with Pasternak’s proposal of testing intentional citizenship in reality. First, the difficulty of distinguishing citizens’ ambiguous internal attitudes towards their citizenship is underestimated. Second, the objective aspect of citizens’ status in society, namely, the way they are treated by their state, is more important than their subjective attitudes, but this aspect is neglected by Pasternak.

The book Just Hierarchies: Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World by Daniel A. Bell and Pei Wang aims to answer the following question: 'Should morally justifiable social hierarchies structure our social lives on an everyday basis, including our relations with loved ones?' Bell and Wang respond positively. In this article, I mainly focus on the relations between intimates, examining the arguments from the perspective of social egalitarianism and feminism. Bell and Wang argue that hierarchies involving shifting roles are justified, but I shall argue that the defence of hierarchy in intimate relations is not completely convincing. First, the authors mistake hierarchical societies for hierarchical organisations. I will explain why this conflation is detrimental to the defence of hierarchies. Second, the authors neglect to mention some of the significant moral wrongs perpetuated by hierarchical systems. A hierarchy such as a caste system not only fixes inferior and superior positions but also conveys demeaning messages to those who are lower in rank. In addition, we also need to consider the macro-background of specific interpersonal hierarchies to be able to make sense of the wrongs of intimate hierarchies. Third, the practical implications of the defence of intimate hierarchies are ambiguous. I argue that, ultimately, the authors are not able to defend what they set out to defend at the very beginning of the book.

Why should (or should not) we have a system of different states that each claim both internal and external sovereignty? How can the state gain its legitimate authority to rule? What is the problem with the ideal of the ‘global citizen’? How should states respond to different groups’ secession claims? To what extent should states have the right to control their borders? If one finds such questions intriguing, one should read Anna Stilz’s book Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration. Stilz argues that a system of territorial states serves to protect important values – occupancy, basic justice and collective self-determination – which are key to living an autonomous life. I focus on the theory’s implication for the debates on border control. I contend that Stilz’s arguments still have difficulties grounding the state’s right to exclude would-be immigrants. That said, the book has done a great job in providing a liberal theoretical framework for us to reflect upon citizenship, immigration, succession claims, cosmopolitan ideals, the colonial legacy and disputes over borders and resources.