Jiyao Tang

This essay argues for a rational agency account of transparent self-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge, the second-order knowledge of one's intentional and cognitive mental states, is grounded on one's first-order understanding of the relevant world-oriented question. My account improves on the previous transparency theories developed by Richard Moran and others in three respects: (1) it accounts for the epistemic warrant of transparent self-knowledge missing from Moran's view; (2) it extends to self-knowledge of other rational beliefs, whereas most existing theories only apply to deliberation-based self-knowledge; (3) it avoids the charge of “voluntarism” since it does not postulate a rational capacity of “deciding what to believe.” My account also comes with far-reaching implications. Most importantly, it will be the upshot of my argument that second-order self-knowledge is constitutive of the very first-order understanding of the world. Moreover,I suggest that at least in the paradigmatic cases, self-knowledge is primarily about one's understanding and knowledge, rather than one's belief, as scholars have commonly assumed.

The goal of this essay is a twofold one. My first task is mainly negative: I want to show that the heated debate over whether pleasure is a sensation misallocates the central task in understanding pleasure and has been based on an unexamined conception of sensation, despite the long philosophical tradition and topical opinions that hold the opposite . My second task is to bring out attention to a relatively uncharted territory in our investigation of pleasure. I shall argue, Gilbert Ryle's Aristotelian insight on the pleasure in intelligent activities, when properly understood, should have led us, and Ryle himself, to investigate pleasure in connection with intentional action and practical rationality.